DISSENT

"The populations of East and West, misled by stubborn governments in search of prestige and corrupted by official experts, bent on retaining their posts, tamely acquiesce in policies which are certain to end in nuclear war.

"Kennedy and Khrushchev, Adenauer and de Gaulle, Macmillan and Gaitskell are pursuing a common aim: the ending of human rights.

"You, your families, your friends and your countries are to be exterminated by the common decision of a few brutal but powerful men. To please these men, all private affections, all the public hopes, all that has been achieved in art and knowledge and thought, and all that might be achieved thereafter is to be wiped out forever."

—*BERTRAND RUSSELL*

The West-Coast Waterfront	**HARVEY SWADOS**
Schlesinger and the New Deal	**JACOB COHEN**
The Perils of History	**HENRY M. PACHTER**
The Cost of Freedom Rides	**WILLIAM GOLDSMITH**

AUTUMN 1961 **75c**

DISSENT

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Nuclear Diplomacy

"American nuclear power can reduce Soviet society to smoldering ruins and leave the wretched survivors shocked, starving, and diseased. The Soviet Union can, it is coolly estimated, kill between thirty and seventy million Americans. Such a war would not be followed by reconstruction. It would be followed by a savage struggle for existence as the survivors crawled out of their shelters, and the American republic would be replaced by a stringent military dictatorship trying to keep some kind of order among the desperate survivors. . . .

"This being the nuclear age it is the paramount rule of international politics that a great nuclear power must not put another great nuclear power in a position where it must choose between suicide and surrender. And the corollary of this rule is that no great nuclear power must put itself in a position where it has made such absolute and such rigid stipulations that it can no longer negotiate an honorable and tolerable accommodation."

Walter Lippmann, New York Herald Tribune Sept. 13, 1961

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A QUARTERLY OF SOCIALIST OPINION

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As He So Plainly Put It!

"Should any of the states, in the present-day conditions, resume nuclear-weapons tests, it is not difficult to imagine the consequences of this act. Other states possessing the same weapons would be forced to take the same road. An impulse would be given to resume nuclear-arms testing of any capacity, under any conditions, and unlimited by anything. The government which would be the first to begin the nuclear-weapons tests would take upon itself a heavy responsibility before the peoples. . . . Should any side violate the obligations to which it has committed itself, the instigators of such violations will cover themselves with shame, and they will be condemned by the peoples of the world."
—Premier Khrushchev in speeches to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. on Jan. 4 and 14, 1960.

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Journal of the Quarter

AGAINST NUCLEAR TESTING!

We propose
- that the United States announce to the world that it will not follow the lead of the Soviet Union in resuming tests of nuclear weapons;
- that, after setting this example of conscience, the United States then conduct a world-wide campaign (through the UN, diplomatic channels and agencies of popular expression) to bring moral and political pressure to bear upon the Soviet Union and France to cease their testing;
- that the United States declare that it will refrain from nuclear testing no matter what any of the other powers may do.

•

When the Soviet Union resumed its testing of nuclear weapons, it was a catastrophe for mankind. When the United States announced several days later that it would start underground testing—it is not yet clear, at the time of writing, whether atmospheric tests will also be undertaken—the catastrophe was compounded. The world thereby moves closer to rationalized insanity; closer to total annihilation; closer to the maiming and destruction of generations unborn.

All previous wars affected mainly those alive, but the "war of the testers" is an act of terror directed against the men and women of tomorrow. Dr. Glenn Seaborg, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, "told Congress today that a Soviet explosion of one 100-megaton bomb would produce 60 per cent as much radioactive debris as did all the atomic tests from 1945 through 1958." (New York *Times,* Sept. 9, 1961). The dispatch continues: "Meanwhile, some persons in the nuclear weapons field were reliably reported to be campaigning for the United States to develop a 1000-megaton bomb, thus topping Premier Khrushchev's threat to test a 100-megaton 'super-bomb.' "

This is sheer madness. Perfecting weapons 5,000 times as powerful as the bomb that ravaged Hiroshima, and then retaliating with weapons 50,000 times as powerful, weapons that can kill and overkill cities, countries, perhaps continents—this can no longer be regarded as "defense," a part of the cold war, an assault upon the nerves of the enemy. Each side now has enough weapons to destroy the other, and from a military point of view

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there is small profit in developing still larger and more destructive nuclear weapons. People can be killed only once.

Not only is the resumption of nuclear testing an outrage against the generations to come, it is also a major step in the drift toward atomic war. The new arms race will be more diabolical than ever, because it will come after the breakdown of the moratorium upon tests and after the failure of the Geneva negotiations. The new arms race will expose the world to the enormous danger that several additional countries, and in time perhaps a dozen or fifteen, will test and hold nuclear weapons.

FOR A FEW DAYS after the Russian announcement, it appeared that the Kennedy administration might be prepared to take the radical and courageous step of a principled refusal to proceed with further testing. Such a step would have had incalculable moral and political repercussions throughout the world; it would surely have dealt grave damage to the claims and prestige of the Soviet bloc. But alas, the Kennedy administration, on this issue as on so many others, has lacked the courage of its imagination. It quite properly asked Khrushchev to rescind the decision of the Soviet Union to pursue atmospheric testing; but its request was compromised by its previous failure to protest with equal vehemence against French nuclear testing; and even before the Russians answered, it announced that the United States would itself resume underground testing, thereby sadly weakening its case against the Russians and raising doubts as to the sincerity of its original protest. The attitude in Washington seems to have been mainly one of trying to squeeze some momentary political advantage out of the Russian move (though even this was not done with much skill), rather than coping with a grave moral challenge to all mankind. Now underground testing is of course to be preferred to atmospheric testing, if only to diminish the terrifying dangers of radioactive fallout. But the announcement that America would begin underground testing was hardly a step calculated to strengthen or dramatize the case against the Russian decision.

In this instance, as in regard to a good many domestic problems, the Kennedy administration has behaved in a style that makes liberalism indistinguishable from caution and caution indistinguishable from conservatism. Russell Baker, a New York *Times* Washington correspondent, writes in regard to domestic issues: "Instead of going to the country to build popular support for his programs, Mr. Kennedy has followed a policy of personal contacts with Congressmen and leaned heavily on the devices of quiet political infighting." Such a policy, as all our experience suggests, yields neither a satisfactory program of liberal legislation nor a public educated and aroused to an awareness of issues. Domestically, it has led to the killing of the school bill and an evasion of major problems. In foreign policy it has led to the loss—though not yet an irremediable loss—of a great opportunity to win the leadership of everyone who is appalled by the idea of further nuclear testing.

To be sure, a decision by the Kennedy administration to refrain from nuclear testing would mean a bitter attack from the Republicans, from every conservative and reactionary force in the country—and this at a time when, partly because of the ad-

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ministration's shrewd pusillanimity, the political right is alert and combative while the liberals are scattered and silent. But it would have been—it could still be—an issue worthy of battle. For here the United States could recoup many of the losses suffered because of a reactionary or muddled foreign policy. Here the United States could not merely take advantage of a profoundly important issue, it could contribute positively, through deeds and not merely public "images," to the very survival of mankind.

A POLICY of not testing nuclear weapons would involve dangers: it would be silly to deny that. Unless one is a pacifist, one must at least consider the military consequences. But given the massed capacities of both sides for mutual annihilation, the policy of not testing would serve to strengthen all those throughout the world who wish to oppose Communist authoritarianism in behalf of democratic values. Such a policy could be decisive on *political* grounds; and it is here, not in the maniacal multiplication of terror weapons, that the issue will be decided.

There is still time for a change in American policy. Will the liberals speak out? Will anything be heard from the Harvard contingent in the Kennedy administration? Will the labor movement have anything to say? Will those young people who have recently been stirred to social action on the segregation problem now respond to this one?

It has been fashionable, though often mistaken, for some time now to say that there are no longer clear-cut issues. Well, now there is one.

I. H.

THE G. S.

"It is only men of ardent minds who are fit for difficult tasks."
—PALMERSTON

The New York newspapers called him "Dag," but no one else dared to address the Secretary General of the United Nations by any but his father's name. In referring to him, diplomats, personnel, newspapermen, and underlings knowingly said "the G.S." or reverently "He." For eight years the lonesome man, aloof on the 38th floor of the East River palace, who had been hired to run the technical apparatus of the world diplomatic meeting place, was everything the United Nations may ever stand for. His vision went far beyond his mandate and he construed the Charter, the resolutions of the Security Council and his job in broader terms than the founders dared write into the articles. The Secretariat itself under him became—from a refuge for New Deal and Popular Front survivors—the nucleus of an international civil service whose members have forgotten which country they came from.

The membership of nations all but doubled and nearly realized the Secretary's principle of "universality,"

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shifting the power balance in the Assembly from the bigger, older, more advanced nations to the smaller, younger, less developed countries. He hoped that in the long run this development, despite its initial unpleasantness, would free the Secretary from big power dictation, and the United Nations from being the cockpit of big power antagonisms.

His systematic effort to strengthen the voice and weight of the small, uncommitted nations received involuntary help from the frequent stalemates in the Security Council where the big power veto eventually defeated its purpose. It happened that after such an inconclusive Council meeting the G.S. simply would announce what he was going to do, with or without much of a mandate, and the big powers, afraid of the responsibility, were glad that he assumed the role which they eventually came to begrudge him. Thus he gave the small nations, which of themselves have little power, an opportunity to impose their moral pressure for causes often transcending their narrow interests. While he was using them to give the Secretary functions he never was intended to have, he educated them in their wise use. To make them stronger for the role he had assigned to them, the G. S. created an economic underpinning which at the same time armed the Secretariat with some sinews of war—money to spend for projects of industrial development. He also created the first international police forces under international command.

The details may be controversial and the result dubious, but the principle of a UN force—as used in Sinai and in the Congo—was established. This is what counted for Hammarskjold. He even went farther: his action against Lumumba and his action against Tshombe constituted direct intervention by the UN in the internal affairs of a country. In defending Hammarskjold, Madame Bandaranaike, prime minister of Ceylon, said: "The UN had no choice . . . the province was standing in the way of unifying the Congo. We also suspect that its actions were engineered by foreign interests . . . it is in line with our policy that the UN should take steps to stamp out these vestiges of reaction." The Charter does not say that the UN should, or even is permitted, to do any of these things. By assuming these responsibilities, Hammarskjold filled the indifferent form of the UN with content and direction; the small nations now could make the UN cause their cause, and the G.S. became their shield and sword. In this venture he encountered the wrath of Khrushchev. Not the specific defeat which Hammarskjold had inflicted on Soviet imperialism in the Congo, but rather its principle—the emergence of a powerful new force, this threat of a law above the nations, this prospect of a bulwark defending small nations —brought Khrushchev's shoe on the table.

But the uncommitted nations made poor use of the opportunity which Hammarskjold offered them. They accepted his help as coming to them because of their past suffering, but not as a program on which to build a new world. Whenever their short-term interests or views differed from the interest of the world organization, they deserted him. He could not persuade Nasser to allow the passage of Israeli ships through the Canal; he could not hold together the UN force in the Congo, and could not impose his policies on aides who still were controlled

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by the governments which had "loaned" them. Eventually he was forced into a "deal" with the Casablanca powers; in order to buy their continued support for his farther-reaching plans, he had to conduct a policy which took him even farther away from his original conceptions. Never before had the United Nations started military action; instead of separating the combatants, its troops became the instrument of one side in a civil war.

We are not concerned here with the question of right or wrong; nor is it necessarily a bad thing that Hammarskjold, after giving offense to the Russians and thereby earning the applause of the U.S. press, now became unpopular with that same press. We are concerned, however, and deeply moved by the dialectics of power which struck back at Hammarskjold in this episode. More lonely than ever, he now was trying to force on the reluctant Africans the solution which he held was right, not only for Africa, but for the United Nations. Here is real tragedy — a terrible hubris which perverted the original aim into the pursuit of opposite means, and a fall which seems so logical a denouement that—contrary to the stereotype most used in his eulogies—one is tempted to speak of his timely death.

DAG HAMMARSKJOLD was a man of old, aristocratic Europe, but in his vision he was a man of tomorrow. His diplomatic methods were "quiet," in his own word, which was a polite synonym for secret. In an age of mass communications he had to operate on a stage where the primadonnas of propaganda rhetoric were running an uninhibited show—and often had to help them down from their self-imposed pedestals. His work was to reconcile the irreconcilables; to win power without starting out from power; to organize a world which wanted to live in turmoil; to please a hundred masters and to be bigger than all of them.

He came to his job with nothing but one of the best minds available among suitably neutral diplomats; after a few years he was filled with a sense of mission which sometimes led him into righteousness; the more difficult his position became in his later years, the firmer did he grasp the truth of his Quixotism. He may have lost the ground under one foot, but he never the lost the stars from his eye's glance.

H. P.

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THE SOCIALIST DILEMMA IN EUROPE

H. Stuart Hughes

For a full decade now—for a span of years that is gradually coming into focus as a historical epoch in its own right—the major countries of Western Europe have been living under conservative rule. This situation has created new and unanticipated problems in the functioning of democratic institutions. More particularly, it has raised an agonizing dilemma for the chief forces of loyal, constitutional opposition —the Social Democratic and Labor parties.

The turn toward conservatism came first in Italy. By his crushing electoral victory over the Communist-Socialist bloc in April 1948, Prime Minister Alcide de Gasperi inaugurated a period of Christian Democratic rule that has persisted ever since. A year and a half later, the new state of Western Germany was launched under similar auspices; here also government by Christian Democrats has proved unshakable. In June 1951, the French electorate for the first time since the war sent a conservative majority to the National Assembly. The following autumn, the British did the same thing. In the British case the reversal proved decisive: the narrow Conservative majority of 1951 was steadily enlarged in succeeding elections. In France the trend to the right appeared to be temporarily checked by fifteen months of Socialist rule in 1956 and 1957. But this government in fact existed on conservative sufferance, and on the crucial issues of colonial policy—Suez and Algeria—it followed a nationalist and imperial course. The coming to power of De Gaulle in 1958 reaffirmed a drift toward conservative solutions that had already been apparent for seven years.

The result of this succession of conservative triumphs has been a "one and a half" party system. On the surface it tends toward the two-party norm which Anglo-Saxons have traditionally considered ideal. And in all fairness one must grant that it marks a simplification of the multi-party competition which vexed European democracy in the interwar period and was at least partially responsible for the turn to fascist solutions in the 1930s. But the real point about the evolution of the 1950s and 1960s has not been its gradual elimination of minor parties as serious contenders. It has rather been the creation of a two-party system with a crucial difference—a hybrid state of affairs in which one of the parties seems to stand almost no chance of electoral victory.

The outlines of this paradoxical situation first appeared in Germany.*

* Otto Kirchheimer, "Notes on the Political Scene in Western Germany," *World Politics*, VI (April 1954), pp. 317-318.

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As Chancellor Adenauer's Christian Democrats raised their electoral margin every four years—as the Social Democrats lost in 1949, 1953, and 1957 (and seemed destined to lose once again in 1961)—it began to appear that the steady squeezing out of lesser contenders was not having the expected effect of equalizing the two major parties. The near-disappearance of the Communists and the Refugees, the German Party and even the Free Democrats, as important electoral formations simply strengthened Adenauer's existing lead. Two years later a similar tendency became evident in Britain. By 1959, after three successive electoral defeats—and four elections in which the Labor party had lost seats—Hugh Gaitskell began to lament that something "almost unprecedented in British political history" seemed to be occurring.

In France and Italy the electoral evolution of the 1950s did not follow so neat a pattern. For one thing, the existence of strong Communist parties, which remained quarantined from participation in government while still commanding more than one-fifth the popular vote, kept a large segment of the electorate from effective political influence. In Italy this situation of "frozen" leftist votes was reinforced by the fellow-traveling attitude of the main body of the Socialists. From 1948 to 1956 Italy languished in a condition approaching one-party rule in which no effective opposition was possible. It was not until the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolution shocked the Italian Socialists out of their alliance with Communism that Italian politics began to approach the "one and a half party" norm. Since then, with each succeeding Socialist party congress, the evidence has been mounting of a slow but irreversible separation of Italian Socialism from Communist entanglement. In the past two years, it has begun to function as a constitutional "half party" opposition to Christian Democracy's dominance of public life.

In France the advent of De Gaulle brutally upset the whole complicated chequer-board of party relationships. Traditional alignments and cleavages seemed lost in a monotonous uniformity of Gaullist allegiance. More recently the outlines of a constitutional opposition have begun to appear. And once again, as in the other major countries of Western Europe, the chief elements of this opposition have been Socialist—whether it be the cautious and qualified anti-Gaullist stand of Guy Mollet's official Socialism, or the far weaker but more militant "autonomous" Socialism of André Philip and Mendès-France. In either case the evolution toward a one and a half party situation has begun.

•

How are we to explain a state of affairs in which conservative parties and movements have not only held on to power but enhanced that power for a decade and more? This would not be so surprising if the social situation in the countries in question had been stable or only gradually altering. In fact, however, the past decade has seen very rapid economic and social changes. The great paradox of Western European society and politics is that the parties which apparently resist change are

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doing well while the parties with a vested ideological interest in change are doing badly.

Very briefly, what has been happening in Western Europe during the past few years has been a vast speed-up in a long-term shift toward a mobile, undifferentiated, and consumer-oriented society resembling that of the United States. The conservative parties have learned how to adjust to this change. Coming to power just as the great shift was beginning, they soon discovered how to exploit the new social trends. They have accepted the welfare state; they have fostered the tendencies toward conformity that a mobile society brings with it; they have systematically encouraged the corresponding turn from ideological and political involvement—the apathy, the "privatization" of life, the blurring of ideological distinctions, the mounting suspicion that political debate is not very important, and the tendency to keep the larger public issues from general discussion. Above all, the conservatives have known how to identify themselves with the undeniable fact of economic prosperity.

In contrast, European Socialists have seemed disoriented and bewildered. Their political footwork has been slower than that of the conservatives—indeed, it is frequently the Socialists themselves whose instinctive responses have appeared the more conservative of the two. And it is true that the Socialist parties in general have a longer and more continuous institutional history than the various conservative formations. On the Continent the abrupt changes of regime during the past half century, more particularly the experience of fascism and the Second World War, broke up or demoralized the parties of the Right; in Britain alone there was no break in Conservative continuity. The Socialists, however—even when they were operating underground or in exile—never completely lost the sense of a functioning political machine. In this respect, their parties are the oldest and most routine-minded in Europe. *As machines,* they are conservative by definition.

And yet to pile on a counter-paradox, the Socialists alone seem able to muster a significant opposition following. They may be functioning as only half a party, but no other democratic opposition has been able to win more than an insignificant fraction of the electorate. Socialism may be old and unexciting, but it offers the alternative that the politically disaffected naturally turn to when they want a change from conservative rule. All efforts to build progressive parties on a non-Socialist basis have failed, from Mendès-France's attempt in the mid 1950s to modernize the French Radical party to the constantly disappointed predictions that British Liberalism is about to make an electoral comeback. Mendès' eventual decision—after the advent of De Gaulle—to unite his shrunken forces with those of the Autonomous Socialists, was an act of simple political realism. The opposition to conservative rule had to be Socialist if it was to exist at all.

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IN TRYING TO TAKE ACCOUNT of this puzzling situation of semi-permanent exclusion from power together with an unchallenged role

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as *the* constitutional opposition, the Socialist parties of Western Europe have proposed two widely contrasting solutions. They have agreed on the factual analysis of their plight. Nearly all discerning Socialists have recognized that the central practical problem for their parties is to break out of the confined circle of almost hereditary Socialist allegiance which on the Continent has restricted them to between 35 and 15 per cent of the vote.

This problem goes back as far as the 1890s, when a few far-seeing Socialists of strongly democratic loyalties like Eduard Bernstein realized that the Marxian prediction of the proletariat increasing to become the majority of mankind would never be realized; in advanced industrial societies the percentage of factory hands would remain stable or actually fall—it was the white-collared and clerical, rather, whose numbers were rising. Hence a new type of appeal to reassure the peasantry and the small middle class was required. The succeeding decades brought no clear solution for this difficulty. Indeed, they intensified the earlier problems. The secession of the Communists after 1917 meant an irreplaceable loss from an already inadequate following. Postwar conditions pushed Socialist parties into power prematurely and without the parliamentary majority that was essential if they were actually to put their program into effect; government by Socialists in Germany in 1918 and 1928, in Britain in 1924 and 1929, and, most crucially, in France with the Popular Front government of 1936, brought disillusion rather than a sense of accomplishment—a loss rather than a reinforcement of popular following. But a full-scale re-examination of Socialist assumptions was never undertaken. It was not until the apparently far more favorable circumstances of the second postwar era had once again ended in disappointment that European Socialism began the examination of conscience that had been on its agenda for more than half a century.

The first (and more widely accepted) of the currently proposed solutions has been that of British Labor and the German Social Democrats. These have traditionally been the largest, the most influential, and the most conservative of European Socialist parties. In the autumn of 1959 both of them at last made explicit the departure from the hallowed Socialist goals that had long underlain their day-to-day political activity. They virtually scrapped the standard central plank of all Socialist programs; they demoted the collectivization of the basic means of production —the nationalization of industry—from its position at the pinnacle of Socialist goals to a merely auxiliary (and unessential) status among a number of possible devices for economic control. They all but eliminated the idea of class struggle from their public pronouncements, and they aligned themselves unequivocally with the foreign policy of their national governments, pledging support for an alliance with the United States based on the protection of thermonuclear weapons.

In the two countries the ideological change differed markedly in tone and content. In Britain the meeting at Blackpool was held in the shadow of the third of Labor's successive electoral defeats, and the mood was one of somber reflection on past errors. Moreover, the party was not

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fully united behind its official leaders, and Gaitskell and his allies did not obtain a clear-cut victory. Although at Blackpool Gaitskell staked his party leadership—and won—on his insistence that Labor repeal the clause in its party constitution pledging the eventual nationalization of all means of production, distribution, and exchange, he was subsequently obliged to accept a compromise formulation. And on foreign policy, the disaffection of the party's left wing counselled a similar caution; the storm was already brewing that in the following year seemed about to sweep Gaitskell himself from authority.

In the autumn of 1959 the German Social Democrats, midway between elections, were recovering confidence after their defeat two years earlier, and they were trying to put themselves in a good position for the election of 1961. Hence there was a bounce and aggressiveness about them which British Labor understandably lacked. Moreover, the Germans were troubled neither by a vociferous left wing nor by the memory of a period in power which had to be rationalized and defended. This was particularly important in the matter of nationalization. The German Social Democrats had never held national office since the Second World War; they had not passed through British Labor's experience of actually carrying out a collectivist policy in the half-decade immediately following the war; they did not need to grapple with the British problem of whether to renationalize those branches of the economy—notably steel and road transport—which the Tories had subsequently returned to private ownership. The German rejection of nationalization, then, was less equivocal than the British. In its recognition of the virtues of free enterprise, the new Social Democratic program voted at Bad Godesberg rose to almost lyric heights. "Competition as much as possible—planning only as much as necessary" was a slogan calculated to dismay the party faithful. To the uncommitted, on the other hand, the program suggested moderation and class reconciliation. It pledged a "new political style of honesty, of objectivity, of cooperation, of synthesis." And the following year, by its decision to pass over the older party leaders and to present the young and "dynamic" Willy Brandt as Social Democracy's candidate for the chancellorship, the party once again recognized the value of electoral sex appeal. It proposed to take advantage of Brandt's position as mayor of West Berlin in offering the public a Social Democratic image of patriotism and orthodoxy in the Cold War.

In France Guy Mollet is apparently trying to lead the larger wing of French Socialism along the same path on which Gaitskell and Brandt have been moving in Britain and in Germany. He agrees with them that nationalization and class warfare should no longer be emphasized, and that the new respectability of European Socialism can be most profitably expressed through giving bi-partisan support to the Atlantic Pact. He seems to believe as Brandt and Gaitskell do that the way to adjust to the present European evolution toward an American-type society is to convert European Socialism into a catch-all welfare-state movement, with fluid ideological boundaries, rather like the Democratic party in the United States.

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The alternative solution for resolving the Socialists' current difficulties is both less clear-cut and less influential than that proposed by Gaitskell, Brandt and Mollet. Its chief proponents are the left wing of British Labor, the militantly oppositionist fraction of French Socialism that calls itself "autonomous" or "unified," and the majority organization of the Italian Socialist party. In Italy alone—for special reasons of history and temperament—this second body of opinion within European Socialism holds a predominant position.

THE MOST ARRESTING distinction between the Socialist Left and the most powerful moderate current is on foreign and military policy. As opposed to the nearly unqualified support that the official leaders of British and German Socialism give to the foreign policy of Macmillan and Adenauer, the Socialist Left is worried and disaffected. But it is far from clear about the substitute it would offer. While the majority of left Socialists argue for retention of the Atlantic alliance in modified form, some of the French are frank neutralists. The Italians for the most part restrict themselves to opposing the stationing of American nuclear weapons on their country's soil. The British—drawing on the popular enthusiasm mobilized by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament—advocate Britain's unilateral renunciation of thermonuclear weapons and the closing down of American bases in Europe. In the autumn of 1960 they actually succeeded in winning a majority in the party congress—until their position was reversed by the votes of Labor members of Parliament who remained loyal to Gaitskell. Yet for all its militancy, British Labor's left wing does not explicitly spurn the "defense umbrella" of nuclear retaliation launched from the United States. Obviously this is a question that it has not completely mastered. Throughout Western Europe, the logic of the left Socialist position is either a neutrality sympathetic to America or a new type of Atlantic Pact pledged to defend Europe by conventional weapons alone. But most of the adherents of Socialism's left wing have not reached that far in their thinking. While they argue that their countries' present foreign policy is dangerous and mistaken, they have not yet found an unambiguous substitute for it.

On the domestic front, the lack of full-scale rethinking is at least as apparent. Most left Socialists are unwilling to discard the old battle cries of nationalization and class warfare. But they have difficulty explaining why they feel this way. They suspect that men like Gaitskell and Brandt are engaging in a "sell-out" of traditional Socialism. At the same time the better economic heads among them have absorbed enough of Keynes to have lost their faith in the panacea of nationalization, and any honest left Socialist must recognize that class lines are far less sharp in Europe today than they were a generation ago. Very often the rhetoric of left Socialism boils down to little more than an appeal for a return to first principles and a restoration of political militancy.

The Italian Socialist party epitomizes the confusion. For a half century the Italians have ranked as the farthest left of the major European Socialist parties. In its insistence on class struggle—in its adherence to a

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"maximum" program—in its reluctance to make a clean break with Communism, the Italian party has reflected the peculiar social conditions of the slowest-to-develop and the least prosperous of the great nations of the West. In Italy, human misery of the nineteenth-century type is still a sharp reality. Quite understandably, its Socialists have reflected this condition by clinging to a nineteenth-century faith in proletarian solidarity and to a romantic vision of a new world of human brotherhood.

The Italian Socialist party carries around with it an enormous burden of past errors. It was the only great party that in the first postwar era tried to straddle the issue of affiliation with the Third International—the only branch of European Socialism whose majority failed to see the necessity of making a clear choice for or against the Bolshevik road to the future. After the Second World War, the Italian Socialists were equally blind to reality. Their decade and more of fellow-traveling grievously eroded their moral capital, breeding a distrust among liberal-minded Italians which it will take at least another decade to efface. Yet for all this there is something amazingly innocent about Italian Socialism. It has a quality of popular spontaneity that in other countries has quite disappeared from contemporary politics. Its faith in the future is of almost childlike intensity; it made its catastrophic mistakes in good faith. The new-old freshness of the Italian party offers a puzzling and still unexploited asset in European Socialism's current struggle for self-definition.

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AT FIRST GLANCE it would seem that the British or the German solution—the path of Gaitskell and of Brandt—has everything in its favor. In the short run, this is certainly true. It is undeniable that the European Socialist parties will not begin to win elections until they have convinced the middle-class electorate that they offer no real threat to private property or the prosecution of the Cold War. They will not be within striking distance of power until they have converted themselves into welfare-state parties only marginally different from their conservative opponents. The evidence is overwhelming—at least in Britain—that a turn to the left would mean an almost automatic loss of Socialist votes.*

But is the current winning of elections the whole, or even the central, question? Even if Labor were to gain a parliamentary majority in Britain, or the Social Democrats should come to power in Germany, would they truly have solved their problem? History is full of examples of parties that have reached authority and then have lost power very rapidly, because they have not known how to behave once they were there. The defining characteristic of the Gaitskell-Brandt policy is what in this country used to be called "me-tooism." And the great weaknesses of "me-tooism" are its lack of political coherence and the fact that it is so easy a game for two to play. So long as European Socialists pursue this

* See particularly the series of articles by Seymour Martin Lipset entitled "The British Voter," *The New Leader,* XLIII (November 7, 1960) pp. 10-14, (November 21, 1960) pp. 15-20; XLIV (February 6, 1961) pp. 16-19.

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course, they can always be outflanked by an ideologically more supple conservative party.

It is only half true to say, as I did earlier, that nationalization of the basic means of production has traditionally been the major tenet of European Socialism. This is true only in an instrumental sense; nationalization has been the means, not the ultimate goal, of Socialist policy. Indeed this goal has not really been economic at all. It has been envisioned as a moral change—a transformation in the *quality* of life from an absorption with private economic satisfactions to a concern for human personality and the well-being of the community as a whole.

This is the central point at issue between the dominant Right and the uneasy Left within the European Socialist parties. Here lie the true grounds for that suspicion of a sell-out on the part of men like Gaitskell and Brandt that the Left has spotted so accurately but has seldom expressed with clarity. The official leadership of British and German Socialism is currently ready to settle for something way short of what European Socialists have always dreamed of. This is the real charge against the Right—far more than its faltering on a merely technical question like nationalization. The truly damning indictment that the Left hurls at the Right is its willingness to accept a society dedicated to private consumption, a politically and ideologically apathetic society in which public goals are almost forgotten in the scramble for individual satisfactions. This we Americans know to be true of our own country. American society is democratic by almost any definition one might choose to propose—far more democratic than the societies of Britain and France and Germany and Italy have ever been. But it is also a smug and consumer-oriented society, in which private affluence is cancelled out by public penury, and most of whose citizens lack a living faith in their own values.

Hence the European Socialists of the Left are convinced that their own countries' transition to an American type of democracy is far from being a total blessing. Nearly all of them recognize that contemporary capitalism has vastly reduced the harshness and egoism of its nineteenth-century predecessor. At the same time, they argue that the new capitalism of the twentieth century, along with an unanticipated levelling of classes, has brought with it equally unanticipated evils of its own. This is what Aneurin Bevan, in one of his last major utterances as the eloquent spokesman of British Labor's left wing, meant when he declared that capitalism had *not* succeeded, that it had produced an ugly society in which values had "gone all wrong."

THE SOCIALIST LEFT, then, is trying both to restore an old tradition of ideological affirmation and to adjust its goals to contemporary conditions, when it argues that in place of or alongside the conventional cure-all of nationalization, something more imaginative is required than mere adjustment to welfare-state capitalism. As opposed to the short-term "realism" of Socialism's right wing, it proposes such long-range measures as nationwide economic planning, a coherent public investment policy, and a vastly expanded program for raising the cultural level of the whole

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population. Such planning emphasizes "social priorities" for the entire community; the corresponding cultural policy stresses adult participation and development at least as much as formal schooling. It is characteristic of the "New Left," not only in Britain but on the Continent also, to criticize the present situation "in terms of moral and esthetic, rather than economic, criteria." Its "concern is above all with the impoverished quality of life . . ., the lack of a common culture, the decline of community, the dehumanizing effects of the mass media."* In this sense its manifestoes resemble such American works of social criticism as Paul Goodman's *Growing Up Absurd.* And the moral impetus behind them comes from a revulsion against the threat of thermonuclear destruction that is leading through a steady logical progression to neutralism or even the preaching of non-violence in the Gandhian tradition.

But where does this leave the middle class? What do these noble aims have to do with the overriding practical question of breaking out of a half generation of conservative dominance and winning over a new segment of the electorate? The answer is that the Socialist Left is taking a long gamble on the future. It is convinced that the policy of the Gaitskells and the Brandts is myopic and, in the end, self-defeating. Ultimately, it believes, a mere consumers' paradise will prove disappointing. A thirst for Utopia will reawaken everywhere. Finally this longing will reach the middle class itself. Or rather—since the familiar class lines will have broken down so profoundly—dissatisfaction with the consumer society will become diffused throughout the population. Then the old moral message of European Socialism will come to have a new relevance. And those parties and groups which have maintained through countless checks and errors their Utopian aspirations undimmed, will find themselves no longer marginal half parties in a sterile and electorally hopeless political debate, but leaders and mentors of a great ideological reawakening.

* Lewis Coser, "Socialism and Apathy," DISSENT, VIII (Winter 1961), p. 25.

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THE SO-CALLED BERLIN QUESTION

"Berliner"

The German voters have expressed their dissatisfaction with the foreign policy of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer whom the socialist leader Dr. Schumacher once, in a premeditated rash of nationalist anger dubbed "the Chancellor of the Allies." The Socialist vote increased by 13%, from 31 to 36% of the total. This increase may partly be attributed to the dynamic personality of Berlin's Mayor Willy Brandt, to the appeal of many youthful candidates on his list and to the abandonment of Marxism in the party's program—but only partly; in previous local elections the Socialists had made higher percentage gains on the strength of their welfare politics, but hitherto the voters always had refused to extend their confidence to them in a national election where foreign policy was the major issue.

The main reason for the Socialist success, all observers and the pollsters agree, was the Western powers' failure to act on August 13. Up to that date, the Socialist vote was trailing badly behind its potential in all polls; after the walling-off of West Berlin, however, the voters took a second look at Germany's future and decided that the close alliance with the West no longer promised fulfillment of their national aims. Now they remembered the Socialists' frequent warning that Adenauer would not and could not achieve the reunification of the two Germanys.

This interpretation is forcefully supported by the dazzling success of the Free Democratic Party whose leader, Dr. Mende, a former officer who likes to display the knight's cross he earned in Hitler's war, conducted his campaign under the slogan: Germany must have an independent foreign policy. This right-wing party which must be represented in any coalition, tends to seek an accommodation with the Soviet Union, in exchange for the mirage that hoping for unification might not be in vain forever. Many Germans would condone neutralism rather than abandon an illusory claim to lost territories. They have long resented NATO as the instrument of an American policy which assigned to them the rôle of foot soldiers in the cold war, and the more nationalistic among them never cherished the consequences: West Germany's integration into the West European Community threatens to absorb her sovereignty and virtually excludes the restoration of an all-German sovereignty.

FAR FROM BEING an instrument of German revanchist designs—as some ill-informed or ill-disposed writers on the American and British Left continue to charge—the Western alliance to this day has been an impediment to German irredentism. It maintained the status quo and protected the West German Republic within its present boundaries. Germany's Slav neighbors found satisfaction in this de facto out-

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come of the world war and the cold war. Neither the French nor the British care to see Germany re-united and the U. S. has paid lip service to a transcendental aim of German unity —but it did so only to save Adenauer's face when his opposition accused him of neglecting the German cause. The world also understood that Dulles did not believe in "Liberation" when Russian tanks quelled the East German rebellion in 1953 and the Hungarian revolution in 1956. For all practical purposes the Iron Curtain is the boundary between freedom and servitude in Europe.

IF THIS IS SO, why then should Khrushchev not be happy with the present state of affairs? In fact he is—and even tries to legalize it. Soviet propaganda once played with the theme of German unity. That was in Stalin's time. Soviet diplomacy then told the Germans west of the Elbe: you may visit your cousin across the river provided you don't join NATO. But Khrushchev, who is sensitive to satellite opinion, has dropped the specter of a resurrected Germany. He frankly told the British when in London: you guard your Germans, we'll guard ours. But he attached two conditions to his acquiescence in the status quo: the West must confirm *de jure* what today merely is recognized *de facto,* and the ugly anomalous situation of Berlin, 100 miles inside the Eastern zone of Germany, must be regularized.

On their face, these demands do not sound so unreasonable. Though the Bonn gvernment does not recognize the Pankow government and severs diplomatic relations with any third government* that maintains an embassy in Pankow, in fact treaty relations exist between the two states. Ruhr industrialists are doing a flourishing business with the East** and so great is the economic interdependence of the two Germanys that the mere threat of a boycott forced Ulbricht to conclude an airtight agreement guaranteeing the free flow of goods from and to Berlin. This agreement, of course, was signed by subordinate officials of the two governments which don't recognize each other. West Berlin itself, the largest industrial city of both Germanys, is viable only because of its heavy tax subsidies, and its present boom has been manufactured to make it the West's show window in the East.

But it is not Berlin's prosperity which has caused 1000 to 2000 people a week, year in year out, to abandon all their possessions in Eastern Germany and to start a new life as refugees—in freedom! Suppose Khrushchev could force the West to "formalize" the status quo—would his puppet regime in Pankow be less odious? The mere prospect that the escape hatch might be closed swelled the stream of refugees to 2000 *a day*—and forced Ulbricht's hand. Suppose the RIAS transmitter—the West's strongest voice in Eastern Europe—were moved 100 miles west: would Ulbricht sit any easier in his satrap's chair? Suppose the pro-American high-brow magazine *Der Monat,* and the satirical weekly, *Tarantel,* were published in Bonn instead of Berlin: would Ulbricht be any less low-brow and ridiculous?

Since the Wall has been erected, East Germany is better insulated against spies and agitators than it could ever be if Berlin were declared a "free city"—the aim Khrushchev pretends he is pursuing. Since no East

* Except the Soviet Union itself! However, this policy may be revised soon.

** The barbed wire that divides Berlin is of West German manufacture.

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Berliner can go to West Berlin, the "show window" is boarded up—so what is Khrushchev really trying to achieve? He has incorporated East Berlin in his satellite East German state (which is a violation of existing agreements); he has severed the unity of the city (which is illegal under existing statutes); no one seriously challenges his possession of East Germany. Could it make much difference to Khrushchev whether this state of affairs is merely enforced by the power of his rockets or is confirmed in writing? Is it thinkable that a man like Khrushchev is so much disturbed by the lack of legal title to anything he holds in Hungary, in Germany or elsewhere? Why must he, instead of declaring himself satisfied, threaten eight countries with extinction unless a paper is signed giving him what he already has?

WE ARE TOLD that his position at home, in front of the Chinese or the generals, is shaky and that he must have a "success"—but is it our business to bail him out of the hole into which he has "ultimatumed" himself? We are told that he must prove to the Chinese the value of "peaceful co-existence" as a method of conquest in preference to militant warfare. But he is doing precisely the opposite—serving ultimatums and threatening atomic warfare. If he wished to prove that "peaceful co-existence" works to his advantage, he would simply open Berlin to all traffic and allow it to be absorbed by its natural economic hinterland. But he is creating a crisis where there was none—why such irrational behavior?

The simplest answer would start out from the endemic crisis in the satellite empire. The terror has increased in Poland, xenophobia is officially whipped into a rage in Czechoslovakia, the Ulbricht regime could not survive one week if the Russian troops were withdrawn, the empire economic plan has broken down. The free city of West Berlin is the only beacon of hope for the 70 million captive people in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary, Lithuania, Estonia, Livonia and Eastern Germany. In these days, when Africa and Asia are maturing to self-determination, these once independent countries may claim for themselves the elementary Human Rights to which the United Nations have set their seal. The servitude of East Germany is the stopper which holds this ferment in the empire bottle, and the freedom of West Berlin might uncork it.

For the last twelve years the 70 million captives have looked to Berlin as a place where the Western powers are committed to defend the rights of free men. Khrushchev cannot extinguish this beacon of hope, but he can dim it: he is trying to show that the West does not stand by its word. The crisis does not consist in any anomaly of Berlin's location, it has been created to test the West's will to resist. Neither Khrushchev nor Ulbricht *needs* Berlin but they can use its vulnerable position to demonstrate that freedom can no longer be defended anywhere. Khrushchev means to prove that there is no "balance of terror" if one side is determined to reduce the world to ashes and the other is not. He is determined to show that the threat of retaliation cannot stop him.

It is in this respect that the German elections are so significant. Ever since their Vienna meeting Kennedy had tried to convey to Khrushchev the message that the United States will not brook any unilateral changes in the status of Berlin; there are indications that on August 13, when the Wall

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went up in Berlin, the East German government was deadly afraid of counter-action. When nothing happened, Ulbricht's press crowed "Kennedy is a coward." For the first time Germans were confronted with the truth about the balance of terror. They handed Adenauer a vote of no-confidence in the United States.

One might say that the Wall has not changed anything in the real relation of power. That would be a crudely materialistic view. People in Europe who are more sensitive to the moral factors of the power game, feel acutely that something has changed. It has been shown that freedom has no power. This feeling of shame and impotence will spread and more people will run for the cover of neutralism if more proofs of Western flabbiness are forthcoming. And let there be no mistake—any of the "reasonable" solutions of the so-called German question, to which one might agree if this were an ordinary dispute about establishing order among the nations, indeed any of the solutions which we have advocated ourselves in the Spring issue of DISSENT* (and which the first draft of this article, written before August 13 had reiterated), any of the solutions so movingly and penetratingly recommended by Walter Lippmann and other reasonable men, would be proof —or would be so interpreted by Khrushchev—that the West is not ready to fight. They would be a signal for West Germany to seek accommodation with the Soviet Union. Russian treaties always are dynamic: what we are asked to sign is not an arrangement that might be more workable than the present one; if we know Khrushchev and Ulbricht, it will be less workable. What we are asked to sign, rather, is an admission that there is no alternative to surrender. What matters to Khrushchev is our advice to our partisans beyond the Iron Curtain: give up all hope that we are interested in your fate; surrender yourselves to the Soviet authorities as we have surrendered to their atomic blackmail.

It is not surprising that advocates of surrender, of unilateral disarmament and of non-resistance, are becoming more vocal at this juncture; it would not be surprising if the message of Western surrender also would find a hearing among the policy-makers in some countries. Munich was followed by the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. Surrender of Berlin would (I do not say "might") be followed by a Khrushchev-De Gaulle Pact. The fulfillment of Hitler's "last demand" was followed by accelerated, increased demands; a Khrushchev without the Berlin "toothache" will be more formidable than the one we have known before.

Besides these elementary truisms, the technicalities of the so-called Berlin issue pale into insignificance. However, to the uninitiated, a few things need to be repeated. First, Berlin today *is* a "free city," inasmuch as it does not elect deputies to the Bundestag, and the laws of the Federal Republic are not automatically valid in Berlin. Second, any change in the present status of Berlin would mean that (under the troika rule which Khrushchev imposes on United Nations) the freedom of the Berliners would be "guaranteed" by troops from, say, Sweden, Cyprus, Egypt, Ghana, Cambodia and Cuba—a prospect which makes this Berliner shudder. Third, the

* One should note too there is a difference between extending recognition to the Pankow and Peking governments of our own will, or at gunpoint. Already, at the time of proofreading, some Western chancelleries speak of "making negotiable" positions which only yesterday were considered vital.

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area Khrushchev is talking about is only *that* part of Berlin which under the Potsdam agreement was to be policed by the Western powers; but *all* sectors were supposed to be under one administration. Let us not forget that the Russians ousted the legal mayor and councilmen from the City Hall (situated in the Eastern sector), and so far Senator Mansfield alone has asked for restoration of an all-Berlin administration. Khrushchev never offered to "unify" the city; he wishes to keep what he has and to negotiate about what is still missing.

Fourth, the freedom of access which has been guaranteed by treaties refers to allied personnel exclusively; the right of German civilians to free access is implied, but it always has been controlled by the Ulbricht government.* Fifth, for its supply of merchandise Berlin depends on treaties with the East German authorities, i.e., on their willingness to keep the roads and canals in repair, not to levy prohibitive transit tolls, etc. Sixth, after Khrushchev has concluded peace with his puppet government in Pankow, he can, of course, under international law (what there is of it) transfer to Ulbricht whatever sovereign rights he holds, in particular the control of the access roads to Berlin. He cannot, however, by any act of his, abolish rights which the allies hold, which include the three air corridors and the right to travel on the ground for allied personnel. But he can harass those trying to exercise these rights, or use such harassment to bludgeon the Western allies into recognizing the Ulbricht government.

With a situation so completely involved, and basically impossible of solution, is there any hope that statesmen will find a way out of the impasse? The tradition of diplomatic techniques here calls for an enlargement of the area under discussion.

IN THE OPINION of many European statesmen, as well as some U. S. Senators, the New York *Times* and White House advisers, it would be good politics to grant the Pankow government formal recognition, in return for a new and better guaranty of free communications to and from Berlin for allied personnel, German civilians and merchandise. It is further suggested that the West should recognize the present border between East Germany and Poland—the Oder-Neisse line—as definitive and that West Germany should resume relations with Poland. The gain would be entirely ours, since we are in no position to challenge the arbitrary disposition of territory which the Russians have made after the war, but such a declaration of good intentions would go a long way in alleviating the fear of Germany's irredentism which drives her Eastern neighbors into Russian arms.

It is irrelevant whether these territories are Polish or German (in fact few Germans survive there or in the Sudeten land); the question is neither one of law nor of right, but one of political wisdom: we are paying millions of good-will money to the Poles, but we don't dare to set their minds at ease on the one question that matters, for fear of offending a few million German voters who already have received indemnification for the loss of their property. (Tragic as the lot of any refugee is, the expellees from Eastern Germany must be counted as aristocrats among the exiles of all times.) Tactfully and earnestly the question might be broached to the Germans in these terms: you have

* Except air traffic to West Berlin.

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buried the centuries-old axe of wars with France, why not mend your fence with your Eastern neighbor? You are asked to make a sacrifice of pride in the interest of peace, you have lost these territories which you once colonized, as a *consequence* of a war—neither as an atonement for starting it nor as a penalty for losing it. To renounce this irredenta means turning a material loss into a moral opportunity.

To bring peace to Eastern Europe, we might further think of the plans, dating back to 1952 and 1955, which are known by the names of Van Zeeland, Eden and Rapacki. They provide various degrees of disengagement or détente, such as forbidding the use, training, installation or equipment of atomic artillery in an area extending between the rivers Rhine, Danube and Vistula; the "thinning out" of foreign occupation troops or their complete withdrawal from the area; the institution of pioneer projects of inspection and control to verify compliance with such agreements.

Some major horse-trading may be done here—the concession of control, by the Russians, against the Western concession of a limitation on German rearmament. In passing, we may note that neither Berlin nor even West Germany is militarily defensible, except to reconquer their ruins. It therefore is difficult to understand the U. S. government's military demonstrations there. As a general, we would attempt to pull our troops out of such a trap. Also in passing, we note the international co-operation of the militarists: without Khrushchev's threats, Kennedy might not have obtained Congressional approval for his defense budget so quickly.

Though for reasons already discussed the complete disbanding of the NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances is neither feasible nor desirable, European socialists feel that their belligerence can be de-fused. To that end, well-meaning people suggest a "UN presence" in Berlin—with all due respect to the late inventor of the term, this is another version of the "let Dag do it" philosophy, burdening the world organization with assignments it cannot fulfill in the absence of big-power understanding, and need not undertake if the big powers do their duty. If by "UN presence" is meant the transfer of the world organization's headquarters to a place of trouble where Khrushchev might control the supply of hotel personnel and general ambience, the suggestion is ridiculous. A deliberative Assembly should be under less, not under more pressure than it is now. If "UN presence" means the dispatch of troops, I must side with Khrushchev's statement, that there is no such thing as an impartial arbiter.

Under prevailing conditions, the replacement of Western by UN troops would be the beginning of an erosion process which must end in the loss of Berlin to the West. Many who feel that the Berlin anomaly cannot last forever anyway, consider the injection of UN as a painless way of pulling this tooth. Much of the current diplomatic interchange is devoted to face-saving: we will allow Khrushchev to climb down from his limb if he will allow us to maintain that we did not surrender. United Nations is an ideal mediator for such deals, but we should distinguish between UN as a bargaining place, UN as an agency of moral pressure to bargain in good faith or as an alibi for poor bargains, and UN as an enforcement agency!

However, United Nations might have another function in the present dispute. It is the proper place to lodge

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the plaint against broken treaties and promises. It should receive an East German demand for self-determination, an East Berlin appeal to restore the unity of the city and the legality of its constitution. It should supervise free elections in all of Germany and free speech to all German parties (the Communists in West Germany and the other parties in East Germany). The only real solution of the so-called German or Berlin problem, indeed, is freedom for the Germans to choose their own government; the majority of the German voters today were unborn or under age when Hitler came to power. They cannot be deprived, for the sins of their fathers, of rights which we pretend to defend; if the Western powers and the United Nations fail to help them in achieving self-determination by peaceful means, they might be faced with a revolutionary situation full of unexpected dangers.

Charge It to . . . ?

Canadian members of the Franciscan Order are carrying credit cards.

The Rev. Irenaeus Hersher, O.F.M., treasurer of the Franciscan Educational Conference, said monks in Canada had been using the cards because "they are not supposed to handle money." Franciscans take a vow of poverty upon joining the order.

Father Herscher declined to say whether Franciscans in the United States would start using credit cards.

"They afford a certain convenience," he said, "but we do not seem to need them yet."

—*From an A.P. Dispatch, dated August* 15.

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WEST-COAST WATERFRONT—THE END OF AN ERA

Harvey Swados

One of the first things to strike an outsider about San Francisco is the respect and esteem in which longshoremen are held by the rest of the community. They are good credit risks; they are homeowners (yes, some have swimming pools); they are pillars of society; Negro members are deacons and elders of their churches and are regarded in their neighborhoods as doctors used to be by the newly-fledged Jewish communities. I cannot think of another part of the country in which, thanks in large part to their union, laborers are so well regarded and are in turn so proud of their work and their affiliation.

One reason why these workers—and the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, it must be added—are so well regarded and themselves have so much self-respect is that the union has substantially complete control over the labor force (so that worker loyalty is always to the union rather than to any employer who buys his services through the hiring hall), and control too over the way in which the work is done. Everybody on the West Coast knows that these workers have had a pretty good life, and a pretty clean union (this is not the place to probe such minor sores as the alleged job-selling activities of certain union-elected dispatchers at the hiring hall). Contractual negotiations have been carried on not merely in public, but in a "goldfish bowl," with workers free to observe while union president Harry Bridges, surely one of the most adroit, sharp-tongued, and agile-witted maneuverers in the entire labor movement, sparred with the Pacific Maritime Association's J. Paul St. Sure, the most universally respected management negotiator on the Coast (and very possibly in the nation). His political heresies aside, Bridges has been incorruptible and has spoken always for the ranks, acutely sensitive to their voice.

However, contrary to popular opinion, the ILWU is not a mass-membership industrial union. In fact its entire longshore membership (exclusive of Hawaii) is little more than 15,000. And of these a number are ships' clerks. The actual number of working longshoremen is therefore very small indeed. Nor is the ILWU, as many believe, a Communist-dominated union. In fact the Communist party in Harry Bridges's own Local 10 (San Francisco) now consists of one aging stalwart, who turns to with his little bundle of newspapers and leaflets, and a hand-

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ful of his followers. The CP is a foundering hulk on the waterfront, of no use to anyone as either vote bloc or whipping boy. Still meaningful, however, are the existence of a substantial number of sophisticated workingmen in the union, most of whom received their political education in or around the CP, and also the undimmed passion of Harry Bridges for the Soviet Union and Communist China, though he no longer needs the Communist party.

Now a five-year contract, which has received international attention, has been signed between the ILWU and the Pacific Maritime Association. This latter is no monolithic organization of ruthless waterfront employers. It was born out of the employers' defeat in the 1934 general strike, and exists now solely as a bargaining agent with the maritime unions; internally its members are apparently as torn with dissension and wholehearted mutual contempt as any labor union, and member employers have been known to make backdoor arrangements with particular unions in order to beat out competitor companies.

With this ratification of the contract, excited newspaper reporters and publicity men have been telling us, February 1, 1961, marked a new day in the history of men and machines, a day which was "historic" and "epoch-making" in that by mutual agreement employers and workers were exchanging the introduction of labor-saving equipment for the establishment of a fund to provide for early retirement, no layoffs, and a guaranteed minimum work week. The contract is officially titled an "Agreement on Mechanization and Modernization." It has been described, I think, inaccurately, as an "automation" or a "mechanization" agreement. Such an interpretation has been fostered by both union officialdom and employers in their publicity handouts, with the result that newspapers have been running leads like that of the San Francisco *Examiner* of last October 25: "Harry Bridges' outcast longshore union showed the Nation's labor organizations yesterday how to live and prosper with automation." In fact both parties are quite frank, in private discussion, in referring to the contract as a $29,000,000 bribe to buy back certain working conditions that have been in force for a generation.

In order to understand the terms of this deal, its relation to the real problem of mechanization/automation, and what effect it will have on the working lives of the thousands of members of the union, we are going to have to go back and spell out some of the conditions that existed prior to the new contract—conditions that made West Coast longshoring the most attractive way of life for a casual laborer in the United States, if not in the entire world.

As a result of the truly historic 1934 strike, the longshoremen won a jointly-operated hiring hall, which freed them from serf-like dependence on the caprice of individual employers or bosses. They also won a set of conditions relating to the job itself which were easily enforceable by a militant democratic union, particularly one strongly influenced by professional revolutionists—conditions which came to be

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accepted as a way of life by the flood of new recruits to the waterfront during the boom days of World War II (in the San Francisco Bay Area, mostly Negroes from the Deep South; in the Port of Los Angeles Area, mostly Latins from the Southwest and from Mexico).

One of these work conditions which is not often talked or written about, but which strikes me as both civilized and unique, has been the longshoreman's relative freedom of choice as to which days in the week he would take off. The mechanics of this were worked out by the men themselves and were democratically defined by union rules for both "gang" men and "plug" men. This arrangement was made possible first by the fact that the industry works around the clock and through the week, depending on the number of ships in port, and second by the existence of a pool of casuals always available for work.

When he got to work, the longshoreman who worked less difficult cargoes—light case goods, containers, unitized loads—could often look forward to rest periods equal to 25 to 40 per cent of his work day, depending on whether he was discharging or loading. The men viewed this as justifiable, because they were never compensated in wages for the unpaid hours necessarily spent at the hiring hall every day, or in time off for the necessarily continuous work on more difficult cargoes.

At work the sling load limit was set at 2100 pounds, which meant that large or unwieldy or dangerous loads would be broken—"skimmed" —into two or more manageable loads within the weight limit, thereby spreading the work equitably and making it possible for those laboring in the hold to work off a four-wheeler. The longshoreman knew finally —if he worked in the port of San Pedro—that his fairly continuous employment was assured by multiple handling, a jurisdictional form of featherbedding which delimited teamster from longshore work and specified that under certain circumstances a cargo load would have to be moved from pallet boards to the skin of the dock, put together and taken apart one or two extra times, between its removal from the ship and transport from the dock by truck.

Aside from this last practice, retained almost solely at San Pedro and almost universally conceded by the longshoremen themselves to be ultimately indefensible make-work, these have been generally the conditions of the working life of the West Coast longshoreman; they have given him substantial and unique control over what might be called the process of production on the docks (that is, the movement of cargo), and they have now been amended or altered for a quid pro quo of $29,000,000, by membership vote of PMA and by referendum among over 11,000 voting longshoremen and clerks.

WHERE DOES MECHANIZATION come into the picture? In four words: the employers shall be allowed to "Utilize labor-saving devices."

But this does not mean that hitherto no such devices had been introduced in the maritime transportation industry. It means quite simply that from here on out such devices will be manned by the minimum number of longshoremen needed to carry out the operation, rather than

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by contractually specified six or eight man gangs. In short, while it has already been profitable for certain of the larger shipping companies to mechanize their ships and their port facilities even while they had to pay men to serve as "witnesses" (the term is Harry Bridges's), it will now be much more profitable under the new contract for those companies that can afford the capital investment to proceed with mechanization and thus compete more advantageously with foreign operators. To this extent, and to this extent only, is the new contract a "mechanization" agreement.

There are an infinite number of gradations of mechanization taking place on the waterfront ("automation" as such is not really at issue, since what is being replaced is not brainpower but backpower), from the blowing or pumping of sugar, like oil, into ships' holds, to such seemingly petty (to the outsider!) refinements in unitizing cargoes as mounting fuel drums, strapped in units of three on a board at their place of manufacture rather than having them handled and stowed singly on the waterfront. The most impressive of these conversions to date has no doubt been Matson's transformation of the S/S *Hawaiian Citizen* into a fully containerized vessel, together with a parallel transformation of the yards and cranes in the ports of San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Honolulu.

When you climb aboard the *Hawaiian Citizen* you are no longer entering the swaying world of the seafaring man. It has become an ingeniously-designed mobile warehouse floating between the states of Hawaii and California and rapidly filled and emptied at either end. Cargo is packed in huge twenty-four foot aluminum cubes which are picked up by a monstrous four-legged device known as Christine (because it looks bisexual, or asexual) and coupled to yard tractors driven by ILWU men who used to drive fork-lifts and jitneys. The tractors haul them to an enormous gantry crane which picks them up and deposits them in the hold where they fit, one atop the other, like the blocks of a Chinese puzzle. What is more, a two-way cycle is constantly in operation: as a load is placed in the ship another load is removed from it; the entire ship can be emptied and reloaded in a fraction of the time required by traditional methods.

On the day that I watched the loading of the *Hawaiian Citizen,* during the waning hours of the old contract, several of the "witnesses" were snoozing and chatting just aft of the number two hatch. They will no longer be there, on the company payroll, under the terms of the new agreement—but this is hardly the most striking aspect of this mechanized vessel. After all, at workplaces with cost-plus contracts all over the country, from Anchorage to Miami, a small percentage of men are sleeping on the job, whether they are workers curled up in a dark corner or executives with their feet up on the desk; since I do not have to meet a payroll, I am so far from feeling that there is anything shocking about this that I incline to the belief that maybe we would all live longer if there were more of it.

What is shocking, though, is the cold gray impersonality of the

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containerized shipping operation represented by the *Hawaiian Citizen.* Not only will nobody be sleeping—nobody will be daydreaming, or arguing politics, or even getting a personal kick out of the cargo that he pats after he stows it properly in the hold. For anyone who, like myself, has ever followed the sea, the *Citizen* is no longer a freighter. The cargo is not visible: it is simply a ranked series of metallic cubes locked into place. One man, alone on his tractor, drives the cube to the gantry; a second man, alone at the controls 150 feet above the pier apron, picks up the 46,000 pound cube and guides it onto the trolley; a third man, alone at the hatch, wiggles his fingers to indicate that it is being properly lowered into the rack that will hold it rigid until it is discharged in the same way some days later.

It is too early to say whether new challenges will develop which will make working on a fully containerized shipping operation as varied, or as much fun (I use the word advisedly) as more traditional waterfront work. Perhaps; but one wonders. One man described it to me as "ulcerating" work. Another said it was "cold and inhuman."

IN ANY CASE, we must be quite clear that this wave of the future is not battering at the docks. Harry Bridges at sixty does not envisage anything approaching complete mechanization of the waterfront in his lifetime. Neither do a number of younger men at the executive end. The waterfront is not a coalmine, where you can swiftly calculate whether it will pay to install automatic equipment: if it won't you shut down the uneconomic mine, if it will, you buy the equipment and throw out the men, and in a decade you have mechanization.

No, the infinite variety of objects shipped from nails to locomotives, together with the conflicting aims of shippers and the infinite variety of conditions prevailing in various ports, is going to preclude rapid conversion of our merchant fleet to Hawaiian Citizens or of our docks to full-scale mechanization for many decades. You can't even blow coffee into a hold the way you can sugar or oil: as of now there are too many grades of coffee, and too many orders for one bag of this and three bags of that. Besides, shipping is a two-way business. For every Matson Line auto ship, specially designed so that cars can be driven aboard at California (instead of pushed aboard by the traditional eight-man gang), loaded like sardines, and driven off at Hawaii at such a saving that it pays to send the ship back empty from Hawaii, there are a hundred ships plying between here and the Orient that will be dependent for decades on the individual products of Asia and the individual toil of its thousands of straining dock workers; mechanization, total mechanization, of our shipping industry--like so many other problems that tax human ingenuity--is going to have to be globally resolved.

WHAT ABOUT THE MEANTIME? In the meantime Harry Bridges will spend his declining years as leader of a steadily declining work force. His fully-registered membership will have job security, an eventual guaranteed minimum work week, and a fairly comfortable and se-

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cure old age, with $7,920 coming each man's way after 25 years of service, in addition to his pension and social security. In return he will yield up those conditions for which he fought not only in 1934, but for a decade and a half thereafter, in a series of over twenty major port strikes. As his social life becomes more and more middle class in all of its values, so will his union become more and more of a tightly enclosed job protective association, as Bridges himself conceded to me; and his working life will become less and less spontaneously rhythmic, and more and more rigidly routinized as mechanization creeps in and productivity studies are utilized to standardize output and to housebreak the longshoreman.

One way of looking at it is to say that in order for the longshoreman to maintain his privileged place in the general community he is going to have to yield up his privileged place on the waterfront. The first area of freedom that I mentioned, that of deciding for yourself whether you wanted to work on any given day, will be one of the first to go. Man-hour requirements are going to be substantially reduced, perhaps as much as 35 per cent (they will have to be, if the employers are going to make back that $29,000,000). In order to make a week's pay, the longshoreman will really have to scuffle. To get his minimum wage guarantee (the new agreement calls for a floor under earnings, with the minimum tentatively established at 35 hours), he will have to accept any work offered—work like bananas or freezers that he would formerly have left to the casuals. Of course it can be argued that what he is getting in exchange is a much more complete security than he ever had before (although most observers are skeptical that the minimum wage guarantee will ever go into effect, since it will probably be computed annually); nevertheless it remains true that in the course of obtaining this security he will be transformed. He will become more like other American workers, whether manual or white-collar: he will go to work more regularly, more steadily, more habitually, he will do what he is told—and in consequence I suspect he will come to like it less.

Now whether or not this free hand in management that employers now have, for the first time in a generation, is going to result in severe exploitation of the longshoremen is a question that can only be resolved on the docks in the months ahead (and by PMA, to whom individual employers wishing to introduce changes will have to make application). Several things can be said at the outset, however. First: it should not be taken for granted that all of the work practices which the union has bartered away were simply boondoggling. True, no one can defend the business of insisting that every single little piece of cargo be placed on the skin of the dock, and then picked up again, one at a time—that is, not unless he is arguing for the principle of make-work as an employer contribution to the struggle against rising mass unemployment (a defensible principle, by the way, for a radical union which sees it as a holding action). Nor can anyone defend some of the other practices, such as four hours on and four hours off, when they were

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abused as a means of goofing off by irresponsibles who had no trade union background and were not indoctrinated by the ILWU in the honorable traditions of trade unionism—in the most notorious instance a dead man was carried on a San Pedro walking boss's time sheet for two days before it was discovered that he had died in a brawl in Tia Juana. That these practices have by and large been eliminated in recent years is symbolized by the enforcement of a "performance and conformance" clause in the 1959 agreement.

It is also true that many men never abused these practices, but utilized them as part of a natural work rhythm in the course of which they spelled each other, equalized their burdens, and lightened the load for the older men in the gang; it has to be remembered that, unlike the forest ranger or the lighthouse keeper, the longshoreman is engaged in a highly cooperative enterprise, one in which the goof-off artist as much as the eager beaver can not only disrupt the work rhythm but jeopardize the lives of the other members of his working gang.

In these circumstances it does seem somewhat unusual that it should be the union officialdom which is giving the loudest assurances that, to quote *The Dispatcher,* "Actually, the only situations where men will work harder is where they haven't been working at all."

This may turn out to be true. But there are no guarantees of it embedded in the agreement. And if it is true it will only be because the men themselves are vigilant and the union itself is militant in supporting their "beefs." The contract is, as I have indicated, terribly complex, and is susceptible of a variety of interpretations as to the applicability of smaller gang sizes or larger sling load limits, on the part of both workers and employers. In addition to the traditional grounds of safety violation in what is still one of the most hazardous occupations in the United States today, the workers are entitled to object to changes on grounds of "onerousness." No doubt even the 10 to 20 per cent of the San Francisco longshoremen who are functionally illiterate will soon be arguing the nuances of that word with at least as much fervor as their children in high school and college. Whether they will be able to do anything about it is another matter.

FOR THE UNION has a psychological and a financial stake in the success of this agreement. This despite the fact that Max D. Kossoris, director of the Western Regional Office of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, argues that the shoe is on the other foot, since PMA will be pouring $5,000,000 a year into the union treasury regardless of how well the members cooperate in living up to the terms of the new agreement. It is true that the agreement as originally contemplated called for the adoption of a system whereby, instead of the work rules being bought out, employers' gains would be measured and the employees would be paid only for the actual man-hours saved (Mr. Kossoris himself was engaged for a year by PMA, with the consent of the ILWU, to devise such a system of measurement). In the midst of negotiations, the measurement of gains concept—to which the union had agreed—was dropped,

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because, the employers claim, it was too cumbersome and technical, and the idea of an annual lump-sum payment was substituted. Nevertheless I think that this interpretation underestimates those pressures on the union leadership which I mentioned at the beginning of this paragraph.

Harry Bridges is in the anomalous position of being an internationally-known labor leader (notorious or distinguished, depending on the angle of vision), with an actual membership of only a few thousand, and shrinking at that. With this new agreement he has re-entered the agreeable limelight, and what is more he has thrown down a challenge to those who threw him out of the official labor movement, the Meanys and the Reuthers, whom he continually excoriates for being more concerned with "respectability" than with "militancy," to come up with new agreements which will be as far-reaching and as "respectably" received as has been this agreement which he has maneuvered so shrewdly into existence. (This seems the most satisfactory explanation of why Bridges pressed for the new agreement in 1960 rather than waiting until the expiration of the old contract in 1962 to bargain off the work rules. The explanation of his opponents, that he sold out, is unsupported by evidence; his own explanation, that he was anticipating further restrictive legislation by the new administration, has its own flaw: while it is true that John F. Kennedy asserted last September in Salt Lake City that "An effective attorney general under present federal law could . . . depose Harry Bridges as head of the Longshoremen," and that this is one campaign pledge that the Kennedy brothers may earnestly attempt to fulfill, it also seems apparent that PMA would hardly have been willing and in fact eager to part with $29,000,000 to junk restrictive work rules if it were certain that Congress would go ahead and do the job for free.)

Furthermore, Bridges is discharging an obligation to those who built the union and fought the good fight. This is an old man's contract. The immediate beneficiaries will be the old-timers with 25 years of seniority, who will be able to retire with up to $7,920 cash money. Bridges's home base, Local 10 San Francisco (which voted up the contract 5–1), has an average age of 56. The center of his opposition, Local 13 San Pedro (which voted down the contract 2–1), has an average age of 36. In an aging union, I think it can be fairly said that the proposed immediate beneficiaries were all but unanimous in their decision to "go along with Harry," while the younger men were split in their reactions.

IT IS RATHER UNLIKELY that Bridges will insist upon the union's grimly supporting "beefs" to the limit if these, no matter whether they should be justified, were to interfere with his generation's getting its due. He has already assured me that he is not going to stand for "phoney militants" upsetting the smooth functioning of the new agreement; and his vice president, Bob Robertson, struck an ominous note in *The Dispatcher* of January 13: "No fast operator, on either

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side, should start thinking of cutting a fat hog for himself, or making a name for himself, by disrupting the *orderly* process of change that will be necessary . . . if any sharpy on either side tries to create dissension, there will be plenty of sincere people to do some yelling. Are there people who don't want to see this plan succeed? I'm afraid so. Some of our own members don't want it to get off the ground." In such an atmosphere, it will be a hardy union member who will persist in pressing a grievance or in asserting that the new agreement works an "onerous" hardship.

Two additional safeguards in the new contract will serve to reinforce worker compliance with PMA-union leadership interpretations. For one thing, in clause after clause it is specified that changes will be agreed on, not at the Local level, but at the Coastwise level. Here again, Bridges was quite frank with me in granting that this can be, and probably will be, used to whittle down local autonomy and concentrate more power in the hands of the International leadership; and the people with whom I spoke in San Pedro, from President George Kuvakas on down, are bitterly agreed with Bridges that the new contract will be a knife to gut their dissident local, to render it powerless to protest, should the new agreement not only knock off an anticipated 800 jobs by eliminating multiple handling but also impose a harder working life on the membership. For another thing, the contract provides that "payments into the Fund shall be abated" up to the maximum Employer obligation of $13,650 per day, "in the event of a work stoppage in any port or ports in violation of the provisions of this document." Here is a five-year built-in insurance that hotheads and militants, whether "phoney" or not, will think twice before depriving their older union brothers, the men who built the organization, of the negotiated rights of their declining years.

But supposing that everything works out beautifully, that the longshoremen go along with the agreement in good faith, and that their employers exercise self-restraint in utilizing their new-bought domination of the work situation. The elderly men will retire, either voluntarily at 65, or mandatorily at an earlier age, with a cash payment to speed them on their way, if lessening man-hour requirements should require a shrinking of the labor force beyond the normal four per cent annual attrition. The younger men will be absolutely assured of a vested interest in their jobs and will be able to look forward to the same deal as the older men. If it works out this way couldn't it be described as a millennial labor-management accord, one which frees management for the job of modernization and mechanization while it protects the old worker who has given his life to the industry and the young worker who is committing his life to the industry?

It could—but there is a fly in the ointment. This fly is the group of dock workers known as "B" men, about 1500 workers up and down the Coast, who are specifically excluded from the benefits of the new agreement. There is no question but that a substantial number of these men—no one now knows how many, and it will vary from port to port

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—will be squeezed out of the bottom end of the industry, so to speak, even while the older men are being squeezed out of the top end into retirement. Therefore men *will* be losing their jobs under this new agreement, and it seems to me a piece of semantic legerdemain on the part of union and management publicists to insist that this is not so simply because "B" men are not "fully-registered" union longshoremen. The fact is that these are men who are committed to the shipping industry and are presently essential to it (they now do most of the hold work in San Francisco, Stockton, and other ports).

WHO ARE THEY? This is insufficiently known, and represents one of the most fascinating and illuminating—if depressing—aspects of the whole West Coast waterfront story. Take the case of Bridges's Local 10, which for some years filled out the labor needs of management by supplying "permit" or "work card" men, in effect apprentices or postulant members, in addition to the "casuals" or "Social Security" men, like policemen or firemen or the unemployed, who came down to the waterfront to earn a day's pay. In the spring of 1958 the Local decided, in conjunction with PMA, to replace the members it was losing by attrition. It ran an ad in the local papers and received about fourteen thousand applications for membership—such was the attractive power of the union and of the longshore work in the Bay Area. The following spring some 570 of the applicants were accepted after interview, and shortly thereafter the figure rose to nearly 800.

PMA was anxious for a more stable and reliable work force than that available from the pool of casuals; it confined its investigation of applicants pretty much to questions of their responsibility and possible existence of a criminal record. The union was anxious for new members who would be loyal and union-conscious; the leadership hoped that the great number of Negro applicants would behave like many of their relatives and friends, who always went down the line for Harry; furthermore, in opening its books to members with union background or maritime experience, it welcomed a substantial number of DP's from other unions which had also been expelled from the CIO on charges of Communist domination, or from unions which had themselves ousted substantial numbers of alleged Communists.

Thus both management and labor stood to gain by this influx of new blood: the former, because it was obtaining the services of men eager to enter the industry, ready to turn to every day, and more than willing to work all the dirty cargoes that the fully-registered men handled only reluctantly; the latter, because it was going to be able to replace the retiring and the dying with men who were by and large devoted to Harry Bridges and his kind of trade unionism.

But then negotiations got underway for what was eventually to emerge as the five-year mechanization and modernization agreement—and the "B" men, who had first been told frankly that they were being taken on to get extra work, and then promised at a series of special meetings that they would become full-fledged union members in

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six months to a year, found that by mutual agreement a freeze had been clamped on the industry. Save for a handful who had squeezed into full membership, some 615 "B" men in the Bay Area now await the end of the freeze and, what seems most likely, their gradually being starved out of the waterfront. (Ironically the "B" men of San Pedro may be in better shape, even though more work will be lost there, because the Port of Los Angeles, unlike San Francisco's waterfront, is growing so rapidly that in a few years it will become one of the great ports of the world; it is also ugly, with its omnipresent oil pump levers pecking away like monstrous insects, in precise inverse ratio to the beauty and charm of San Francisco.) There are optimists who believe that economies resulting from the new agreement may revive coastwise shipping, now virtually moribund because of highway trucking; there are even those who expect an impending revival of the China trade, once the mainstay of West Coast shipping. Either could absorb the cut in man-hours and even make necessary the permanent employment of the "B" men as members of an augmented labor force. But a hard-headed economist like Max Kossoris, in an article in *Monthly Labor Review* for January 1961, speaks not of "whether" but of "after": "After most of the class B longshoremen and the casuals have been eliminated from the industry, how will the rest . . . of the cut in man-hours be absorbed?"

These men are not a statistic. As I indicated at the beginning of this article, it is the fact that they exist that should matter—not how many of them there are. When I asked an executive of PMA whether it wasn't really true that most of these men wouldn't be losing their livelihoods as a result of a contract publicized as a job-saving agreement, he replied, "The 'B' men are a matter for Harry Bridges' conscience."

So I asked Harry Bridges, and he replied, "Although the 'B' men are not considered a part of the industry, they're better off working here two or three days a week than they would be now in industry at large. In our opinion, they'll be all right for the next two or three years."

THE "B" MEN themselves just don't know. Some are still inclined to trust Harry; most, however, are increasingly bitter and vengeful. A few, with no trade-union background, may become so vengeful that they will attempt to sue the union: this may be why the union is once again holding special meetings for them, meetings which had not been called since the beginning of the freeze. I am more concerned, however, with the dedicated militants than with the anti-union. These are men, many of them, who entered the working class voluntarily and who, after rough years in the NMU or the MCS or the UAW fighting for the Communist party line because that line happened to coincide with their own idealism and socialist principles, are now at the end of their rope, at the end of the line. Finally fed up with Stalinism in '52 or '56 or whenever, they turned to the ILWU because Harry Bridges

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seemed still to be leading a democratic working-class anti-capitalist force. Many of them carried the ball for Bridges in other unions when he needed bail money, or legal aid in fighting jail and deportation; they were willing to do just about anything for him, and in fact some of them did do just about anything for him. Now they find that they are expendable. An injury to one, they discover very very late, is no longer an injury to all.

The terrible disillusionment of these idealists finds its parallel among the scattered opposition to Bridges in the fully-registered union members, including some of the older men. Again I am not speaking primarily of the opposition on the right, which ranges from white-superiority workers frustrated by Bridges's automatic bloc vote from Negroes (some of whom have been getting theirs back by "Crow Jimming" the whites), to "professional Catholics" who wear the Cross but have been known to wheel and deal with the Communists. I have in mind those dissidents who, because they are Socialists or Trotskyists or ex-Wobblies or ex-Stalinists, persist in operating as though the principles of solidarity and brotherhood were antecedent to self-aggrandizement, the accumulation of power, or the captivating glare of publicity. I number these among the finest men I have ever had the privilege of getting to know, but I must in conscience report that their prospects in the ILWU are dim indeed.

Not only do they have little, if any, contact, with the "B" men, the ones who will be frozen out of the industry by the contract; from fear or distrust they have almost nothing to do with each other; being reasonable men, they are not always certain that Bridges is automatically wrong on every issue; and so, as each operates with his small band of followers, they gradually lose heart and turn their intelligence to the resolution of other problems, whether personal or social. What are all the old lefties doing? I asked one of these disillusioned men, and he replied with a weary smile, "They're sitting home nights."

ALTHOUGH IT IS ENTIRELY POSSIBLE that he now has more in common, intellectually and temperamentally, with Paul St. Sure than he does with his own rank and file, Harry Bridges has in the past given great leadership to the workers of the West Coast. And although he has also done them some very questionable services indeed, it is a brave man who will rise to oppose him, knowing that he is opposing not only the leader's record, not only his practically unanimous support in the Negro ranks—which have always been accorded scrupulous equality and now form a majority of the membership of the San Francisco Local—but also his caustic tongue and his skill at both oratory and demagogy. When I asked him how he intended to educate his membership to the subtleties of the new agreement, and to the necessity for self-discipline if it is to work, he replied readily, "We'll give it to them Castro-style, at our meetings." And at least a half-dozen longshoremen have reported to me, with shame or fury, the meeting at which Bridges rose with his cold grin to taunt the fully-registered men for their qualms about dump-

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ing the "B" men: "You want to play politics with the 'B' men? Then bring them in and give them equal working rights. But you're not going to do that. You know it and I know it."

And they didn't. Whether they would have if Bridges had appealed to their best instincts that afternoon instead of their worst, is doubtful. It is doubtful too whether he has guessed wrong about the temper of his people during the 1960s that they (including the leaderless and aimless young redhots of San Pedro) will settle for what he has won for them in the new contract and will not yearn—or struggle—for that which he has yielded up in return.

A LEADING PMA OFFICIAL, recently traveling in the Soviet Union, was closely questioned at the Ministry of Marine, where he paid a courtesy call, about capitalist reaction to the new "Mechanization and Modernization" Agreement. The official replied that most of the American press had received the agreement favorably, that many editorials had hailed it as an epoch-making solution to some of the human problems posed by automation and mechanization for industry at large, but that the *Wall Street Journal* had condemned it as "Communistic" because it paid hard cash for buying back prerogatives that should always have been management's. The Minister ruminated for a moment, and then murmured to his translator, "Tell the gentleman that I agree with the *Wall Street Journal*."

This story may reveal more about the nature of the Soviet Union, or of its bureaucrats' conception of communism, than it does about this new contract. But it may serve to remind us too that a way of life is passing from the scene. Already men *are* working harder on the waterfront and are grumbling, but impotently, as they come to realize once again the meaning of the practices they voted out of existence. When the new contract expires in 1966 the men who have lived under it will be a lot less easily distinguishable from the rest of the American workers than they are today. Not only will the radical dissidents of whom I have been speaking be harder to find; so will the other oddballs, the men with brains who liked to work with their hands, the occasional novelist, painter, or philosopher whom one encountered on the waterfront because it was—as loyal union member Eric Hoffer put it to me—"a good place to talk and a good place to think, a mixture of physical and intellectual stimulation." By 1966 Eric Hoffer will have retired with his pension, and both the union and the waterfront will be far less hospitable havens for whatever Hoffers this nation may be fortunate enough to produce in the future.

This article, together with other DISSENT pieces (revised) by Harvey Swados, and a good many other pieces, will be published next spring by Atlantic-Little, Brown in a book to be called *A Radical's America*.

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SCHLESINGER AND THE NEW DEAL

Jacob Cohen

Twelve years ago in his book, *The Vital Center,* Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. presented materials for a new-style liberalism which has remained the basis of his politics to this day. It is clear that Schlesinger was not using the term "center" simply in order to move liberal philosophy in somewhat from the left; he was also relocating the liberal intellectual. No longer, he felt, could the liberal afford to be an outsider looking upon society and politics from the distance of estrangement and an inappropriate ideology. The new liberal must be an insider, confronting social and political problems from the center of politics itself. Here was a manifesto for leftist intellectuals to renounce some of their rights as citizens of the world and assume some of their duties as citizens of America. "Pragmatic liberalism" was one term which Schlesinger used to describe his position at that time; it is a term which more and more old leftists are today wearing as a badge of honor.

Radicals, of course, are suspicious of liberals who tacitly crown corrupt systems by participating in them. Schlesinger had an answer in kind: his was not a surrender to practicality but the necessary conclusion from a more mature vision of the nature of history and man. History is the key word here. (It is my special word, not Schlesinger's. I use it because it seems to me it conveys Schlesinger's message most clearly.) In *The Vital Center* Schlesinger, under the influence of Reinhold Niebuhr, projected a view of history substantially altering the view that had become habitual for the radical left.

"Man," Reinhold Niebuhr has said, "is by nature historical, and the truth about man is mediated historically." This epigram contains the essence of Schlesinger's views. Man (if I may now translate) is inextricably rooted in historical circumstance. Whatever truth he perceives about his own destiny is therefore relative to his circumstance, whatever actions he takes to implement that truth must be mediated through it.

For the old-time radical the term history meant something quite different. For him history was revealed in the grand structure of meaning and purpose which he perceived in events. Because this structure changed dialectically, it was predictable. For Niebuhr, however, the intractable historicity of man doomed the radical's attempts to discern the ultimate structure of things. The course of events for Niebuhr was predictable, but only roughly predictable. It exhibited paradox as well as dialectical simplicity, tragedy as well as triumph. Both the Marxist

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and the Niebuhrian commanded that knowledge be wedded to action, but for the latter this knowledge was a will-o-the-wisp, and more often followed action than preceded it. Thus Schlesinger's call, *cum* Niebuhr, for the intellectual to relocate himself within the main currents of political action was seen by him not as a move to practicality but a high-minded suggestion that political action was the only honest angle of historical vision.

There was another aspect of Niebuhr's thought which Schlesinger invoked in *The Vital Center* to lend weight to his effort at relocating the intellectuals of the left. This was Niebuhr's famed conception of the inevitability of human sin. Schlesinger used sin in two ways in support of his position. First, he showed how sin presumed against the old utopian ideologies. For if, as Niebuhr had argued, sin and not property (or any other combination of social institutions) was the final cause of the struggle for power in history, then clearly no reordering of society, whether by revolution or not, could fundamentally change the human condition. Secondly, he showed how sin had made liberalism respectable and political action within a liberal state the precondition of authentic political thought. If sin propels all men into an inevitable struggle for power and self-aggrandizement, then, he argued, the best of all political systems would be that which placed restraints upon *all* men, rulers as well as ruled. The best system for attaining this is a pluralistic, constitutionally limited democracy. The art of running such a government is the art of politics, and the art of politics is the art of dealing with sin and sinners. For Schlesinger all the effective managers of American democracy: Andrew Jackson, John Quincy Adams, Franklin Roosevelt, have been instinctive Niebuhrians.

It is possible to accuse me here of committing the fallacy of misplaced profundity by thus making Schlesinger, and those members of the ADA for whom he spoke in 1949, into Niebuhrian existentialists. I too have failed to notice the ADA brooding over the problem of sin. Actually, I am only reporting one of several portentous names which Schlesinger himself dropped in *The Vital Center*. But I insist that Schlesinger's argument, for all its kitsch seriousness, cannot be discounted. It is based, however glibly, upon an image of man and history which has spoken powerfully and relevantly to important men in our day. And Schlesinger is a potent example of what happens to Niebuhr in simpler hands. It is clear that Schlesinger is one spokesman among many "atheists for Niebuhr" in contemporary political discussion.

The publication of the first three volumes of Schlesinger's *Age of Roosevelt* is therefore an event of some importance. Here is the theory of the vital center operating in its own most favored realm, history. Here is the intellect of a pragmatic liberal probing the life and times of pragmatic liberalism's greatest hero.

IT WOULD BE HARD NOT TO ADMIRE the daring with which Schlesinger has imagined his task and the industry with which he is achieving it. In three volumes, *The Crisis of the Old Order: (1919–*

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1933) (1957), *The Coming of the New Deal* (1959) and *The Politics of Upheaval* (1960) he has barely brought his story to the end of Roosevelt's first administration. He has not yet adumbrated the problems of foreign policy and the war is still to come. Since Schlesinger is presently making and taking notes for the Age of Kennedy, the job may never be completed.

A lucid but also a rather fussy writer, Schlesinger takes great pains to evoke the atmosphere of the moment. Many of his descriptions are enormously effective. What historian, or novelist, has captured the depression so vividly, or, for example, retold the events surrounding the court decisions of 1935 so dramatically? There is suspense and drama and irony in his pages. Yet there is something ceremonious and mechanical about all this mood music. Twelve or thirteen hundred pages into these volumes and we begin to predict when Schlesinger is going to trot out his prose. (One begins to wish the sun shone happily and hopefully throughout the first inaugural.) Schlesinger is fussy about his characters too. Each of them is meticulously portrayed and provided with a pocket biography as he enters on stage. Some come off beautifully: Harold Ickes, Huey Long, Father Coughlin, Henry Morgenthau, and, over and again, Roosevelt. But, in addition we are inundated with so much anatomical description, thirty-second psychology, irrelevant and irreverent anecdote about so many New Deal personages that soon we forget who it was that had the paunchy face, who the shifty eyes and who wasn't paranoiac.

Amidst this sound and fury Schlesinger fits a biography of Roosevelt, and a superb one. We have detailed descriptions of the principal New Deal legislation, analyses of social movements, weighty discussions of economic policy, chatty reviews of congressional and party politics, and brisk summaries of the books, ideas, and ideologies which were politically visible during these years. He offers judgments on almost all the critical problems raised by his materials and for the most part they are balanced and charitable.

And there *is* a unifying vision which gathers in the disarray in these books. It is the unity imparted by Schlesinger's vision of the vital center. Schlesinger has prescribed that the intellectual think through broad social and political problems from the perspective of working politics. In *The Age of Roosevelt* he has taken his own advice.

Perhaps I can illustrate the point and draw out some of its implications. Schlesinger has punctuated his narrative with countless prophecies of doom thundered against the New Deal during these years. From the right we hear braintrusters accused of conspiring a revolution in which Roosevelt, the Kerensky of America, would be replaced by some appropriate Lenin. From the left we hear Roosevelt accused of conspiring to bring Fascism to our shores. We are shown farmers pouring milk on dusty roads, veterans beginning to march, a nation singing hymns with Coughlin and Long, and we are informed that many were of the opinion that revolution was rife. (William Allen White, Raymond Swing, Sin-

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clair Lewis, remember, all insisted that Fascism could happen here.) Quotation is piled on quotation, prophecies of doom from every quarter, contradictory, often absurd, invariably wrong. Schlesinger's purpose is, I suppose, to build a mood. But his method and his organizing vision conspire against him. Every prophecy, indeed nearly every criticism, is confronted through quotation. Hardly distinguishing between what is serious and what is not, Schlesinger enters into none of these prophecies and answers them feebly or not at all. Was fascism a possibility, or socialism? Was a revolution in the farm belt possible? The questions are barely asked. Socialism, Fascism, revolution become as momentous as any other field report passing across a busy chief executive's desk. Schlesinger filters the political life out of his materials, and deprives historical moments of their reality.

This homogenization operates throughout the book. Philosophy, which must be excruciatingly honest to its own assumptions and is not itself when separated from those assumptions, is cut to the proportions of a political program. Social movements are weighed on the scales of political pressure, even suffering becomes a lobbyist among lobbyists. I say this with some care to the seriousness of what I am charging. I am aware of the many pages on which Schlesinger has recorded suffering vividly in these volumes. He has told us many times over that Roosevelt felt this suffering and acted upon his feelings. But I have not sensed in my journey with Schlesinger through the New Deal that he has made the suffering of the depression part of himself or indeed reexperienced anything but a narrow strand of the political sensibility of these years. Schlesinger lacks what for me is Niebuhr's surpassing quality, the quality of moral empathy, the ability to enter into the moral compulsions which raise men, all men, to action. A vital center without moral dimension (which may mean without transcendent dimension) presents as distorted a point of vantage upon history as the most doctrinaire ideology.

But Schlesinger's attempt to rethink the New Deal from the perspective of vital center politics does more than flatten his historical vision, it also involves him in several problems of historical interpretation. There are I believe four crucial questions concerning the New Deal which Schlesinger fails to answer satisfactorily: (1) What was new about the New Deal? (2) What was pragmatic about the New Deal's pragmatic liberalism? (3) Could the New Deal have travelled further on the road to reform without breaking the healthy continuity of American political institutions? (4) Wherein lies Roosevelt's greatness? In each case Schlesinger's failure to satisfactorily answer these questions reveals a weakness not only in his historiography but in vital center liberalism itself. Let me consider each of these questions briefly.

I. *What was new about the New Deal?*

Schlesinger is of at least two minds on this question. The very title and cumulative impact of his first volume, *The Crisis of the Old Order,* conveys the impression that some momentous change in Amer-

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ican history occurred at this time. Schlesinger speaks of the "structural changes" instituted by the New Deal. But in the remaining two volumes he demonstrates, implicitly and occasionally explicitly, how thoroughly the New Deal worked within the old system. "The decision to save the system rather than change it," Schlesinger remarks at one point, "had come about almost by inadvertence." Indeed these volumes are a chronicle of inadvertent change.

Actually, the several "structural changes" Schlesinger charts could more accurately be termed repairs. This is not to gainsay their significance. Clearly the New Deal redressed the disastrous economic imbalance between agriculture and business; improved unreliable and irresponsible security exchanges; redistributed purchasing power somewhat; and revised what in 1932 was the worst relief system in the civilized world. There were vivid changes of political style too. By courting organized labor and the recent immigrant, the New Deal appreciably widened the constituency of national politics. And Roosevelt's forces distributed parcels of love and justice to the needy to a degree unprecedented in American politics. (One sometimes wishes there had been more food.) But to call these "structural changes" with any precision one would need to examine the structure they were supposedly changing much more systematically than Schlesinger does.

Perhaps the strongest case for the contention that the New Deal accomplished any basic "structural change" might be made if we were to say that the New Deal perfected the political institutions appropriate to an economy of "countervailing powers." The term "countervailing powers," of course, is that of Galbraith, upon whom Schlesinger leans heavily in his first two volumes. With this term Galbraith attempted to describe the new form American capitalism took in the 20th century when the old system of competing individuals was replaced by a new system of competing power blocs (big Labor, big Agriculture, big Government, big Consumer). No question, the New Deal gave appreciably more power and recognition to labor, agriculture and government, and, in general, raised the system of countervailing powers to the level of self-conscious politics. This we might strongly argue constituted a structural change.

Yet at the same time Schlesinger helps us recall that the system of countervailing powers existed long before the New Deal. (Some historians date its rise as early as 1890.) Most of the reforms instituted by the New Deal were old hat by 1932. It is significant that the New Deal developed no new philosophy of reform, relying on a patched up merger of Teddy Roosevelt's New Nationalism and Wilson's New Freedom. Taking a larger perspective, therefore, one might argue (using Schlesinger's own materials) that the period 1929-32 marked not the crisis of the old order, but the death throes of an order which had been in crisis for almost 40 years, and that the New Deal marks the last act, not the first, by which American politics accommodated itself to the problems of economic justice raised by the system of countervailing powers.

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If we are adequately to measure the changes instituted we must go much further than Schlesinger. Did the New Deal confront the really fundamental problems which were raised by the new capitalism? Did it, for example, succeed in creating what years before Teddy Roosevelt had perceived was the *sine qua non* of adequate government in the new era: a national political leadership effectively independent of the tug and pull of the great interests? In our day we have seen national leadership hamstrung by the inherited necessities of countervailing power politics. I would argue that the New Deal failed to solve one of the fundamental problems of the new order *at a moment when the problem could have been solved.* My point is that Schlesinger does not raise questions of this kind, and cannot deal with the problem of change unless he does.

Another thing which keeps Schlesinger from dealing properly with the problem of change is his carelessness with regard to the problem of continuity. How can we measure historical change if we have no clear sense of continuities? Haphazardly in these volumes (and in stunning detail) Schlesinger indicates how deeply the continuities of American history shaped the character of the New Deal. We see how nostalgia for the family-sized farm over and again hampered the nation in finding a solution for its agricultural problems. We see America's commitment to the rhetoric of free enterprise and her paranoiac fear of the rhetoric of socialism (a phenomenon unique among advanced industrial nations) continually inhibiting reform. We see America's habitual individualism and competitiveness resisting the effort to establish a sense of community and two-party, non-ideological politics blunting the edge of action.

What changes took place in the New Deal took place within and against these continuities. But Schlesinger offers us no guidance on how to relate the two. There is, of course, no historical change which is not embarrassed by the microscope of history. Minutely scrutinizing French life before and after the French Revolution Tocqueville can almost convince us that no revolution occurred. Historians have done the same thing with the Russian Revolution and are in the process of doing it with the Cuban Revolution. No doubt, tradition indelibly marks the character of all change and severely limits its possibilities. But, after all, changes do occur.

The point is that the vital center is poorly equipped to deal with historical change. It cannot know where the center of history is, for it doesn't know of what it is the vital center. Not knowing where it is, it doesn't know where it has been, nor how far it has come. Something that will look a good deal like ideology would seem to be necessary before the historian can hope to deal adequately with the problem of change.

Which leads to a consideration of the second question I feel Schlesinger has not answered properly:

II. *How pragmatic was the New Deal's pragmatic liberalism?*

The great task of pragmatism has been to apply the experimental method to man and society. The most important question we

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can ask of any pragmatist is, "What is the basic unit of society upon which you intend to experiment?" For John Dewey, the preeminent pragmatist of our day, the answer to this question (at least during most of his career) was "society itself." This effort to treat society-as-a-whole as the fundamental unit of experimentation is part of a development in American thought running through the work of Bellamy, Croly, Beard, Veblen, Mead, to Dewey himself. (For William James, the first great pragmatist, individual man was the unit of experimentation and therefore he developed no real social theory.) For the later pragmatists no social experiment which did not deal systematically and consistently with society itself was truly scientific. For this reason Dewey denied that the New Deal was pragmatic. "Experimental method," he wrote in 1935, "is not just messing around nor doing a little of this and a little of that in the hope that things will improve. Just as in the physical sciences, it implies a coherent body of ideas, a theory that gives direction to effort."

Consider now Schlesinger's use of the term pragmatism:

> Faith in experiment implied a belief in a middle way. The pragmatic approach rejected equally those who would make no change at all in the social order and those who demanded total change. It sought increased government management of the economy but stopped short of government planning of all economic decisions.

As with nearly every political term, Schlesinger defines pragmatism by posing it *against* doctrinaire ideology. Pragmatism is both more and less than ideology: more successful because its methods are geared for success, less ambitious because it has learned how stubbornly history resists totalistic solutions. It is the method of the vital center and signals the end of ideology.

There are two reasons why I would insist that neither the New Deal nor vital center liberalism earns the name pragmatic. First, it is clear that neither of them are truly experimental in temper. There is no evidence in the *Age of Roosevelt* that the New Deal ever conducted a social experiment even approximating an experimental model, nor does Schlesinger in *The Vital Center* devise any potential experiments for our approval. Experimentation is impossible from the vital center. It has no over-all sense of the society upon which it is experimenting, and, more important, its implicit view of history conveys the suggestion that history is likely to resist experimentation. History from the perspective of the vital center is not only complex; it is also incongruous, a buzzing confusion of conflicting interests, the scene of diffused, interacting, and overlapping sources of authority, full of contradictory ideas and ironic gaps. "Control" is the word we usually associate with the experimental method, and the history which Schlesinger perceives would hardly stand still long enough to permit any control. Improvisation is not pragmatism.

The second reason I would deny the New Deal the name pragmatic is that it lacked the set of unchallenged moral assumptions which are necessary to make pragmatism work. To conduct an experiment intel-

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ligently we must know beforehand what will constitute a successful experiment. To experiment intelligently on man we must be morally, I would almost say, ideologically secure, for what but a clear social ethic can distinguish a success from a failure with man? Schlesinger, who usually knows what to say, makes the point this way:

> Without some critical vision, pragmatism could be a meaningless technique; the flight from ideology a form of laziness, the middle way an empty conception.

Well spoken. And since the point is now his we may properly ask Schlesinger what "critical vision" of the New Deal animated its pragmatism. More often than not an eclectic hodge-podge, a humanitarian "sense," an "instinct for the future." Devising social experiments is difficult enough, devising one which satisfies a humanitarian sense or an instinct for the future is impossible. Schlesinger was wrong to begin with when he posited an antinomy between pragmatism and ideology. One might better argue that pragmatism is impossible without ideology. What else is this "critical vision" of which Schlesinger speaks if not ideology of some sort? The question is not whether we have an ideology but whether that ideology is explicit. The danger of Schlesinger's doctrinaire opposition to ideology is that it will dull the moral and critical faculty itself and make pragmatism indeed a form of laziness, an empty conception. That Schlesinger has succumbed to this danger I shall now illustrate by considering the third question which his book has failed to answer:

> ***III. Could the New Deal have travelled further on the road to reform without breaking the healthy continuity of American political institutions?***

Schlesinger not only fails to answer this question, he never seriously considers it. By the testimony of these pages the New Deal was a chapter in the history of half-hearted reform. Over and again we see reform inhibited by practical politics and ambiguous objectives. When the federal government orders the slaughtering of hogs, at a time when millions were hungry, Schlesinger comments on Wallace's behalf: "What alternative was there given the rules of the game?" He applauds the success of the AAA: "Here was democracy's feasible middle way between a self-interest which meant anarchy and a coercion which might mean tyranny—planning by incentive, rather than planning by command." But what of the government's utter failure to deal with the desperate plight of the tenant farmer? It should not go without saying, without a clear sense of what moral claims the tenant farmer had upon national policy, that any federal attempt to alleviate the suffering of the tenant farmer would shove the system into anarchy or tyranny. Yet too often in this book it does go without saying.

Schlesinger makes a good deal of the New Deal's efforts to improve the quality of national life. The New Deal passed legislation, he tells us, for reasons many today would argue are beyond political control.

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We see TVA engineered not only to provide cheap electricity but to make rural life more attractive in the face of a pernicious trend to urbanization. The Homestead projects, we are told, sponsored a back to earth movement aimed at breaking up the ills of mass society, building character, depopulating slums. We even have the first governmental efforts at dealing with the excrescence of suburbia. Schlesinger applauds these efforts and rightly. But what significance are we to attach to these efforts? Schlesinger lays them end to end offering no critical appraisal of their achievement. Were not these efforts abortive, half-hearted, and ineffectual? We need not become simple-minded meliorists in order to entertain some skepticism that all that could have been done, was done.

Pragmatism for Schlesinger seems always to end up as fatalism. Consider his treatment of the so-called first and second New Deals. Historians have disagreed as to how radical a break there was between Roosevelt's first administration and his second. The microscopic historians have piled example on example of second New Deal aspects of the first administration, and first New Deal aspects of the second administration. We lose all sense of the shape of things when we know so well. For once Schlesinger resists the microscope and demonstrates superbly that there *was* a change, and does so without defacing the tale told by his facts. But having done this he then fails to state a preference for one or the other, and in fact proceeds to synthesize them into component parts of a single action. The planners of the first New Deal, we are told, had the necessary idealism, and perhaps a closer sense of the emerging shape of the American economy, but they were excessively the children of light, ignorant of the realities of power and the way power inevitably perverts the ideals it serves. The Brandeisian lawyers of the second New Deal were more the children of darkness, brought a surer, more tough-minded political touch, thereby augmenting the first New Deal where it was weakest. The vital center absorbs all into itself. As in some classic drama each stage of the New Deal is made a component in the completion of a single action. (The second New Deal, we are told, was "an almost inevitable response to the new necessities of the American situation.") Here as elsewhere in the *Age of Roosevelt* Schlesinger's sense of history reveals a deep strain of fatalism, a fatalism fatal indeed to that sense of freedom which is pragmatism's life-blood.

Now what does it matter if we call Schlesinger a pragmatist so long as we understand he is pragmatist without a gambler's heart? I am not jealous of labels. Schlesinger may call himself whatever he wishes and need only accept the burden of consistency. What I am trying to illustrate is how the meanings he perceives in things, and which adhere to his labels, serve to cripple the possibility of effective liberal politics. I share his unhappiness with isms; but we must deal in some sense with isms if we are to speak the language, and convey our thoughts through it.

I hope therefore the reader will understand how directly I am speaking to Schlesinger when I say to him that the trouble with his position is not only that he is not enough of a pragmatist but that he has only

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half learned the lessons of his own historical realism. Historical realism works in two directions, not one. It works against idealistic reform but it also works for it. It not only limits the possibility of achieving our ideal goals (Schlesinger has utilized this insight powerfully and cogently) but *it also assures us that these ideals will not have as dangerous an effect upon the system as Schlesinger seems to suppose.* I asked before whether vigorous action on the part of the government to alleviate the suffering of the tenant farmer would have endangered the system, and my answer is "no!" precisely because of my historical realism. The consequences of ideology *in America* are not nearly so dire as Schlesinger has supposed. America is the place which not only inhibits the use of ideology, it is also the place which controls its dangers.

Permit me to illustrate my point with regard to an entirely different problem. I have heard historical realism used by Southerners in resisting integration. Apply the ideal of equality abstractly, they say, back it up with force and you will do a violence to historical circumstances which will be far worse than any good you will achieve through integration. Now I have considerable sympathy with the line of argument. But I detect in this case a certain dishonesty with regard to its own assumptions. For the same historical realism which leads them to be suspicious of abstract, totalistic solutions to real problems should convince them that the effects of these total solutions need not be so destructive as they imagine. Even the famous Reconstruction Period, from 1865-1876, just after the Civil War, which Southerners lament to this day as an example of the violence which doctrinaire politics can do, saw few fundamental changes in Southern life. The fears of the Southerners were as inordinate as the ambitions of the Northerners and the violence to Southern life which they envisioned in their distorted imaginations contributed to the violence which actually occurred. They were accomplices and so are their counterparts today. A sense of historical realism could have led them to accede to reform as easily as it led them to oppose it.

I do not for a moment wish to make Schlesinger guilty by this or any other association. He, of course is not a segregationist. But there is an instructive parallel which might be drawn between this illustration from the South and the New Deal. Like the serious Southerners who cried havoc (also "Communist") at the inroads which abstract equality would make upon Southern life, so too were there industrialists and bankers who hollered Communist about the inroads the New Deal was about to make upon our sacred institutions. Schlesinger has conveyed the density of life in America well enough to reveal how ludicrous, how hypocritical, the cries and threats of the business community were. Yet it is clear from his account that the violence of their reaction to developments in the New Deal helped block avenues of reform and moved the vital center somewhat further to the right. I am convinced that if the New Deal had been more realistic it would have seen through the opposition, calmly and persistently revealed to them how inordinate were their fears, and could have *safely* moved further along the road to re-

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form than it did. Historical realism is quite properly a prelude and reminder to ideology, but it cannot be a substitute for it. I am unhappy that a liberal of Schlesinger's importance can spend three volumes depicting a pageant of reform without ever asking the profoundly historical question of whether more could have been done. This uncritical acquiescence to what he selectively defines as historical reality not only makes for an inadequate *Age of Roosevelt,* it also indicates the perils residing in vital center liberalism.

This leads me, finally, to the fourth question which I believe Schlesinger has failed to answer satisfactorily:

IV. *Wherein lies Roosevelt's greatness?*

The charge of fatalism which I have levelled against Schlesinger is not one he would accept happily. Schlesinger has sensed the charms of fatalism, commented trenchantly on the tendency of mass democracies to fall victim to them. Yet he has been quite explicit in insisting that the politics of the vital center is a politics of freedom and not of fate. Indeed his very attempt to relocate the intellectuals of the left within the vital center of political action was an attempt to put them in touch with the wellspring of historical freedom. In a recent issue of *Encounter** Schlesinger wrote:

> . . . historical determinism deprives history of its moral dimension by depriving the individual of accountability for his acts. No historical philosophy, in its ultimate implications, could more profoundly contradict the democratic faith in freedom, dignity, and responsibility of man. A convinced democrat must therefore make the case against fatalism; but to do so, to restore the moral dimension to history, one must contend for the potency of human choice: individual decisions have to make a difference to history after all . . . The heroic leader has the Promethean responsibility to affirm human freedom against the supposed inevitabilities of history. As he does this, he combats the infection of fatalism which might otherwise paralyze mass democracy.

It is with the heroic leader, therefore, that Schlesinger finally rests the case for freedom, and in America it is with the president. "Vigorous government under the American system," he writes in *The Coming of the New Deal,* "would seem almost impossible without something like the Rooseveltian sleight of hand at the center." A consideration of Schlesinger's treatment of Roosevelt therefore provides the sternest test to the thesis we have been developing.

In Roosevelt, vital center liberalism finds its hero incarnate. He brought to the executive office energy and movement, sublime confidence, and consummate political virtuosity. He was the anti-ideological, pragmatic, historically realistic, man of action *par excellence.* He was more sympathetic with greater varieties and greater numbers of Americans than any man in the history of the office. He was the vital center

* "On Heroic Leadership," *Encounter,* (December 1960), p. 5.

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of the vital center and recapitulated in himself the feelings and traditions, the good sense and forward thrust of America itself. To Schlesinger Roosevelt's was the instinct for the future, the subterranean idealism which kept New Deal pragmatism from sinking into laziness and empty conceptions. He was the perfect democratic leader, heroic in stature, yet committed to the task of leadership by persuasion and education rather than coercion. One cannot doubt from reading the *Age of Roosevelt* that America would have been a different place under a different president. In this sense Schlesinger's conviction that the president is the center of freedom in a democratic system stands as proven.

But for me the most remarkable thing I learn about Roosevelt from these books was his ignorance of the moment in which he lived, of the forces he governed, and the future he was entering. No man, of course, can know the entire truth of his time. What are historians for, except to remind us of this? Lincoln did not fully understand the forces of incipient capitalism with which he was allied though these forces had emerged and were there to be known. Yet Lincoln understood, with clarity and depth, the nature of the crisis of democracy and of the nation in which he was involved. Roosevelt over and over again impresses us with his ignorance in these matters. America had more to fear than fear itself: it had an economic system addicted to cycles of boom and bust to fear; it had a world movement of totalitarianism to fear; it had the complications which attend mass society to fear and it had much that could be stated explicitly to accomplish as well. It is the Roosevelt ian political flair which always seems to attract Schlesinger's admiration and which he renders most heartily. He records too the rhetoric, the vague goals, the intuitions of the man, though not with the same fidelity. But democratic society must be run by more than a kind of political existentialist and must scrutinize itself in more intelligible terms than Schlesinger provides. What could Roosevelt have accomplished which he didn't? That is the question we should ask. To what further use could he have put the dextrous powers of his office? An answer to these questions which has no sense of the style of the man is empty of life and Schlesinger has infused his portrait with much that is of life; an answer to this question which has no element of systematic criticism, no explicit sense of what is possible and what is desirable, no thoroughgoing commitment to the notion that history not only is but that it can be improved, is empty of meaning.

I do not accuse Roosevelt of fatalism, I accuse Schlesinger of it. We have not said enough when we have established convincingly that a chief executive has the leeway to influence the course of history. If we are to be free ourselves we must ask whether he influenced events in the direction they ought to have and could have gone. I find in Schlesinger's treatment of Roosevelt a reflection of his treatment of the entire New Deal. Here is the same mood of acquiescence, the same liberal yes-saying, the same know-nothingism in the name of good history. And all of them examples of some of the perils which reside in the vital center.

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GEORGE KENNAN: THE PERILS OF HISTORY

Henry M. Pachter

"When there is something the Russians want from us, one or the other of these (distasteful) features of their policy may be thrust temporarily into the background. And there will always be an American who will leap forward with the gleeful announcement: 'The Russians have changed.'"—Mr. "X" in *Foreign Affairs,* July, 1947.

There is more than manner and know-how in Mr. George Kennan's urbane style; he also is a nineteenth-century statesman, and his political wisdom comes from the school of Castlereagh and Talleyrand. He does not just disagree with this or that particular line of the State Department; he denounces the totalitarian traits which have tainted the policies of the most democratic statesmen in the twentieth century—such as the Treaty of Versailles, the policy of Unconditional Surrender, the moralistic view that all people on our side are saints, all on the other sinners, the willingness to put up with the threat of nuclear war, and the obsession to hold outlying positions.

Mr. Kennan spreads before us the nostalgic view of the "balance of powers" and of a multi-national universe, free from arch-enemies and undying alliances. He thinks that having to deal with Khrushchev and Mao *simultaneously* makes things much easier for us than having to deal with Stalin alone; any other view is "simpliste." One could not agree more—but the question is not whether the view is *simpliste* but whether world affairs have been reduced to a two-power struggle. We all wish it had not, and Mr. Kennan's efforts to restore a multi-lateral universe have endeared him to the small nations in particular.

Mr. Kennan once formulated the so-called policy of containment. This policy called for political remedies against communist penetration; but if words have meaning, it also implied the engagement of aggressive forces at the point of friction. Though the NATO alliance was born out of this containment thinking, Mr. Kennan later repudiated this meaning. But in all his extensive writings he has failed to state how his interpretation of "containment" applies, for instance, to the coup of Prague.

In *Realities of Foreign Policy,* written six years after that event, he pokes fun at "another view which would hold Moscow responsible for all Communist activity everywhere" and goes on to explain that Soviet penetration is made possible by "weakness and illness of a given society," and to conclude that "containment is basically a

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problem of . . . our relations with the peoples of the non-Communist world." Well, the historian Kennan knows that in 1947 Czechoslovakia *was* part of the non-Communist world, and our relations *could* have been quite helpful, had not a telegram from Moscow forbidden Masaryk to accept Marshall aid. Nor was the "given society" sick. In the forthcoming elections the Communists anticipated a resounding defeat; it was precisely for this reason that Moscow—not to be held responsible for Communist activity everywhere—despatched Zorin to Prague personally to engineer and to supervise the coup of February 1948.

Nor was containment an answer to the civil war in China. On the other hand, there was no sicker place in the world than Berlin, but we successfully defended it while Mr. Kennan was director of the Planning Office in the State Department. He later found the consequences unpalatable and suggested the opposite policy: "disengagement," meaning, if words mean what they say, the interposition of a certain neutral zone between hostile blocs.

Mr. Kennan mentions neither of these conceptions in his most recent survey of East-West relations,* but comes out with a third suggestion, which on closer inspection turns out to be the most characteristic notion of Castlereagh's world: "balance of powers."

IF THE "DISENGAGEMENT" slogan has endeared Kennan to certain circles traditionally associated with a "left" label, the real Kennan disengages himself from the shibboleths of radical and socialist democracy. He does not think that the Spanish Civil War was the great divide between profascists and antifascists or, for that matter, that this division is of any consequence and has any meaning. Nor is he convinced that *de jure* recognition of the Chinese People's Republic is the slogan by which the righteous recognize each other; he rather is inclined to the opposite opinion: that such recognition, if for purely practical reasons it must be extended to the Chinese Communists, is distasteful at best.

Moreover, his attitude to the Russian and Chinese revolutions is based on a kind of Tory righteousness which once seemed the trademark of Dulles, his antagonist: Already in *The Decision to Intervene,* his most scholarly book, Kennan assumed a fundamental difference between Western attitudes toward Bolshevism and Bolshevist attitudes to capitalism. "Many people in Western governments came to hate the Soviet leaders for what they *did;* the Communists hated the Western governments for what they *were,* regardless of what they did." With their pragmatic approach, Westerners never really doubt the legitimacy of other nations, whereas Communist power not only was founded on the hope of Western doom, but was dedicated to the destruction of other states. The interventions of 1918, according to Kennan, can easily be explained by fortuitous circumstances such as Wilson's weakness and approaching stroke, whereas the Bolsheviks quite frankly

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* *Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin,* Atlantic Monthly Press, Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1961, 411 pp. A superbly written book, though slightly mistitled. Half of the volume is devoted to events up to 1922, while Stalin's last ten years, to whose knowledge the author might have contributed from personal experience, are left out completely. The persuasive style and the magisterial pose of the author unfortunately make it impossible to review the book. I know of no other historical work that relies so much on the writer's personal assurances and that knocks so many strawmen down with anything like so much grace.

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stated their world-conquering aims. Amazingly "simpliste"—the historian does not look in archives for the philosophy of a decision; but in newspapers and pamphlets Mr. Kennan might have found reflections of the pressures which bore down on Wilson to fight Bolshevism for what it *was*.

Kennan sees the past in the light of conservative doctrines; but he adopts quite a different stance when he talks about the present and the future. He shares with the Left and with the neutralists at least three basic assumptions:

a) Pragmatically the most important, and in his new book the one which seems to be central, is a notion of "Stalinism." Normal relations, he insists, were not possible either with Stalin as a person or with the system he imposed on the Soviet Union. With this obstacle removed, and Khrushchev an altogether different person, we no longer need feel that we are compromising with evil if we try to establish communications, nor need we fear that such attempt will fail of a positive response.

b) Underlying this theory is a more profound conviction that the character of a regime is reflected in its foreign policy, so that a more "liberal" dictator is easier to talk to than a paranoiac tyrant. Though alluded to throughout the book, this conviction is contradicted on other pages. In rejecting the policy of "unconditional surrender," e.g., Kennan follows orthodox conservative doctrine; the United States should not have put out of business a militaristic regime which provided effective balance against Soviet power in the Pacific. But when he comes to discuss Russia, the change which supposedly took place around 1956 there seems to make the difference between possibility and impossibility of communications.

c) As a corollary, it is postulated that such a change not only has taken place in the domestic relations of the Soviet regime with its people, but the nicer rulers of today also have given up the world-revolutionary plans to destroy the center of capitalistic power and to conquer the outlying areas.

To make these points, Mr. Kennan indulges in a number of verbal exercises, historical falsehoods and misinterpretations which accumulate to a partisan view of history. The fact that some members of the Central Committee presumably differ with Khrushchev on occasion is styled "rudimentary parliamentarianism,"* and Khrushchev's manner of banishing the dissenters is dismissed with the words: "Let us not be put off by the angularities of Khrushchev's character." Likewise, Khrushchev's emphasis on rocketry at the expense of consumer satisfactions (and I suppose his attempt to wreck the United Nations, his claim to get Berlin, etc.,), are summarized as "a tendency toward preoccupation with internal and defensive interests, away from the world revolutionary dreams of the early aftermath of the revolution."

THESE MAY BE MATTERS of taste and interpretation. But a historian must have his facts right. Mr. Kennan all too often simplifies or omits them. Poland came into being gradually by the creation of a National Council in 1914 under Austrian Auspices, a proclamation of independence in 1916 by the Central Powers, a recognition of independence by the Provisional Government in St. Petrograd in March of 1917, and a solemn Foundation of the

* Does not even the most rudimentary form of parliamentarianism require a minimum of publicity for divergent opinion?

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Republic in November, 1918. Kennan believes that in 1920 Poland was "only a few months old" and owed its existence to the "sentimental benevolence of the Western powers." German troops returning from Russia in 1918 were not noticeably more affected by Communist propaganda than others; on the contrary, the infamous "Balticum regiments" supplied the nucleus of the Nazi forces. Ebert never was "Chancellor" of the Reich. Liebknecht did not "proclaim a Soviet Germany . . . while Scheidemann was proclaiming the German Republic"; he spoke two hours later and ended in hailing "a free German Republic." Discussing the Yalta agreements, Kennan blames "the traditional American sentimentality about China" for a treaty which he thinks was highly satisfactory to the Chinese. "Such are the facts about Yalta," he exclaims, suppressing the "fact" that the treaty had to be rammed down Chiang Kai-shek's throat. Nor does he cite the evidence—not even to refute it—that Stalin did not start the Korean war, a puzzler for historians of our country.

Trifles; but they show the carelessness with which Mr. Kennan easily proceeds to grave assertions, always personally assuring his readers that his conclusions are based on careful study of the documents. But the use he makes of documents would not stand criticism in a sophomore class. To prove the difference between the pragmatic approach of the West to the Soviets and the Soviet leaders' dogmatic approach to Western capitalism, he does not compare public speeches of the one and of the other side, or diplomatic correspondence of the one and of the other side, but contrasts Bolshevist propaganda speeches with the fumbling process by which Wilson arrived at the decision to intervene. If the decision to intervene was just a blunder, Kennan does not ask himself why all Western statesmen seemed to blunder in one direction only, and that rather consistently over a period of time. The Bolsheviks, who had to ask themselves that question, were justified in discovering a pattern there, suggesting that they were being attacked for what they *were* rather than for what they did.

No doubt this was true in the first four years of Soviet power. But the British and United States governments did not recognize the Soviet Government definitely until 1931 and 1933, respectively. While Stalin was promulgating the doctrine of "socialism in one country" and fought hard inside the Comintern for his doctrine of coexistence, the Western governments continued to treat the Soviet Union as an ostracized country with which one might, at best and then under precautions, entertain business relations. But Kennan places the blame for this attitude exclusively on the messianic spirit of Bolshevist foreign policy and on the persecution complex of Stalin as a person, and to do that he has to suppress Stalin's numerous pleas for "Co-Existence." The real villain of Kennan's book is Stalin.

To MALIGN STALIN, it is necessary to exalt the humanity of Lenin. Thus it is asserted that Lenin "was relieved of that ignominious need . . . for buttressing his view by reference to someone else's gospel." Do ambassadors to Moscow not read *State and Revolution,* about half the text of which is quotation from "gospel"? Or: "(Lenin) could rule them through the love they bore him, whereas Stalin was obliged to rule them through fear." The sailors of Kronstadt may have thought

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differently about Lenin and so might have numbers who were purged by him before, during and after the revolution. "His mind remained open. . . . Those who shared his belief in the basic justification of the revolution could come to him and talk to him, and could find their thoughts accepted in the spirit they were offered and responded to." Paul Levi and Ernst Reuter (later the Mayor of Berlin) had a different experience; though Lenin had to admit that their criticism of the ill-fated "March Action" in 1921 was sound, he "responded" with a public tongue-lashing and expelled them from the Comintern.

To make Stalin out as a usurper, Kennan characterizes him as "only a colorless drone in the Party's administrative offices"; before 1917, he was known to his colleagues only as a trouble-maker. The most superficial reading of Party history belies these statements. Long before the revolution Lenin assigned to "a wonderful Georgian named Koba" (Stalin's Party name then) a difficult and most consequential job: to work out the Party's policy toward the nationalities. This entailed an attack on one of the pundits of pre-Bolshevist Marxism—Otto Bauer. Later Stalin organized the Baku Congress of Eastern Nations which may be considered a turning point in Soviet foreign policy. He was a member of the Central Committee before the revolution and in that capacity attended national congresses abroad; in Lenin's famous "Testament" he is named as one of the two most likely to become his successor. Quite a "trouble-maker," but certainly no colorless drone.

But Kennan needs the legend of the underling Stalin who wormed his way up by deceit and intrigue, for a purpose: constituting himself as a lay analyst, he has decided that Stalin was jealous of the brilliant Jewish intellectuals who made up "half the Russian Social Democratic Party." Himself only a converted police agent, Stalin furiously persecuted those who might remember his obscure beginnings, and he vented particular wrath against the "cosmopolitans" who were his betters by education and ability and, simultaneously, were suspect by their international urbanity. According to Kennan, he feared the revenge of the pre-Bolshevist Socialist International and the connections some of the old Bolsheviks maintained with their old comrades. "Trotsky and all that Trotsky represented was Stalin's fear; Hitler was largely an excuse for fear." Kennan goes as far as to maintain that Stalin did not really believe in the danger of a Nazi attack, because he was concerned only with the "protection of his personal position."

Just as Emil Ludwig has blamed the First World War on Kaiser Wilhelm's crippled arm, Kennan wants us to believe that Stalin's inferiority vis-à-vis the Jewish intellectuals, turned into a persecution complex, was responsible for the Second World War. The grain of truth which may be hidden in such assertions—just as with Woodrow Wilson's tiredness—is rolled into a mountain. Instead of tracing the real interests of the Soviet State, its Party and its leaders, and thereby elucidating Soviet foreign policy, Kennan reduces it all to the characters of two men: "Soviet diplomacy was so much more variegated and colorful in Lenin's time than in the Stalin era. In the change, the foreign policy of a movement became the foreign policy of a single man."

As a description of two periods in Soviet foreign policy, this is not very convincing. Lenin's foreign policy was

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utterly opportunistic, but Stalin certainly produced more ideas and often took the initiative where Lenin was a victim of outside forces. But Kennan's statement is even less adequate as an analysis. Can the brilliant execution of a disengagement maneuver, justified to the Comintern by the doctrine of "socialism in one country," or the inspiring Popular Front offensive, Litvinov's frantic attempts to force collective security through the League of Nations, can the successful device of diverting the Japanese aggression away from the Soviet Union and south into China or the desperate stroke of embroiling Hitler with the West, can all this be called either unimaginative or "the policy of a single man"? Should we not rather look for the real problems for which these policies were the solution? And notably to the incessant conflict between the revolutionary traditions of the Communist party and the political needs of the Russian state, or between the interests of the Comintern and those of socialism in one country?

Russia's interest in the twenties, e.g., demanded that the Chinese nationalists should pursue the war and civil war which tended to weaken the Peking Government and the war lords, its masters, who were servants of Japan. A Communist revolution in China then was out of the question. Lenin therefore had initiated his famous friendship with Dr. Sun-Yat-sen. Yet, according to Kennan, it was Stalin who "for the temperamental reasons of which I have spoken (!), was more interested in the expulsion of the imperialists from China than in . . . an early Communist revolution." When an intelligent man utters such arrant nonsense, one always must look for an ulterior reason, which in the present case is not difficult to find. The personal view of history which Kennan is serving up in this volume serves one major aim: to blame Stalin, and him alone, for the bad relations between Soviet Russia and the West. ". . . The illusion of total antagonism can be created only by a complete absence of effective communication. For this reason [one] may be inclined to doubt whether an enemy with whom one can communicate is really an enemy, after all." (p. 259)

It is difficult to imagine a more ambiguous statement. After all, if Stalin prevailed at Yalta and Potsdam, it was not for lack of communication; there were enough people around who understood what he said or refused to say. On the other hand, our sense of being considered mortal enemies by the Soviet leaders has been enhanced rather than diminished by Khrushchev's table-thumping. Whether he speaks through rockets or swings his shoe, his language is always clear, though no one can pretend that it makes communication much easier. The etymology of the word implies that communication is a two-way affair, and if I had to define the difference between Stalin and Khrushchev in terms of communication, I would say that Stalin listened but spoke little, while Khrushchev speaks too much and has no ability to listen.

Inability to communicate with Stalin, it seems, also was the reason why the Western powers failed to rescue the Spanish Republic. Though the great trials only started after the Non-Intervention Committee had been convened, and though the fate of a few old Bolsheviks could not be of much concern to Messrs. Chamberlain and Chautemps, and anyway Kennan's research then was not available to them, Kennan decides that "Stalin's

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Russia was never a fit partner for the West in the cause of resistance to fascism." Why? Because "Russia herself was the scene of the most nightmarish orgies of totalitarianism." This thinking leads on to slippery ground. States conclude alliances with others regardless of their religion and constitution; a realistic view of history—and particularly of Soviet foreign relations—shows that national interest always got the better of political sympathies. But in saying that "Stalin's Russia" was no fit partner, Kennan sets the stage for the statement that Khrushchev's Russia is.

Perhaps it is—but not for that reason! If a deal can be made with Khrushchev, it will be for the same reason that deals could be made with Stalin: that the policy-makers here and there decide that it pays to regularize the status quo. We have no proof that the "nice" Khrushchev will keep treaties any more faithfully than the bad Stalin. On the contrary, experience points in the other direction: his "angularities" are becoming less predictable than Stalin's roughness. Mr. Kennan chooses to believe that Stalin "consumed—almost to the last crumb—those very prerequisites in Russian society on which his fearful, jealous, totalitarian power maintained itself. He had created a situation in which, fortunately for us, it would have been very hard for any other Stalin to establish himself." Khrushchev is not Stalin, by the principle of identity; Stalin was bad, by definition; hence Khrushchev is not bad. Q.E.D. The book is composed as a great counterpoint to the hopes Mr. Kennan places on Mr. Khrushchev. With a keen sense for the dramatic, Kennan shows us first the intractable Lenin, then the impossible Stalin, to work up to the great turning point where the new "parliamentarianist" dictator is both tractable and possible. This is drama, but is it history?

THE BOOK from which I have quoted most extensively, however, is not a historian's book, as Mr. Kennan's *The Decision to Intervene* was. It is something one might call "applied history" or "appreciation of some lessons of history." It reminds one of Machiavelli's *Discorsi* in style, manner and content. Applications are tacked onto the recital of an event, and the lesson drawn usually is one of Realpolitik: not to blind oneself by ideology, not to be led into war for the sake of principles, always to keep an eye on the balance of power that will exist after an opponent has been knocked down, to restrain one's friends in formulating aims of total salvation, and to envisage limited rather than virtuous goals, to put one's house in order before preaching to the savages and anyway not to overestimate cultural propaganda as a weapon, not to believe in absolute evil (except where Stalin is concerned). One might subscribe to these and other dicta, which have come down from Machiavelli via Metternich, Talleyrand, Ranke and others to Walter Lippmann and finally to Kennan, had the author not claimed for them special significance. He strikes the pose of a leader demanding confidence, or at least of a teacher of wisdom. But writing under the stress of Khrushchev's Berlin ultimatum, I wonder how our Ambassador to Belgrade turns into practical policies the concluding line of wisdom in this book: Leave some problems for our children to solve. That is indeed good advice—if Kennan only knew how to convey it to Khrushchev.

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PUBLIC AT BOTH ENDS

Christopher Amos

It is a long time now since craftsmen in the trade regarded with amusement any statements suggesting that publishing was a business—publishers had considered themselves gentlemen, not businessmen, and their declared concern had been with art, not commerce. But that historic smile, however rueful it had been, has faded away. The mergers and public stock issues are no longer news, though such financial transactions are, if nothing else, the criteria of big business. Recently there have been twenty-odd mergers involving forty presses and publishing houses; in March, 1960, the month before Random House acquired Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., *Publishers' Weekly* started a monthly listing of the publicly traded book company stocks that now includes 29 issues with more to come.

First the mergers: dramatic as they are in coalescing seemingly immutable and disparate sovereignties, they are only a secondary result of a deeper change. Mergers are nothing new, viz: Morrow and William Sloane Associates; Appleton-Century-Crofts (merged again with Meredith and again with Duell, Sloan and Pearce; Putnam, Coward-McCann and John Day; etc.)—nor is public ownership new: McGraw-Hill, Holt and Prentice Hall, among others, have been traded for some time. What is new is that in 1959, to every one's astonishment, total sales of text and reference books, trade and juvenile, hard cover and soft, exceeded a billion dollars—$1,005,635,000 is the combined figure of the American Book Publishers' Council and the American Textbook Publishers' Institute, and the total for 1960 has been estimated at one billion one hundred thirty million.

The greatest increase of business has been among the text book publishers, their sales having doubled in the last five years, and it is here that expectations of profit in educating a population outgrowing the means of conveying that education have attracted non-risk investments. But trade publishing booms too, and provided that those who have been educated continue to read, its market will continue to expand. In paperback publishing something over 360 million volumes were sold in 1959, or about a million books consumed a day. I will confine the observations that follow mostly to trade publishing, but as mergers centralize all publishing, the text executive who would leave

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out too explicit mention of, say, Mexican territorial sovereignty in an American History seeking Texas adoption, sits ever closer beside the distributor of brightly discolored fictional paper cover maunderings to determine the content of the trade publisher's list. A great many good things will come of the new multi-million dollar corporations; I would like only to cite a few of the dangers of this bigness which, though they may not be expressed in figures, are as real a dividend as any appearing in a financial statement.

SEVEN YEARS AGO, in an article in the *Saturday Review,* Curtis Benjamin, president of McGraw-Hill, argued that there was no such thing as bigness in the book publishing world, and that, in fact, the peanut business, he cited figures, was larger than trade publishing by half. Last year, Mr. Benjamin appeared in the same magazine with an article entitled "The Business that Disdains Success"; now, having accepted bigness, he denounced guilty preoccupation with the slogan "fewer and better books," and cheered his colleagues on to a publication explosion. Investors are betting on Mr. Benjamin rather than peanuts: in the year and a half that *Publishers' Weekly* had reported the trading, McGraw-Hill stock has increased in value from 44½ to 123 (since split). This is one example of investors willing to buy in even though the ratio of stock price to dividend earnings is out of line, and the source of one pressure to get them back in line.*

The trade industry's growth of sales (fiction, nonfiction, juvenile and reference books) has been steady, but previously even an annual 20 per cent increase over relatively nothing was still relatively nothing. In 1939 the volume of sales split among nearly 100 publishers was $178,000,000, and in the year 1959, it swelled to $680,000,000, the income spread among as many fewer houses as there were mergers. This is an increase, adjusting dollar value, of more than 300%. This lovely trend has not been allowed to languish merely in the present simply because accountants have run out of figures: The Book Manufacturers' Institute prepared a detailed forecast which predicts that "something like one billion two hundred thousand books will be sold by the American book industry by 1965, an increase of about 27% over the 1958–59 average." Great pressure to go public is imposed on companies whose growth potential is so well documented.

If in their founding years publishers were moved by mainly poetic considerations, the reasons leading to their selling out are controlled by the hard facts of business sense and personal mortality. It must be borne in mind that most publishing houses were begun as the single vision and personal responsibility of one man, and have been either family owned or closely held by their management. A delicate, and perhaps impertinent, phrase of the investment business is "management

* For publishers' issues as a block, Barron's reported in January, 1961 that the ratio of price to earnings was 27 to 1 as compared to the Dow-Jones average ratio of 18.1 to 1. *Publishers' Weekly* this August noted, however, that book stocks, as a group, were down 12% in price during the second quarter this year—still up 22% over the same quarter in 1960.

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senescence," a euphemism employed to criticize a multitude of fiduciary sins ranging from the situation of estate taxes which must be faced, to the demands of a changing market that allegedly haven't been faced. Not all publishers have prospered, and it has been the moribund houses that first experienced annexation, valued for their tax loss benefits as well as their literary properties. But consider the term as applying to actuarial realities rather than as a righteous judgment of allegedly dated business practices: Before its merger, control of Bobbs-Merrill was held by three men, two in their sixties, one over eighty—if any one died, his estate would have had to sell his holdings to pay the death taxes, leaving the other two with less than controlling interest; at Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., presumably one man stood in danger of casting an inheritance tax burden on his heirs, with the Bureau of Internal Revenue determining, perhaps at an inflated estimate, the value of the company whose stock was untraded and unlisted. Cashing in on the honorable investment of a life time, at twenty-five per cent capital gains tax, is the certain and expedient course.

So MUCH FOR WHY a company sells out and becomes absorbed; going public is the opposite, it is a means of growing bigger while retaining control. In the rapidly expanding book industry there is a fierce rivalry between the individual firms to diversify and enlarge at a faster rate than their competitors. The rationale of bigness is strength in the market, and competitive growth requires refinancing; public stock (equity financing), can raise money for acquisition and at the same time broaden the sharing of investment risk. Merger has proven the fastest method to accomplish diversification: Noonday's paperbacks have been merged with Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, putting the latter firm in that segment of the market, and the former more solidly in the black. Knopf's Vintage Books (paper) have been added to Random House's Modern Library Paperbacks, and the combined operation is now competitive in size with Doubleday's Anchor, Dolphin and Image paper book division. Crowell-Collier, with three magazines deceased, absorbed Macmillan and The Free Press, and now plans to reenergize the Macmillan text book list lately overshadowed by the merged giant of Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Crowell-Collier has announced expansion of its encyclopedias, a move matched by the merger of The Encyclopedia Britannica with Crompton and Co. Random House, having acquired the Knopf trade and college departments, plans to expand, especially the latter, and has added the elementary text firm of L. W. Singer, a larger and more important addition than Knopf, though not as startling. Harcourt, Brace merged with World Book Company, Prentice-Hall with Iroquois Publishing, Criterion with Abelard-Schuman, Avon with Hearst, World Publishing Co. with Meridian, New American Library with the Los Angeles Times-Mirror; the list continues, including American publishers taking over British houses, and even such large and securely autonomous firms as Harper and Houghton Mifflin receive frequent inquiries from intermediary bankers representing investors. A

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few large interests with announced plans of acquisition are still looking for mergeable publishers.

A company that has established its value by listing its stock finds itself in a more favorable position to raise money either by more easily obtained loans (debit financing) or by further equity financing. Better still, new acquisitions can be made by stock swapping, without the necessity of cash ever changing hands. Only a certain percentage of the company's stock, far less than half interest, is put on the market at a value determined by assets, income statements and the like. Over the years, as the company's value increases, and expectation of growth bids up its price, more stock can be offered at the future going price. The first offerings of the recently listed companies have been small and heavily over-subscribed. In the case of Western Publishing, the stock was offered at 42, went up to 51 on the first day of trading, and now, a year later, after a four for three split, is something over 70.

There are other reasons for expansion to result in merger and public ownership; in one way or another they apply to the book business. One feels that Hearst bought Avon just because it had nowhere else to put its money. Howard W. Sams, Inc., known only to the electronics industry for which it publishes television repair manuals, bought the better known Bobbs-Merrill so that it could establish greater common interest in a common stock issue. In some cases executive tax rates might be cheaper on dividend income than on a straight salary, and there is an opportunity then to attract sharp new management with the lure of stock option plans. At any rate, for the cheering investor looking for glamor and adventure, books, once the unlovely commodity firmly associated with the teacher's ugly looks, are now the focus of happy and enthusiastic interest.* Or are they?

ONE MUST DISTINGUISH between accomplishment and the thing that is accomplished, between production and the object that is produced. Consider only trade publishing, and separate books that are published from the business of publishing them. This end of the industry is changing in more ways than merely an increase in size, and it is naive to think that businessmen, sedulous in the pursuit of sales, will think their duty to *circulation* a separate and equally serious matter. I am thinking of the change occurring in that kind of publishing, once the activity of an individual design, which took the initiative in introducing new art and serious viewpoints, and felt a responsibility to see that this work got deserved circulation; I am thinking of the publishing activity that honors the artistic method of abstraction and the artists' deputation to portray an individual ideology opposed to a social ideology. An editor found that while he might not know his audience with personal intimacy, the chances were good that if the work was honest and that he could become enthusiastic about it, it would

* I quote from the 8/31/60 quarterly report of the Fidelity Capital Fund, net investment $20,059,258: "In the quarter just ended, your fund increased its investment in the publishing industry to 10.1% of its total net assets from 4.3% in the quarter ending 5/31/60."

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also interest a sizable enough public. This kind of publishing, concerned with a coherent and integrated editorial point of view—opposed and controversial by definition in an arbitrary world—seems to be fast passing, editorial coherence being replaced by a sales line that is diversified and ingratiating. An editor of the *New York Times Book Review* told me that they had not commissioned many essays for the past fall season in expectation of the large number of books that were to be published. The books arrived in great and unexciting quantities, and the *Times* regretted not having something more interesting to fill its Sunday pages.

Publishing boards of directors bristle with lawyers and advertising men, merchandisers and salesmen. The work of finding, recognizing and developing the careers of serious artists has been the difficult task of publishing; historically, it has best been accomplished by an editor and publisher who were the same person, and who needed to agree only with himself, a hard enough job. The businessman, having discovered the economies that can be effected by combining sales, production, shipping, billing and promotion within his merged firms, longs even more ardently to invent similar savings in his editorial department. So Bobbs-Merrill has had its editorial staff completely cleared out, and Rinehart nearly so. This leaves the businessman's committee to pass on editorial decisions, such decisions as will displease no one.

Mr. Knopf, the exemplar of the publisher who wished to record an individual vision of the changing world as expressed by his serious artists and made permanent in beautifully bound volumes, has said that from the moment the subject had first been mentioned he hadn't spent four hours thinking about his company's sale to Random House. Over and over he has been quoted as saying that the business which he still runs, and which will, likely, as a subsidiary, always bear his name, will not change during his life time. "The only significant change is Wall Street's new regard," he said. "Public ownership has been the case in England for decades to no serious detriment." These are reassuring words, and yet, whereas in England Sir Stanley Unwin can write an honored book entitled *The Truth About a Publisher,* including a chapter called, "How to Make a Nuisance of One's Self," regarding cantankerously individual opposition, it is hard to imagine an American publisher writing an equivalent piece and meaning it.

In a single conversation I heard a publisher state both that all the manuscripts worth publishing were being published (an unprovable statement), and also that the industry will be publishing far more and much better books. These two statements seem at first to be mutually exclusive: for if there is just enough savor to go around, wherewith will the extra salt be savored? To digress a bit: of the industrial nexus, the observation has been frequently made that mass production has blinded us to the process by which a product is produced. Before technocracy we become inept and find that as consumers some of our power of selection has been usurped; it is the businessman who orders from the designer and pays him for a product-design that can be economical-

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ly adapted to the machines that can mass produce it—printing presses in this case—and the consumer takes his pick of what is available and best suits his style. Further, although the consumer takes his pick only from what is available, there is a plethora of cultural modes from which to choose: a stupefying variety of materials, tools and arts from all the disciplines of all times and all places. Here is where the publisher will find material for "more and better books": he or his salesman acting as an editor rifle the art treasures of the ages, comment on the manners of the court of Nefertiti, amplify the solemn advice of God's golfing partners, record the explorations of the heavens and the rummaging of the psyche. This is not editorial forthrightness, but an operation of looting and mooching. Better books? It hasn't been proven; the businessman is creating not an addition to culture but a concentration camp for it.

JUST HOW PROSPEROUS is the new prosperity? I suspect that in many important ways it is quite rotten. The image comes to mind of spring ice being danced upon by a chorus of marvellously nimble accountants; and, indeed, on the chill surface there seems to be plenty of action: Stocks increase geometrically in value. But sales, though supporting bouyancy, show a humbler increment of gain, a gain that is matched, possibly offset, by rises in manufacturing costs. I am not insensible to the virtues of the proliferation of quality reprinting available at lower prices (although I am surlily suspicious that the friendlier bendable paperback, finding a braver audience in its bright reincarnation, is bent to the contours of the body though perhaps not to the mind). But neither can one remain insensitive to the shameless sensationalism of the cheap reprints. According to the Book Manufacturers' Institute survey, the greatest increase in book manufacture will be in the cheap reprint category; a great deal of new business, it seems, will be old business. And as the average paperback is less than a quarter the price of an average casebound book, more than four times as many would have to be sold to keep an increase of dollar volume equal to sales volume. The limitation of sales display space threatens to cause quality reprinters the same glut crisis as was visited on cheap reprinters in 1954.

Five years from now it is predicted that readers will buy almost a half a book more apiece than they do now. This increase accounts for all sales: to the educated, the uneducated and those being processed. In other words, the ratio of sales to population is not markedly increasing, and the amount spent per capita is in decline. The old-fashioned book store, in trouble for years, may be finally dealt a blow from which it cannot recover by the discount houses stealing the dependable best-seller sales with their 20% to 40% off-list bargains. And as reprinting increases, individuality of books decreases, for the publishers tend to demand uniformity in titles, and package them in a rigidly consistent format, one book differentiated from another largely by the nonidentical arrangement of identical adjectives describing—or indicting—the

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contents. Neither do the reprinters, stripping the natural resources from the last 56 years of publishing—that is, any book still in copyright—encourage reforestation of lasting vitality by their single minded demands.

The authors, will they benefit in the new prosperity? The omens are not good. The worst augury is the decline in the ratio of authors to the number of books being published. This works in two ways: among reprinters, a favorite author is a dead author whose works are in the public domain; and with hardcover publishers it is no secret that any nonauthor from the mailboy to the editor-in-chief can dream together a piece of printed merchandise. Authors are no longer considered the only asset of a publisher and they are seeing not an increase in their traditional scale of royalties but rather the reverse. Previously, an author with sales over ten thousand copies could expect to reach the plateau of 15% royalty on the list price. But now, contracts with ten per cent top are not infrequently signed with similar reductions throughout the sliding scale. The cheap reprinters, it is true, are forced to make more liberal payments for current properties, half of which goes to the original publisher, and often dramatically overpay royalty expectations in competitive bidding for a book. But these end-of-the-rainbow prices are paid only to the splashy novelists or confessing film stars, very rarely the serious fiction writers, and rarer still to biographers, historians, or scholars.

Another measure of prosperity can be found in the answer to the question, are new jobs being made? is new blood being infused? The book business is notoriously low-paying: secretaries, many straight from Radcliffe, start out in New York at $55 a week, and a reader, expected to be well educated in literary selectivity, even if he isn't called on to exercise it, begins at only a little more. This is the only thorough editorial apprenticeship possible, but it must be doubted that the best candidates are lured as recruits. There are more salesmen, more administrators, more accountants—and these men have, by and large, respectable incomes—but very few new literary minds. In *Harper's Magazine* of a year or so ago, an article by an anonymous book editor (I can only too fully appreciate why any editor might wish to clothe himself in anonymity) entitled "Letter t oa Young Man About to Enter Publishing" advised any serious applicant that it would help if one's father were a member of some distinction in the publishing house of one's choice. I don't think this is any longer true. The chances are good that if one's father had founded a publishing house, he has since sold it. In fact there are far fewer jobs proportionately, of an editorial nature even though there are far more titles of allegedly far better books that must need someone to edit them. A well known and greatly admired publisher working for a company to which he had sold his own was facetiously asked if he had ever thought of going into business for himself. He chose to regard the question as a serious one and said that, no, there were too many problems nowadays.

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IT WOULD SEEM that if books are less interesting, rewarding, or valuable no one is to blame but the author. There have rarely been enough authors at any one time, really talented ones, to fill one publisher's list, let alone provide for nearly a hundred of them. The knowledge and interests of editors have prompted the writing of many solid books that wouldn't otherwise have been written, and this is still so though seemingly less so. The initiative of the personal publisher introduced the reader to new works, but now the big business publisher is coming to *follow* the record of past sales (Doubleday actually employs IBM machinery for this purpose) to know what might next become popular. At publishers' sales conferences new books are described to the salesmen in terms of what the book resembles: ". . . it's like *Rebecca,* only the house is in Faulkner's Mississippi, and the hero is a little boy like in Salinger . . ." But the overwhelmed book buyer, criminally misinformed by the astonishingly under-qualified book reviewers, begins to lose all critical faculties as he is forced to undertake simply the consumption of a reasonable facsimile of what he had last consumed. And the designer of the material, both the editor and the author, must be shrewder and shrewder as they are reduced to the role of suppliers to the machinery of mass production and distribution, becoming also more and more ignorant of who their public is and what it might want.* The salesman, untrained as a designer and subject to whim and fashion, thinks he knows, and as he becomes responsible for an ever growing percentage of books, he tends to reinforce the business conceit that the process is of greater importance than the final product. The reasonable facsimile is usually not as good as the original, however good that might have been, and with the editor forced to please the requirements of a machine before he pleases himself, the result is a subtle, but unmistakable, programmed debasement.

The book business is undergoing, as many other industries have already experienced it, a separation of ownership from management, the designer from the material he would design, and the consumer from any large consideration as a human to be satisfied rather than as an agent towards clearing the warehouses at a periodic frequency determined by sensible business sanitation. This is, of course, not the whole truth about book publishing. There are still thoughtful men trying to accomplish thoughtful programs. Editors woo and encourage authors of work appearing in the littlest magazines. And while a prospective automobile buyer cannot buy a sturdy new 1930 Ford if that is the style he wants, the book buyer can find with increasing availability centuries old works in handsome new editions. But a Model A Ford's obsolesence has no ideological bias, whereas new books, serious books, attempt nothing if not to find new artistic representation of expressly

* When so much of a publisher's income is derived from various subsidiary rights: movies, book clubs, magazine first serial, etc., a foresighted editor will edit for other industries' machinery—with which he is presumably less familiar—as well as for his own. This process is being reversed, much luck to us, by movie companies (Jerry Wald, Columbia Picture) and magazines (*Life, McCall's, Time*) entering the book trade.

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individual ideology. If individual, then biased—but without the artists' nervous tics or even more infuriating distortions there is no vision. Bias, however, leads to trouble.

This is the main point about the mergers, expansions and the heavy artillery of Napoleonic business. Because publishing has grown big and therefore powerful, it has equated the majority point of view with itself. It is most successful and enthusiastic publishing self-help books, so-called, about how to achieve a position in that majority, not necessarily your majority, or how to get ahead in it, or how to measure how far ahead you have gotten. Publishing is poorest where it swore it never would be: in circulating the author concerned with what is holding us back. The opposed writer, creating literature by recording the uniqueness of man and pointing to salvation in resistance not submission, threatens that majority point of view.* At the beginning of his career his bias is unsalable, and throughout his career his ideology is unacceptable. Despite the larger publishing houses' greater leverage with agents and other sources of manuscripts, a moment's investigation shows that the smaller house is far more frequently the original publisher of important new authors. Of course, if the ideology becomes an institution itself, and salable as any other commodity, all is forgiven if not honored. "Rebellion," says Madison Avenue, "is our hottest property." And the whole point is missed.

The writer writes also to get published. If he opposes, so is he opposed. In order to get published, the writer may or may not be able to avoid a self-imposed censorship; he may not muster the likely strength —without realizing its loss as a weakness—to let go the devastating blow, the stroke that would restore *his* majority. And the loss is ours. Perhaps this aspect should have been placed back in the text under considerations of the effect of bigness on writers. But the effect is all of us. The middleman conveyor becomes not a close encourager, but a potential ogre, the thought of whose retaliatory strength, even for a split second, turns the blow. And neither are we encouraged. As between writers and businessmen there is no doubt, nor is there really reason even to wonder, that writers, as a gang, have far the worse manners. Part of this may be that writers, having delivered the blow, assume that the power of it will sweep all before it (as expressed in large sales) and can become quite ugly when this doesn't happen. Businessmen-publishers have fine manners—and constantly run the risk of being betrayed by them into the attitude of the jolly panderer rather than the stern elevator.

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* This is not just suddenly true, but provable perhaps only over a period of time: Dreiser meticulously delineated the society of his time to indicate that, given a social reality so constituted, the crimes of Cowperwood, Griffiths and Carrie Meeber were understandable and even inevitable. *Sister Carrie* was recalled from the bookstores by its publisher, and *The Genius,* was, for a period of time, suppressed. More recently, *The Organization Man* was turned down by the company whose editor had encouraged its writing, and when it proved successful at another house, brought it back to publish as their most successful reprint.

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THE COMPANIES ARE BIG and getting bigger, their overheads are high and getting higher; they have to produce in volume, yet volume does not seem to allow of variety. Publishing has arrived at a strange paradox: costs increase, larger editions of any single title have to be sold, there are more titles, and yet there is a diminishing difference between editions—less reason or incentive for a purchaser to settle on any given title. In the last ten years there has been an increase of forty per cent in the number of new titles published annually—over 15,000 last year.* Theoretically, it would seem that there is a greater freedom of choice for readers. But faced with the task of choosing between this not really distinguished book and that supposedly definitive treatment of such and such a subject, finding his choice among the mediocre and downright bad authors who are encouraged and the good writers who are compromised, or any number of seemingly attractive but somehow unsatisfying choices, a severe psychological hardship is worked on the reader. There are too many choices the vast majority of which have little correlation with the readers' apprehension of their own lives. The book that is made into a book in order that there should be more wares to sell to offset overhead, may exist in the physical sense, but it is not real. Therefore it cannot be chosen for real reasons; the readers' selections are neither unique, personal nor free, and soon, under such an anxious burden, he may stop exercising a choice without meaning.** Book clubs, whose function is to help the readers' choice with a certain amount of pre-selection, mirror this dilemma in a different way. Books worth choosing are apparently few, and frequently several clubs will choose the same one. In the weekly opinion magazines book club ads often follow one another on succeeding pages, boasting of the unique thoughtfulness of their identical selections. And publishers proudly announce that their book is a simultaneous winner with the Literary Guild, *McCall's* and *Readers' Digest*—in gushing full length, in driblets, with the life squeezed out of it.

Perhaps book publishing has reached the point the movies attained some time ago. Extravaganzas set against the same stupefying variety of alleged cultures, and budgeted often at more than ten million dollars, came under the artistic direction of the bank presidents who put up the jack. As a result, there are now independent units of escapees from that system miraculously bringing in feature length movies under $100,-

* Much of the title increase is of technical volumes, and finds its market in the need to look things up in printed tables, an increase in the required number of books per student, adult education, etc. The argument still holds: people become more proficient at running the technocracy, but have less opportunity to find the literary example, specific to their time, for instruction on how to run themselves.

** In the days when things were a good deal simpler, a book such as *In His Steps* could sell many millions of copies in the original edition. Today a best seller may stay on the *New York Times* list for many weeks and sell no more than 15 or 20,000. But a phenomenon of our times, *Doctor Zhivago*, sold over three quarters of a million copies in hardcover, and perhaps several million more in paper. Instrument of the cold war or no, it can be argued that despite the book's difficult style, it was appreciated for its concern with the readers' reality. The only book to sell more copies recently is *Peyton Place*. Whose reality this is about I don't know. Publishers could also write about the idiocies of readers.

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000, movies that are seen, praised and which prosper. It is not too much to hope, indeed there are signs of it now, that independent, personal, Off-Publishers' Row publishers may appear in significant numbers. With the possibility of non-schedule publishing, infinitesimally small overheads and combined but unmerged distributions, perhaps they can make a go of it. Or perhaps, if the evil is the concentration of capital and the diffusion of talent, authors may take it into their heads to reverse the process, i.e., concentrate their talent and spread the capital among themselves in some sort of cooperative arrangement. If authors became their own publishers, there might be the opportunity not only to minimize the distance between the designer and the product, but the producer as entrepreneur, writing his own jacket copy, advertising copy (it couldn't be rendered less enticing than it is now), making the selection of typeface, etc., could take his royalties as salary, thereby saving on taxes, participate in profits above royalties, and take on new talent out of enlightened generosity. A co-op publishing house that spent a minimal amount of money on sales and distribution would, by the excellence of concentrated talent, force a decent representation of its books in book stores. Such an organization would have the incentive to accrete new talent.

At any rate, with or without encouragement, the good books, one hopes, will be written and, reluctantly or not, they will be published; but if only at the smaller houses or if imbedded in long lists from the industrial combines, then their authors run the risk of being swamped in the sheer volume of publication. Behind this volume lies the power, finesse and intention to out-advertise, out-publicize and out-shrill all but the most redoubtable and newsworthy heretics.

It was not to the large publishing cartels that Shaw would have directed his advice that ". . . there is nothing for us but to make it a point of privileged heresy to the last bearable degree on the simple grounds that all evolution in thought and conduct must first appear as heresy and misconduct..." He would have saved his breath.

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The following article forms the concluding section of a pamphlet, "Socialism and Culture," recently issued in England by the Fabian Society. It is reprinted here by the kind permission of the Society. Copies of the entire pamphlet may be purchased from the Fabian Society, 11 Dartmouth St., London, S.W. 1, for Four Shillings, Sixpence.—EDITORS

SOCIALISM AND CULTURE

Richard Wollheim

Should a Socialist society be a single, or a multi-cultural, society? Is there an entity called Socialist culture which is the proper culture of a Socialist society, or, on the other hand, is it a mark of a Socialist society that it offers its members a cultural multiplicity from which to choose?

My own answer is that a Socialist society should be a culturally plural society. Indeed I think that the historical mission of Socialism is to introduce to the world a form of society where the individual may realize himself by drawing at will upon the whole range of human culture which is offered up for his choice freely and in its full profusion.

Many Socialists will disagree with this. For them the attractions of Socialism are essentially connected with the benefits to be derived from an integrated and cohesive society, and they employ arguments drawn either from the nature of culture or from the great radical ideals of Equality and Fraternity to support this connection. Personally I think that these arguments are inadequate. And I think that there are other, and perfectly adequate, arguments drawn from the third great ideal of progressive politics, Liberty, which make the case for the plural society irresistible.

THE CASE FOR A COMMON CULTURE, based upon the very nature of culture, has recently received a very powerful and articulated formulation in Raymond Williams's *The Long Revolution*,* and it would be as well to consider the argument as it is there developed.

The starting-point of Williams's argument is a conception of culture as fundamentally a system of communication, a system by means of which one individual citizen transmits his experience to others. The cultural impasse in which we find ourselves today arises from the fact that our society has become fragmented into different groups between which it is no longer possible to commune freely. The exit from this situation lies

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through the "common culture" of Socialism: for with the inauguration of this system the barriers to intercourse will be down and man once again will be able to talk to man.

It is, in other words, Williams's contention that any genuine desire for cultural improvement must be a desire for a common culture; that this is so follows rigorously from the nature of culture as a system of communication. To my mind this contention is invalid, and it gains such plausibility as it possesses only from an ambiguity in its use of the notion of "culture."

For if we regard culture as primarily a system of communication—and this, I think, is not so evident, because not so clear, as Williams would have us believe—then cultural progress does perhaps mean the institution of a common culture, but, it must be noted, where this in turn means something like the institution of a common language. But this of course is not what Williams and those who argue with him mean when they talk of a common culture: they mean something much more like a situation in which everyone is animated by the same purposes and ideals. Williams sometimes tries to explicate his ideal by means of the expression "common meanings, common values." But what he fails to see is that he has compressed into this expression two quite different ideals: the modest ideal of a society in which people speak the same language, and the more comprehensive ideal of a society in which people say roughly the same things. The first ideal does perhaps follow from his original conception of what culture is: the second certainly doesn't.

Of course it is just possible that when Williams talks of "shared values," he has in mind merely what might be called the "permissive" values: values like toleration and rationality which are the preconditions of any common system of inter-communication, not something to be expressed in it. If it is only these permissive values that Williams thinks should be shared, then his ideal is perfectly compatible with a diversity of positive values, and what I would call cultural pluralism. But I think it is fairly clear that he identifies the common culture of Socialism with the widespread acceptance of more substantive values. For why else should he insist upon the sense of community, of participation, that will inevitably flow from the new culture?—and what otherwise would lead him to think of the Aldermaston marches as an earnest of the new spirit?

THOSE WHO WOULD ARGUE for an integrated society on the ground of Equality assume that a plurality of cultures is bound to involve a hierarchy of cultures. Now if a hierarchy here means simply a qualitative ordering, this can scarcely be regarded as something objectionable: for the alternative would be relativism, which is clearly undesirable. I therefore take the assumption to be that once any differentiation of culture exists within a society, the *differentia* are bound to attract and draw to themselves distinctions of a purely social kind. One culture will be regarded as socially superior to another, and membership of it will serve as a badge of class or status.

Now, in advocating a plurality of cultures I certainly am not arguing

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for a hierarchy in this pejorative sense, and I see no reason for thinking that support of the one commits one to the other. I envisage a plural society as one where various cultures coexist without any special cachet or prestige attaching to one rather than another. And if it is then claimed that this is impossible, and that different cultures will always provide occasion for social discrimination, I can see no reason for this. It may be claimed that any form of diversity *can* become a means of social distinction: but it does not follow from this that any particular form of diversity *must* become a means of social distinction. If, however, it is felt necessary to guard against the mere possibility of this happening, then we are immediately committed to a doctrine of social pessimism. For the only alternatives for society are a hierarchy or else total uniformity.

THOSE WHO ARGUE for a common culture on the ground of Fraternity maintain that it is only within a close-knit and integrated society that relief can be obtained from the inhumanity and the fragmentation of modern life. Since the coming of industrialism and the break-up of the old order, Man has suffered from a certain indefinable sense of loss: a sense that life under modern conditions has become deracinate and disinherited, and that whatever might give meaning to existence is beyond his reach. If he is to extricate himself from this tragic situation, if he is to regain the dignity of which industrialism deprived him, his hope lies in the restoration of community.

It is difficult not to admire the serious concern for the quality of life in modern society that this argument reveals, but I am highly skeptical both about the analysis that it offers of our present situation and about what it proposes by way of a solution.

For to begin with, I find it implausible to suggest a unitary over-all explanation of all our contemporary disorders, of everything that has been fundamentally wrong with society since, say, 1760, and unilluminating to characterize the whole of our present social predicament in terms of some highly general, highly abstract concept like "alienation," which is supposed to describe in some essential way the condition of us all. For behind any such interpretation or characterization lies the assumption that basically all men are impelled by a common aim, that they seek satisfaction in a common objective, and that happiness or a satisfactory solution, if they could attain to it, would be identical for all. It is, of course, admitted that, in fact, modern conditions being what they are satisfaction is unobtainable: but this implies that there is, even today, a common condition of man, deriving from a common sense of frustration. Such an assumption is plausible only on the further assumption of a common human nature, whose essence we can penetrate and thereby arrive at a notion of the optimum conditions for its survival and activity.

Now, in a very fundamental sense, it may not be absurd to postulate an underlying human nature of this generic kind. But such a conception would be of purely theoretical interest. It would have no value or use in a discussion of man in society. For as soon as we occupy ourselves with human beings at the point at which they enter society and make demands

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upon their fellow human beings and their environment, we are dealing with human nature as substantially modified by experience and upbringing: we are dealing, that is to say, with formed character. And the essence of character lies in the different ways in which different people are disposed to react to, or behave in, similar circumstances: character exists when people have different aims and consequently find satisfaction or frustration in different situations. From this it directly follows that it is impossible to give a general diagnosis of *the* disorders of modern man in society or to indicate in a universal way *the* source of his frustration. And from this in turn a further consequence follows which is crucial to the present discussion. If the ills of men in society are specific and particular, if they relate at least as much to private and personal, as to shared environmental, factors, then there seems no good reason to look for, or to believe that there exists, a universal or general solution to those ills. We have already seen the error in assuming that there exists *a* satisfactory form of work which would satisfy all alike: it is exactly the same error, though on a larger scale, that is involved in assuming that a common culture would ensure the end of frustration and general social contentment.

Moreover, even if there was reason to believe that a common culture was, in principle, the proper solution to all our contemporary disorders, there is a further reason why it could never in fact be efficacious as a solution: namely, that it would have to be imposed. Those who were born into it would have to accept it. It is, however, a necessary condition of psychological cure that the solution offered to the patient should be accepted freely. Now, either the notion of a common culture is empty, or else it fails to satisfay this stipulation.

It seems to me, in this connection, a curious fact that in the mid-twentieth century, just when the positive science of mind seems to offer us a real insight into and understanding of the vast multiplicity and variety of human disturbance, there should be a regression on the part of supposedly advanced thinkers, to *a priori* psychology and the antiquated metaphysical categories like "alienation" or "estrangement" in terms of which it is expressed. For it cannot plausibly be maintained that what was good enough for the young Marx is good enough for us. Moreover, this retrogressive move not merely denies us the chance of properly identifying the true sources of discontent and ill-health in society, but if persisted in, would ultimately prejudice our chances of accepting the assistance that psychiatry and psychoanalysis have to offer us.

THE PRAGMATIC OBJECTIONS to the idea of a common culture, on the grounds that it could not be adequate to the problems it is supposed to solve, that it could not bring about the regime of Fraternity and Equality, are reinforced by a consideration of the third great ideal of radicalism, Liberty. For it is surely inconsistent with the idea of Liberty that men should have their lives limited in any way that is not practically necessary. The liberalized society is one where men fulfill themselves according to thir own view or conception of life—provided, of course, that in doing so they do not interfere with, or impose upon, the self-fulfill-

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ment of others. To achieve this end, they must be free both of the dictates of established authority and of the subtler but no less effective power of social pressure. Furthermore, they must have free access to the principal ideas evolved in the course of human history concerning the conduct of life: and in so far as these ideas do not satisfy their reasonable expectations of guidance, they should be free to make good the deficiency by what John Stuart Mill referred to as "experiments in living."

It would be no service to the ideal of Liberty to disguise the fact that its pursuit is often exacting. The burden of choice, whereby a man has to decide what meaning he will give to his life, can be hard to bear, and sometimes he will want to lay it down and return to a society which, either explicitly or implicitly, either by express rule or by tacit intimation, provides him with an answer to problems which he must otherwise answer himself. By appropriating to itself the old liberal ideal of autonomy only. Socialism certainly does not make itself a more comfortable doctrine. The hope, however, that it holds out is that in a society from which material insecurity and inequality have been removed, the chance of a man's attaining the degree of emotional maturity and integration necessary for the free ordering of his own life, will have been appreciably raised.

But it must be pointed out that this hope will not be attained directly through the institution of Socialist sociey. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Socialism has often drawn upon itself the scorn of great artists and thinkers, of men marked out by their singular awareness, their prodigious understanding of human nature, just because they thought it to be the claim of Socialism that human unhappiness and misery, that personal suffering and the sense of loss, could be expunged from the earth by means of the proper reconstruction of the forms of social life. The anger and the opposition of these great men is understandable if the Socialism of their day made any such stupid or philistine claim.

Socialism properly understood has no easy remedy for anxiety or unhappiness or for the various disorders of the mind. There are, however, things that in a Socialist society we may reasonably hope for. We may hope that the absence of certain kinds of conflict and certain kinds of privation will aid the study of fundamental conflict and fundamental privation. We may hope that in a society of universal prosperity and literacy these findings will be widely diffused and acted upon. We may hope that those whose infancy received a benign and enlightened supervision, will grow up to be human beings capable of making an adult choice. And we may further hope that, not merely in childhood but throughout their lives, the finest efforts of the society will be expended in presenting everything that culture and civilization have produced that that could relate to or affect or enrich their choice.

It should be the ultimate boast of socialism that it decreases the possibility of bad upbringing, that it increases the possibility of good education, and that, having in this way realized the conditions upon which free choice depends, it further offers a man reasonable security that as he chooses, so in fact he will be able to live.

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The following article forms part of an Epilogue to appear in the paperback edition, published by Praeger this coming winter, of The American Communist Party: A Critical History *by Irving Howe and Lewis Coser.*

NEW STYLES IN FELLOW-TRAVELING

Irving Howe and Lewis Coser

If the future of the Communist Party seems dim, there have been some developments in the United States these past few years that should encourage those who believe the Soviet Union represents a force for historic progress. Among the disorganized but still numerous adherents of "the left," as also among a small number of college students, new political moods are discernible. These are not yet of special importance, but with time may become so.

The party finds itself in a vexing position. Its inner core remains static and immobilized, caught up in its political dilemmas. Yet the periphery of American Communism seems to have expanded somewhat, and more important, a political mood of a vaguely "progressive" kind is reappearing which may help the party survive, if not flourish. At first glance this mood bears some semblance to the Popular Frontism of two decades ago; actually it is quite different. Here are some of its sources and components:

—a general weariness and disillusion regarding the Cold War, together with the feeling that both sides, if not equally bad, are open to such severe criticism they do not merit the support of independent liberals and radicals;

—a belief that the Soviet bloc has reached a point of stability, or as the matter is occasionally put, is "here to stay," so that all the talk about opposing (sometimes, even about resisting) Communism is felt to be irresponsible or an invitation to atomic war;

—a discontent with American life which often takes the form of a nonpolitical estrangement, a denunciation of American foreign policy as inept and reactionary, and a critical attitude less dependent on Marxist categories than a distaste for American "materialism";

—an indifference to abstract ideologies in general and the ideological claims of the two powers in particular;

—a conviction that the big powers have become rigidly bureaucratic (or "square") while the true sources of political vitality can be found only in certain underdeveloped countries where the national leaders still have style, initiative and flavor.

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NOW THESE ATTITUDES are obviously of unequal merit and some of them conflict sharply with others, yet all contribute to the political mood we are trying to isolate. For involved here is not the formal coherence of a party line or ideology, but an emotional-intellectual groping, a search for a new style of political response. It is a mood that has little to do with any interest in Communist ideas or Communist organization, yet is impatient with the claims, no matter who may make them, that the Communist movement is a major enemy of freedom. It is a mood that mixes cynicism about democracy with sharp critical insights into its failings in the United States, a mood that brings together a worship of power with a celebration of anarchic rebelliousness.

Where can such amorphous sentiments be found? Frequently, though least important, among certain old leftists. Also among "progressives" who do not consider themselves Marxists, a minority of pacifists, and vaguely radical students. And in such organizations as the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and the "peace" groups formed in a few cities as split-offs from SANE.

Old leftists still nostalgic about the hopes they once had for the Soviet Union now wish the past could be forgotten and Stalinism, perhaps vindicated as a cruel historic necessity, be followed by an era of "liberalization." Certain "progressives" feel that the clash between the two major power blocs is a catastrophe in which they have no particular stake, that strong anti-Communism is unavoidably a veil for reaction, and that one must learn to live with the Communist states and parties. For some pacifists the threat of atomic war overshadows everything else, and they subordinate their sincere dislike of Communist authoritarianism to their wish to end the Cold War, even if this means advocating policies that open them to the charge of "appeasement."

SUCH RESPONSES are familiar. What is new is the appearance of a younger group composed of students, intellectuals and semi-intellectuals who endow these sentiments with a color distinctly their own. They have no particular attachment to Russia or Communism, but dislike intensely the idea of an anti-Communist "crusade." They are not very interested in distinguishing between kinds of anti-Communism, whether of the right or left. They cannot, of course, share the memories of people over 40, but they are singularly, even willfully, uninterested in what happened before the Second World War, and like all too many members of their generation, they suffer from an astonishing lack of the historical sense. They believe that the "old political quarrels" are largely meaningless and can dismiss as equally *passé* those who had the acumen to oppose the Moscow trials and those deluded or cynical enough to support them. They indulge themselves in the provincialism of their generation, which is more a provincialism of time than space: as if nothing that happened before 1940 could possibly affect their lives. Yet despite all these traits, which in their sum are bound to stir the impatience of older people, they are right in feeling the need to avoid errors of the past; their mistake is in assuming that to do so they should also avoid a knowledge of the past.

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When they turn to politics, they have little concern for clear or precise thought. What attracts them is the surface of vitality, the appearance of freshness, the gesture of drama. They care more for style than conviction, and incline more to outbursts of energy than sustained work. Several years ago such young people were likely to be attracted to Communist China, which then seemed bolder and less "Victorian" than Khrushchev's Russia. But the Mao regime proved too grim, too repressive, too dogmatic. Since then they have been searching for new models and heroes, usually in the underdeveloped countries. An intelligent labor leader like Tom Mboya of Kenya does not interest them nearly as much as a demogogic orator like Patrice Lumumba of the Congo. The figure who has most won their imagination is Fidel Castro, who dared tweak Uncle Sam's nose, fought heroically, spoke rhetorically and dressed spectacularly. Castro suggested to these young radicals the possibility of a politics that was not yet functionally rationalized, and meanwhile they neglected to notice that it had become totalitarian. They were drawn to figures like Lumumba and Castro out of a distaste for the mania for industrial production which the Soviet Union shares with the United States, but they failed to see that these leaders of underdeveloped countries, who seemed attractive because they represented spontaneity and anarchic freedom, were themselves fascinated by precisely the same mania for industrial production.

Such moods among the young were both encouraging and frustrating for the Communists. Encouraging, because for the first time in some years there is accessible to them a small milieu in which to function with at least some freedom. Frustrating, because they cannot really take organizational advantage of this fact. The old leftists are tired, the "progressives" too distant or cautious, the pacifists too sophisticated or suspicious. And the young radicals are too indifferent to traditional leftist politics even to consider the CP a serious option—for if they oppose efforts to persecute the Communists, they usually have no hesitation in brushing them aside. All the CP can do, then, is to wait.

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AMERICAN NOTEBOOK Some Brief Comments On the Domestic Scene

THE COST OF FREEDOM RIDES

William Goldsmith

In the 1920s and 30s it cost something to maintain one's posture as a believer in civil rights. Radicals were personally involved in and were dunned incessantly in campaigns for strikes in the South, sharecroppers' relief, and the defense of victims of racial injustice. In the left-wing parties regular contributions were expected of members on the basis of a sliding percentage of their incomes. Every meeting and social affair meant digging down for additional contributions, and if they weren't quickly forthcoming, good-natured banter and tireless haranguing were sure to follow. This may or may not have been an exciting and romantic period for radicals and liberals, but there is no question that it was an expensive one. Causes were supported with more than words.

In the light of this record it is particularly surprising and distressing to note that liberal, socialist and democratic trade union organizations have been so backward in coming to the support of the recent struggle for human dignity and civil rights in the South.

To date 297 Freedom Riders have been arrested in Jackson, Mississippi, for "disturbance of the peace." The involved legal proceedings take a little explanation. All the Freedom Riders who were arrested were brought before a local Jackson City court which is technically not a court of record. They were charged with disturbing the peace and given the alternative of posting bail until their hearing was set in a court of record, or serving a major part of their sentence in jail (45 days) before they could even obtain a hearing. Most of the Freedom Riders elected to follow the latter course in order to dramatize their fight, but in effect it meant that they were suffering the major portion of the penalty for a crime they had allegedly committed before being given an opportunity to defend themselves in court. Individual trials have been scheduled from the middle of August to January of next year. All 297 Freedom Riders had to be present in Jackson in August for the hearings where the trial dates were set (which meant an additional trip back there for most), and of course those whose trials are set ahead were not able to stay over for them, but will have to return to Jackson still again to stand trial. Most of these Freedom Riders have been

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	Already Spent	*To Be Spent Before Labor Day*
Bail (Jackson, Tallahassee, and Ocala)	72,700	82,000
Legal Fees	6,700	?
Lawyer's Expense	3,600	?
Travel to Stand Trial	3,000	30,000
Travel for Riders	32,400	27,000
Training for Riders	12,000	6,000
Hospital Bills	1,100	—
Phones, Telegrams	5,100	3,000
Printing, Mimeo	1,900	—
	138,500	148,000

The foregoing does not include overhead, office expenses, or fund-raising costs. Nor does it include the expense of other activities. Many costs are approximate as not all bills have been received as yet. The estimates are based upon a total of 300 riders going to Jackson, Mississippi—267 have already been arrested there.

students or individuals of modest means who are usually not in a position to meet all the expenses involved. The first cost is transportation from their homes to the southern city from where the Freedom Ride will be launched. Sometimes board and room expenses are involved while completing tactical non-violent training for the protest, or simply waiting to coordinate a delayed departure. Then there is the bus fare to the destination where the protest is to be made. Arrests normally followed the arrival of the riders in Jackson and here legal expenses for all and bail bonds for some were involved. By the end of July, 1961, CORE (Congress of Racial Equality) had spent $138,500 directly in support of this campaign, and was committed to an outlay of more than double that figure before the summer was over in order to continue the legal struggle of all those arrested.

The delaying and obstructionist tactics of the courts in various southern cities have been an increasingly exasperating and costly factor to deal with. For example, there is the case of the three Freedom Riders who were arrested protesting against segregated facilities in Ocala, Florida in the month of July. They were forced to remain in the city for a number of days waiting delayed arraignment. Then their offense was divided up into several counts and trial was set for a later date for the first of these counts. Having jobs and families to return to in the North they had to leave Ocala and return to that city in several weeks to stand trial, but then only for the first of their several counts. At the completion of the trial they were informed that they would be required to be present in court several weeks later *for sentencing for this count only*. This meant, of course, that they would be forced to spend the rest of the summer commuting back and forth to Florida at great expense to CORE, and maddening inconvenience to themselves.

ALTHOUGH THERE have been other organizations participating in one capacity or another in the Freedom Ride campaign, CORE has done the major part of the organizational work, and has given the participants whatever

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financial support they have received. Since practically every single member of its staff has been actively engaged in the field throughout the summer, they were simply not available to man a large-scale fund-raising campaign. Furthermore, CORE's staff has been selected for these leadership qualities in the non-violent struggle for civil rights, and even if they had been available for fund-raising activities it is questionable how successful they would have been. Fund-raising in modern America is a big-time business, and "cause" organizations have to battle it out with the hard sell Madison Avenue professionals. To mount a campaign of this kind requires professional experience and skills not likely to be found in the staff of an organization like CORE. Even if CORE's staff could make a successful transition to large-scale fund-raising, the cost would have to be carefully weighted in terms of the moral initiative that the organization has achieved.

The callous neglect of the liberal community is forcing this agonizing problem on the CORE leaders just at the moment when their efforts have begun to bear fruit, and where everything dictates their continued activity to keep the pressure on. Why is it that the liberal movement has been so apathetic, so parsimonious in coming to the financial support of the new civil rights struggle? Many liberal, labor and religious organizations are enjoying a state of affluence in the 1960's that they have never approached before. Why haven't they used their tremendous resources to rally support behind these young people who, in such a short period of time, have achieved results that their predecessors have unsuccessfully fought for over a period of several decades?

There has indeed been some liberal and trade union support for CORE. The AFL-CIO contributed $5,000 at one time during the campaign and the Industrial Union Department of the same organization another $5,000 at a later date. Several International and Local unions have come up with smaller contributions at the urging of leaders like Charles Zimmerman of the ILGWU who sits on CORE's Advisory Board. But total trade union contributions have not exceeded $20,000. Protestant, Catholic and Jewish organizations have together not contributed more than $10,000. A handful of New York artists were able to raise as much for CORE by holding a week-end sale of their paintings. Certainly these contributions are pitifully small in view of the millions of members the organizations speak for, and in contrast with the contributions they have all made to many other worth-while causes in the past. Hundreds of thousands of dollars have been contributed by the AFL-CIO and various International Unions to support democratic European and Asian unions in their struggle against Communist foes. Additional contributions, well into six figures have gone to pet charities, political campaigns (in and out of the unions) and bond drives to help struggling nations to meet their deficits. If the trade union leaders were courageous enough to go to their membership for these causes, why haven't they shown equal concern for the struggle for basic human rights for American Negroes,

Even before receiving Mr. Goldsmith's article, DISSENT, *despite its limited resources, contributed $100 to CORE. We urge our readers to help this campaign by sending money directly to CORE, 38 Park Row, New York 38, New York.*

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many of whom are members of their own organizations?

THIS ROLL CALL is incomplete, but there can be little argument that the response has been shabby from all groups in the liberal, labor, religious, socialist and even Negro communities. Practically all the money raised has dribbled in from regular supporters or individuals acting on their own. This is all to the good, but it has not been nearly enough to finance this fight and who can predict what the implications will be if CORE fails to raise adequate funds to meet its commitments? Already a number of the Freedom Riders have been forced to return to Jackson to serve out the remainder of their jail sentences because adequate funds for their appeal bail and legal costs were simply not available. Liberals and radicals should seriously consider the long-range consequences of their present estrangement from this genuine struggle of social protests which has inspired and brought to life so many heretofore uncommitted young people in the North and in the South.

THE CONVENTIONS OF THE MAD

T. J. Ross

". . . a body that don't get *started* right when he's little ain't got no show—when the pinch comes there ain't nothing to back him up and keep him to his work and so he gets beat."—*Huckleberry Finn*

". . . it can't be like this. What have we done, all of us? What has happened? . . ."
"Don't think about it. . . . If you do you'll go mad."—Sagan, *Those Without Shadows*

I

The letters column of the July '61 number of *Mad* comics under the banner, "A Mad State of Affairs," features a photograph of the daughter of the governor of North Carolina smilingly enthroned in bed with a batch of *Mads*. "Thought you might like to know," writes the fan who'd sent in the item, "that *Mad* has even reached the Governor's mansion." *Mad's* cup runneth over.

Other tributes come regularly from high school and college teachers and from college-bred mothers concerned with finding a synthetic antidote to the influence of pop culture on their children's minds. Yet in its comic book format *Mad* is exactly like what it is supposed to be panning, and its drawing is even more crass than that of the ordinary "funnies." The cartoon strip —in the rhythm of its potted "plotting," in its simplistic reduction of materials to a one-dimensional, escalator-like descent to an anticipated "surprise"—shares the basic pattern of all kitsch. It is impossible to use this form without dependence on its stereotypes —stereotypes already fixed in the pub-

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lic imagination, like the Gaunt Thin-lipped Hero (Dick Tracy or Gregory Peck), the Defeated Dad, or the Sweet Young Know-nothing. In assuming this form whole-hog, *Mad* must, in fact, adhere to its assumptions. Like the recent corrupt Hitchcock films, *Mad* is a "sophisticated" example of kitsch feeding on itself—even its show of frenzy is a pretense as, with a Hoo-Ha here and a Hoo-Ha there, it throws up such spoofs on pop as Prince Violent, Melvin of the Apes, Flesh Garden, Perry Masonmint, the Katherine Money Party, and Tennessee Williamsburg.

Good for a laugh now and then, if you know pop, *Mad's* message is defensiveness and gamesmanship rather than resistance, criticism or wit. Thus, some gagging about pop violence will be followed by the "Mad Shakespeare Primer" to remind its readers that Hamlet, which contains "two knifings, three fatal duels," etc., is ". . . a good play for children. It is much better than watching violent TV programs . . . because it is more violent than TV and comic books put together!" Rather than voicing resistance to the oppressiveness of official culture, *Mad* expresses a savage acquiescence to it. It invites its fans to wallow inside the whale, then come out one-up.

Like the sick comedians, *Mad* likes to cover the news once-over-snottily, and, like them, it casts a discreetly universal net, in the name of know-how. "If the nations were smart," *Mad* points out in its number for July '59, "they'd take their cue from Big Business, hire an Advertising Agency" . . . and go in for this sort of thing:

> Why Be Lonely? Is the fast-moving Arab World passing you by? Join Nasser's Friendship Club.
>
> You're in Good Hands with Red Star. "Red Star Five-Year Plan" has already protected such countries as Poland, Hungary . . . from war-mongering Imperialists! It can do the same for you.
>
> Your Premier Problems Are Over: The DeGaulle Employment Agency. "Premiers Are Our Specialty."
>
> Save! Save! Save! . . . We have countless old flags, old maps, old Colonels . . . Watch for the Cyprus Surplus Lists: Mac's Empire Surplus Stores, Ltd.
>
> Visit Exotic Formosa: Mao's Guided Asian Tours: Armed Escorts! Planned Plunder!

The round-up is edgy and abstract, a kind of pointless flailing. Notice that if you juggle the above into free verse you have the lukewarm makings of a Beat vision. In keeping, however, with its cackling conformism, *Mad* avoids Beat extremism as much as it does any hint of intellectual skirmishing. One near-critical skit considers Hollywood's handling of the German and Japanese soldier in films made during the war, and after:

> During: The Japanese Officer is sadistic . . . screams in pidgin English . . . looks like a monkey.
>
> After: The same officer is kind but misunderstood . . . talks impeccable English . . . looks like Keye Luke.
>
> During: The German Officer is evil . . . shouts *shvienhundt* . . . wears monocle . . . keeps vowing to destroy decadent American democracy.
>
> After: The German Officer is honest and sincere, but confused. He says things like "Vere haf ve failed as human beinks?" He keeps vowing to destroy decadent Hitler-type Fascism.
>
> During: French patriot faces firing squad (sketched as Jean-Pierre Aumont) and says: You may keel me, Herr Hitler, but . . . another Frenchman will rise . . . you Nazi pigs will nevaire . . .

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> After: The patriot who faces the firing squad is now Maurice Chevalier: ". . . I cannot blame you for my death, Herr Hitler. Zere are good Germans and zere are bad Germans . . . you are merely carrying out ze orders . . .

And so on to a look at war films of the future in which Tab Hunter will play the Japanese Officer, as an ally, while Perry Como plays a kindly bird-loving Gestapo officer whose purpose is "to help minorities rebuild their churches and synagogues."

Hovering, however grossly, on the edge of an impolite critical perspective, *Mad* flattens the point in the moral vacuum of know-howism: read *Mad* and learn how to make movies properly adjusted to propaganda temperature.

II

In the savagery of its acquiescence, *Mad* shows its consumers how to be bastards à la mode. An actual ad which has been running in the Sunday supplements concerns the Phoenix Mutual Retirement Plan. The ad's attention-getter is a photo of a clean-cut fiftyish couple smiling at You. He, arched sideways as if about to say something sincere, wears a breezy sports shirt and holds pipe in hand; she, in manner and complexion nattily menopausal, sits erect, eyes on You, knitting as she grins. The caption reads: How We Retired in Fifteen Years with Three Hundred Dollars a Month. The come-on follows:

> Want to know something? Liza and I have been sitting here in the sunshine for practically a whole week. Just talking, watching TV, reading and plain loafing. . . . You see, we've just retired . . .
>
> Funny, but this great new happiness of ours had its start back in an unhappy time. It was fifteen years ago that I injured my leg...

And so on to how the happiness-finder found a Phoenix ad in a magazine and urges you too to send the coupon . . . today. . . .

In going after this sort of thing, *Mad* matches its straw-man original with a literalist frenzy (which is in keeping with the psychology of the feeble-minded, as well as with its own tone of premeditated idiocy). *Mad's* attention-getter is a sketch of a couple of brats in hammocks, wildly blue-eyed, contained, and sneering at Us. He waves an enormous sundae in the air, while she juggles a soda in one hand and cake in the other. The caption reads: How We Retired at the Age of Eleven with 800 Dollars a Month, and is followed by:

> Like many other 11-year-olds, my twin sister Rhoda and I had been dreaming of retiring for a long time. After all, we weren't getting any younger . . . very often when jumping off our front porch, we got like drawing pains in our ankles . . .

And so on to how the team discovered an "exciting and unusual loophole" in the exciting and unusual Phonyex Mutual Plan whereby they manage to blackmail the company into guaranteeing their future.

III

Mad's archetypal smiler and cover boy is dubbed Alfred E. Neuman (no man; new man; nu, man?). Wider, flatter and less cocky than that of Bergen's Charlie McCarthy, his renowned smile expresses neither satisfaction nor awareness nor challenge but a sense of defeat so total as to assume that whoever is being smiled at will be done for next. It is, in the precise meaning of that all-American phrase, "a shit-eating smile," borne by the combat-fatigued veteran of Dad's ad

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culture. For Alfred E. "opting out" is neither retreat nor strategy but a way of being one-up on squaresville in the square's own terms; nor does this mean a sort of dandyism but, American-style, a self-contained slobbism, or, as I have said, savage acquiescence.

The pre-election issue of *Mad* appeared with two front covers: one showed Nixon, grinning madly with Al E. by his side sporting an "I Like Dick" button; the other showed Kennedy, likewise, with Al E. standing by with an "I Like Jack" button. Needless to say, *Mad's* paragon is not alone in not having felt any difference in "greatness" between the candidates, but, again, the imperative is to go along smirkingly with the prevailing drift.

That *Mad,* like TV, never mixes situations so that a hint of real conflict might come into the joke, may be seen in how it spoofs the Society Page. The usual society page, as *Mad* has it, runs to a power-elitist homogeneity and extravagance of this sort: "Stephanie Duprey and Napolean VII Wed in Grand Canyon" or "In a palace near the statue of Zeus on Mt. Olympus, Miss . . . daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Oscar Sessingfors . . . owners of the Caspian Sea and Rocky Mountains became the bride of Major General Nottingham, owner of the 17th Infantry Division . . . he is a distant descendant of Adam." But a page devoted "to the slobs who constitute 98% of our population" would go, *Mad*-wise like this: "Miss Zelda Zyttzger Wed in Bayonne to Weight Guesser"—one Sparky Gahagan who is shown wearing a straw hat, jacket and T-shirt, and striped pants. Both bride and groom are buck-toothed. The notice on Sadie Dooley and Blubber Knerd raises shades of Beckett and Lenny Bruce:

> Ferdie's Flophouse . . . was the setting . . . for the marriage of Miss Sadie Dooley, daughter of Mr. and Mrs. "Two Ton" Dooley who reside in the doorway of 76 Houston St., to Blubber Knerd. He is the son of Mr. and Mrs. Knerd of Bench 3, 74th St. and Central Park West . . . Miss Ducky Dooley, sister of the bride was maid of honor and owing to her well-muscled physique also served as best man.

Television, with programs like *Life With Riley* or *I Love Lassie,* does honor to the condition of its public by upholding, in its inimitable deadpan fashion, a kitchen-bound cretinism as the ideal of the Good Normal Life. *Mad,* on the other hand, revels in apprehending that life as one of sodden desperation. But both agree on the same line of demarcation: there are the 2% that we all read about; and the 98% that we all know about.

The *Mad* issue for Dec. '60, featured a section on "How to Deal with Parents from Ages 21 to 60." Here is the one subject on which *Mad* really lets go: the Parent. In one place, Grant Wood's Gothic couple are shown in front of a depot marked Westport, holding stacks of bills. In another, a framed portrait of an ape labelled "Mother" hangs in the hut of Melvin of the Apes. Or mother will be shown exhorting her son to marry that fine girl, Zelda; as mother leaves the room, son with Zelda, both yawning, peer over the edge of the couch on which they've been loving. In every case the parent is drawn as an unaware, physically repulsive dolt. Consistently, and perhaps unwittingly, *Mad* depicts parents as apes and family life as apish, without any upbeat compromise. One issue shows Dad Lester Cowsnofski in his Rocket Testing Chamber locked away in bliss from "his familiar way of life on earth." Dad's motto is: "I'd

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be crazy to go back to them things I hadda leave behind." The children's attitudes to the familial are even fiercer. Once the abundant falsities of Dad's world of ads and "squares who care" has been described, it is but a step to physical recoil. So, parents in the world of *Mad* don't look good.

Mad here touches on an issue which crops up in the classroom whenever a book like *Brave New World* is discussed. Granting what one may have to say about the dire myths of progress, scientism, standardization, the collapse of romantic values, and the rest, the brighter students (whether married or single) will gleefully unlimber arguments which are (a) anti-familial and (b) pro-"benevolent despotism." Huxley's vision doesn't abash them in the least. They already see family life from the *Mad* point of view.

IV

The first *Mad Reader* (Nov. '54) was introduced with a "vital message" from Roger Price (a TV entertainer and M.C. of the squarest category). His purpose was to present *Mad* in a light that would reflect innocuousness and "service" for, like all pop, *Mad* does not presume to be self-justifying, but rather finds its excuse in filling a sociological "need." Here's how it's done:

> Mad achieves what on the surface would seem to be impossible. It is even sillier than the things it lampoons. It takes broad, sometimes crude—but never vicious—swings at aspects of our culture that are foolish, sentimental, venal, stuffy, or just plain corny. In other words, it Gilds the Lily, it carries carbohydrates to Farouk.

It does, indeed; it gives Farouk what he's already overstuffed with and, like what it reflects, it assumes equality in inferiority. Yet Mr. Price claims for *Mad* the distinction of being "the first successful humor magazine to be started in this country since the *New Yorker*. . . . People want something new. They will buy a magazine that sounds like it knows something." There it is: "sound" like you know something but keep feeding them the same old carbohydrates. That this is as pat a description of the *New Yorker* formula and tradition as one could hope for, does no honor to the state of *Mad*.

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ARE WORKERS MIDDLE CLASS?

S. M. Miller and Frank Riessman

Are workers becoming "middle class"? Is *Fortune* correct in describing workers as a "salariat" rather than a "proletariat"? A belief is spreading among social scientists and unionists that in their middle age unions are becoming middle class. But an evaluation of a number of sociological studies suggests that the extent of "middle-classization" among workers* is, to recall Mark Twain's comment on rumors of his death, "grossly exaggerated."

We shall deal here with three atguments for the view that workers are becoming middle class: 1) objective conditions of life no longer distinguish workers from the middle class; 2) workers have the same desire for success that middle-class people have; and 3) the homogenization of attitudes and values which occurs in a mass society obliterates class differences.

1) Objective Conditions

For many craft workers income levels are good, especially when compared to those of lower white-collar employees. Yet the wages of large groups of workers, in the South, in New England, and in "sick" industries are still very low; among workers who suffer most from discrimination—Negroes, Mexicans, and Puerto Ricans —poverty is often extreme.

Many wage earners work far more than a forty-hour week; indeed, high earnings in manufacturing industries are due largely to time-and-a-half overtime. And about one worker out of twenty "moonlights"—that is, holds more than one job. Nor should we forget that the "high" wages in manufacturing are not really so very high: an average weekly pay in 1959 of $90 is not a luxury income if one considers present prices and taxes.

Unemployment occurs more frequently among wage-earners than among white-collar workers, especially during the kinds of recessions we have come to know in recent years. In the steel industry between the middle of 1956 and the fall of 1958, semi-skilled workers had a 20 per cent, and unskilled workers a 25 per

* By workers we refer to manual or blue-collar wage-earners. We do not include white-collar or agricultural workers; nor the "lower class" who are irregular members of the labor force in unskilled and service occupations. Unfortunately, in contemporary social science the all-inclusive term "lower class" is generally used to refer to both workers and the true lower class. This leads to much confusion in both empirical and theoretical studies. We use information about this "lower class" only when we think it applies to the working class and not merely to a statistical agglomerate of lower and working classes. In citing various studies we do not necessarily defend their methodology or implications; what we wish to emphasize is the weight of the evidence.

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cent drop in employment; but no office employees were laid off during the same period. Workers always have a nagging fear of unemployment, for even during boom times many plants shut down temporarily or are closed because they cannot compete with newer, more efficient factories. Daniel Bell has reported that "the most bitter complaint of auto workers is that they have no way of knowing, from one week to the next, how many hours they will work in any given week; through the year, a man may get as many as twenty 'short work weeks'."

Harvey Swados has described the exhausting and dehumanizing quality of assembly work, even in modern plants. Ford workers fought in the 1955 collective bargaining negotiations for a provision that would permit assembly line or production workers to cut their wages 35 cents or more an hour by taking a sweeper's job. In this way they could hope to free themselves from the exhausting rhythms of the assembly line.

To be a member of a workers' family still means to live a "different" life. In education, for example, working-class children do not fare well. In a wealthy state like New York, about half of all children entering high school don't finish, and most of these dropouts are from the working and lower classes. Since the Russian success with their Sputnik, Americans have been made painfully aware that many of our most talented youngsters don't go to college. But the fact that most of these children come from working-class families has been widely overlooked. Studies demonstrate that workers' children are rarely encouraged and accepted by school personnel in the way middle-class children are.

Data on social mobility show that only 30 per cent of working-class sons rise to middle-class positions. On the other hand, about 70 per cent of the sons of middle-class fathers stay in the middle class. If a middle-class job is your goal it is a tremendous advantage to have been born middle-class. Moreover, the "mobile" working-class son is much more likely to end up as a poorly paid white-collar worker or the owner of a marginal small business, than is the middle-class son who stays in his own class.

2) A Profile of Success

The available information indicates that the objective conditions of middle- and working-class life continue to differ. But at least as important is the subjective outlook of the workers themselves. Do workers absorb middle-class values and strive for "success" as middle-class people do? A desire to get ahead, for "success," most certainly does exist in the working class. But the content of this desire must be carefully clarified, for although the same terms are used by middle-class people, they may have entirely different connotations in working-class usage.

Middle-class striving on the part of workers, if it existed, would have the following characteristics: 1) it would be central to their total pattern of behavior; 2) it would include a desire for prestige rather than merely for improvement in living conditions; 3) it would be individualistic, directed towards a personal rather than a group or collective achievement.*

* Two objections to these criteria are that middle-class individuals living in an "other-directed" world do not pursue success, and that group means of achieving improvement are increasingly accepted by white-collar workers. We do not agree with the first point, which stems from the work of Riesman and

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These three conditions would have to be met before we could say that workers strive for middle-class status. We would also have to ask a fourth question: Do workers strive *consciously* to imitate middle-class attitudes and behavior?**

The information necessary to answer questions about these conditions is not fully available. But enough is known to cast doubt on the thesis that most workers strive for a middle-class success and the way of life associated with it.

On the problem of how central is the success-drive among workers, the findings of Herbert H. Hyman are very striking:

> The components of this value system, in our judgment, involve less emphasis upon the traditional high success goals, increased awareness of the lack of opportunity to achieve success and less emphasis upon the achievement of goals which in turn would be instrumental for success. To put it simply, the lower class individual doesn't want as much success, knows he couldn't get it even if he wanted to, and doesn't want what might help him get success.

Hyman's analysis of public opinion data revealed that workers do not tend to value education—a major vehicle for advancement—as much as do middle-class persons. He discovered also that workers and their children favor a job that provides steady employment and low income over a risky but more promising job.

In a very important study Richard Centers observed the same tendency. He found that a majority of manual workers thought it more important for the government to guarantee every person "a decent and steady job and standard of living" than to make "certain that there are good opportunities for each person to get ahead on his own." Business, professional and white-collar groups disagreed; they rated "opportunities" much higher. Among personnel managers, it is a generally accepted view that factory workers tend to rate security above other elements in a job, while white-collar employees tend to prefer "opportunity for advancement."

Centers' most significant finding was that more than three-quarters of the workers in his sample of white males identified themselves as working class when given a choice of "upper class," "middle class," "working class" and "lower class." The oft-cited *Fortune* survey which reported that most workers identified with the middle class had unfortunately neglected to include the choice of "working class" on its questionnaire.

Joseph Kahl has written an article in which the difference between middle-class and working-class goals is explored. Of the boys (in a group from Boston wage-earner and lower white-collar families) whom he studied carefully, at least 60 per cent had families which were concerned with "getting by" rather than rising into the middle class. Some even expressed the idea that "the competitive game [to rise higher] was not worth the candle."

In a study of Michigan auto

Whyte, for it is the style and not the fact of success-striving that has changed. As for the second, there has indeed been a tendency towards group improvement, but it has met with much criticism and is limited to occupations that are poorly paid or of a civil service type.

** An important warning: The so-called "middle-class psychology" of workers which we have been describing cannot be taken as an adequate description of the actual psychology of the middle class.

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workers, Ely Chinoy found that half had "never thought of becoming a foreman or failed to mention foremanship" in discussing plans for the future. Twenty-five per cent claimed they would definitely not want to be foremen; and a few had actually turned down the chance to move up to such a position. Only 25 per cent admitted to ever wanting "advancement." Charles R. Walker discovered that in a Pennsylvania steel mill there was "a resistance to promotion [that] was striking"; at least three-quarters of the men were not interested in promotion; 25 per cent had turned down the opportunity to advance.

Bennett Berger found among workers moving to a suburb (a locale that is regarded as a hotbed of status-striving) that relatively few sought or would accept promotion.

Different kinds of studies—some more reliable than others—all point to the same conclusion: *"getting ahead" does not play as crucial a role in working-class life as it does in the middle class.*

3) Consumer Goods or Values?

The desire to improve one's economic position does not necessarily involve subscribing to middle-class ideals nor to the American mania of perpetual upward mobility. One can simply want to enjoy more of the good things of life for oneself and one's family, apart from matters of status or prestige.

We must therefore distinguish between the actual goods and the symbols which become attached to them. A worker may want a bigger income so that he can afford a more comfortable home. The possession of that better home may, in turn, give the family higher prestige among neighbors and friends. But we cannot assume that the status which goes along with the improvement in living standards was a dominant reason for wanting it. In American life, living better—having an easier, more enjoyable life—simply involves having the things many middle-class people have. But for a significant portion of the middle class it is the prestige-value of these goods which is most desired. Workers, by contrast, do seem to seek these goods mainly for their usefulness, not for their prestige.

This contrast in attitudes is nicely illustrated in a story that circulated some years ago. In suburbia, so the story went, many middle-class families, wanting to keep up with the Joneses, were putting up television antennas when they didn't have sets. On the other hand, working-class families, despite low incomes, were among the first to buy television sets, not for the prestige-value but because TV was a highly economical and exciting form of entertainment.

That mobility strivings can have a varied content was demonstrated to us in a small-scale study of workers we conducted a little while back. One respondent, for example, answered "yes" to the question, "Are you trying to get ahead?" But in reply to the follow-up question, "What does getting ahead mean to you?", he said: "Having a steady job so that you can pay your bills. Being able to manage, that's getting ahead." This concept of success is rooted in a desire for stability, not social position

These divergent attitudes towards status are illustrated in an odd but insightful pamphlet called "The American Worker" by Paul Romano and Ria Stone. They contend that middle-class and working-class people

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want to become independent businessmen for very different reasons. For both, of course, there is the expectation (frequently unrealized) of a higher income. The middle-class person is likely also to be concerned with gaining in prestige and social status. But for the worker, this is much less true; he wants to start his own business in order to become his own boss, to get away from a foreman's controlling demands and to go his own way, free from factory pressures.

The fact that workers now possess some of the things which were once thought to be exclusively middle-class property (e.g., automobiles, vacuum cleaners, high school education, etc.) does not mean that they really have a middle-class standard of living. Havighurst and Neugarten have pointed out that as middle-class goods become more accessible to workers, middle-class standards and prestige symbols change to include such new items as high-fi equipment, dishwashers and a college education.

It is also true that the means used for getting ahead are different in the middle class and the working class. Workers improve the conditions of their life mainly through the collective action of their unions. Middle-class individuals do not use, and often frown upon, collective action as a means of self-advancement. To the middle class, if everyone is advancing then no one is bettering himself, since success is measured in relation to the progress of their immediate peers. Many workers, however, accept the union as their vehicle for getting ahead. Sol Barkin of the Textile Workers' Union has summed up this point very well:

> The union seeks to advance the worker as a member of a group rather than as an individual competing with others. It establishes rules of conduct and conditions of employment for all, instead of special terms for individuals. . . . The individual worker reared in our culture looks for personal achievement, not by violating the interests or mores of the group but by taking advantage of the expanding employment opportunity within the plant or the economy as a whole.

4) Middle-Class Hankering?

Evidence to support the contention that workers seek to emulate middle-class standards is scanty. There is, however, work done some time ago by Useems and Tangent which shows that while workers would like more money and better living conditions they dislike the anxiety and competitiveness which goes along with their attainment. Drake and Cayton report the contemptuous attitude of lower and working-class Negroes towards "strivers and strainers."

The most interesting conclusions on this subject have emerged from a recent study of the voting behavior of Detroit members of the United Automobile Workers. In their report, Kornhauser, Sheppard and Mayer carefully depict the pattern of attitudes of the most highly skilled, best paid and best educated workers. This group is closest to middle-class standards both economically and socially. We would expect these workers to imitate middle-class life and to adopt important middle-class symbols, for they come closest to the middle-class pattern of living. If they fulfill our expectation we might conclude that there is some tendency for workers to become middle class.

But of all union members, this privileged segment is the most pro-union,

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the most likely to participate actively in the union, the most likely to vote Democratic and the most likely to think in liberal terms. If one were to develop a scale of class-consciousness, this group would be the closest to the fully class-conscious pole.

The suburban workers studied by Berger had not developed a middle-class style of life. Their basic pattern was not changed by having a little grass in front of their homes.

These findings reveal a false assumption in the salariat argument. Values are supposed simply to follow income: raise income and values will change; lower income and revolt occurs. But this mode of analysis is much too mechanical. Pierre Martineau, market research expert of the Chicago *Tribune,* has cited a number of investigations to demonstrate that at the same income level (even a relatively high one) wage-earners have different tastes, styles, and modes of reaction than middle-class people. Income alone, when considered separately from occupation, does not seem to be crucial in determining attitudes and behavior; educational differences among workers are much more important than income variations.

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A counter argument maintains that the spread of mass culture, inundating all classes, has caused common life styles and "homogenized tastes" to prevail in the United States. This is again an example of the environmentalistic fallacy: a description of influence is accepted as an adequate description of behavior.

Much more important than TV and the mass media in shaping life-styles are family, education and occupation, (though all of these are in turn affected by mass culture). The synthetic popular culture of today seems to have a rather deep effect upon youth, but later experiences on the job and in the family may well outweigh the influence of the taste-makers.

Many studies reveal that workers and middle-class people differ in both crucial and non-crucial aspects of attitudes, beliefs, and behavior. This is true no matter what indices of class are used. Although great confusion prevails in interpreting results, considerable divergence in the modes of child-rearing are reported in working-class and middle-class families (Bronfenbrenner). Kinsey and his co-workers have documented differences in the sexual behavior of the American male which follow class lines. Miller and Swanson have concluded that workers and middle-class people have strikingly different basic life styles and ways of defending themselves psychologically. Their book is constructed around the differences which social class creates in personality. Workers are less likely to become neurotic and a little more likely to become psychotic than are middle-class people, according to Hollingshead and Redlich. Religious behavior also differs: Protestant workers are much more likely to prefer active church services than are middle-class Protestants (Lipset). A great number of studies demonstrate that workers are much less likely than members of the middle class to join associations. Attitudes towards politics and civil liberties also differ importantly in these two social classes (Lipset and Stouffer). Almost every issue of a major sociological journal will add to the list of class differences in attitudes and behavior, although the interpretation is often unreliable.

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6) Proletariat, Salariat, or?

While fewer workers than middle-class individuals are deeply concerned with the problem of success, there are undoubtedly some groups of workers who are intent upon such goals. And at the same time it is not true that everyone in the middle class worships the bitch-goddess success. Many workers do share a major part of the middle-class orientation. Many other workers share a desire for advancement or education for their children and yet remain uninvolved in the total middle-class value system. A small percentage of workers has an outlook that may be called class-conscious. These, we suggest, are the shadings of actuality, as distinct from the formulas of preconception.

We think that the outlook of the majority of workers is neither that of a class-conscious proletariat nor that of a middle-class salariat. In the 1930's there was a tendency to idealize and sentimentalize the worker. Today, there is a feeling that the should-be "noble proletariat" has succumbed to the attractions of middle-class life and no longer demands our special concern. Neither view is adequate.

What one may gather from current research is that many workers have a distinctive way of life: it centers on the family, and the family is group-

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BOOKS

Dissecting Conservative Thought

THE FUTILITARIAN SOCIETY, by Wiliam J. Newman. George Braziller. 1961. 412 pp. $6.

William J. Newman's theme can be expressed in a loose syllogism: America's problems call for change and innovation. But conservatives are "stasis seekers." Therefore conservative ideas are a "menace" to the nation.

The theme is elaborated through a delightfully breezy and ironic dissection of the writings of Old Conservatives (Felix Morley, William H. Chamberlain), New Conservatives (Kirk, Rossiter, Viereck) and academics who write in a Conservative Mood (Louis Hartz, Daniel Bell). His conclusions are "sound," and his comments on the implicit conservatism of the Luce-ian national purpose literature are perceptive and amusing. Yet one has some reservations.

It is generally considered bad form to criticize an author for what he has not tried to do, yet Newman's explicit disavowal of any attempt to examine conservative actions and the sociology of conservatism and his decision to confine himself to the dimension of self-proclaimed conservative thought seem to me to produce an unreal and essentially futilitarian analysis. For example, it may make sense from a purely academic viewpoint to call Russell Kirk probably the most important figure of American conservatism in the twentieth century, but in any wider perspective—and in terms of political importance—wouldn't Robert A. Taft be a stronger contender for this title? Secondly, can one discuss American conservatism without considerable emphasis on the economic doctrines of the ideology? Hayek may derive his conservatism from "non-American roots" but it is in America after all, that he became a fad and the inspiration for a vast secondary literature of laissez-faire conservatism.

When one examines conservatism on the higher plane of belief in original sin, the role of hierarchy and the nature of the Constitution, as Newman does, the question necessarily arises of the connection between abstract principles and the concrete political positions to which these are purported to lead. The author recognizes this problem in passing but does not resolve it satisfactorily. Thus in discussing natural law concepts Newman admits that "use of natural-law thought as such will not tell us whether a thinker is a conservative or liberal." However, he goes on to say that even when natural law is used radically "there is an important vestige of conservatism in this doctrine." And in criticizing his specimen authors for digmatic rigidity, Newman displays the same characteristic himself. While many observers have noted the greater compatibility of socialism with the conservative's concept

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of organic community than with the liberal's emphasis on individualism, Newman insists on mutually exclusive liberal and conservative syndromes, thus solving by over-simplification the problem of relating philosophic to political positions. At a lower level, if Lippmann is a conservative then does it become conservative to advocate a non-commercial public television authority, which Lippmann has done? I question, that is, the utility of analyzing theoretical positions apart from their concrete applications.

Finally, the book evidences occasional lapses in consistency. Daniel Bell is aptly criticized for his recent anti-ideological writings, and Newman insists on the value of the "right kind" of ideology in improving "one's sense of reality by giving a point of view." But it must be noted that he comes close to dogmatic pragmatism himself when asserting that American can make decisions without an ideology or ridiculing the notion that 170 million people can have any collective purpose. Such inconsistencies (even though the essential direction of his meaning comes through intact) suggest a failure to think through his own position thoroughly. Despite this—perhaps partly because of it—Newman's book is a provocative and lively study. One hopes the author will follow it with a fuller, more tightly reasoned statement of his own position—of the alternative he would suggest to the futilitarian society.

MICHAEL D. REAGAN

The Unhappy Many

THE AMERICANS: Photographs by Robert Frank, introduction by Jack Kerouac. Grove Press. 1959. vi. 83 plates. $7.50.

Shortly before Joe Hill was executed by the state of Utah, he requested that his ashes be scattered in every state of the union, except Utah. That state, he said, he would not want to be found dead in. One's first response to *The Americans,* a book of photographs by Robert Frank (with an introduction by Jack Kerouac), is to extend Hill's sentiments to the whole country. Here, in a country capable of vastly enlarging and beautifying the material life of its people, is a culture that not only produces an avalanche of dime-store trivialities but has succeeded in conditioning the population to accept them. Frank's camera has caught Americans in off-guard moments—a choice way to see what persons who are subjected to an ethos of production and distribution for profits really look like.

These photographs reveal Americans looking bored, lonely, waiting (for nothing), crowded amidst the rubbish of a high-geared industrial society, thrown together in incongruous relationships and settings.

America possesses a sort of double life—a vast commercial squalor on the one hand and an actual physical and potential cultural beauty on the other. Frank has made visible the first of these Americas which myriad power and propaganda blocs from the NAM to *The Saturday Evening Post* pretend does not even exist. To know that it does exist, one need simply go to any

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Greyhound depot and find he has missed his bus, or spend an hour in Times Square.

Photograph after photograph urge these claims—the stark save-money signs of gas stations in the country which seem like ironic cries for help, department stores beseeching YOU to remember your dead loved ones by buying a 69-cent white plastic-foam cross, neon-lit cowboy bars, lost young lovers in Chattanooga, couples sitting in shiny cars watching drive-in movies, people not knowing what to do with themselves when they are confronted by the week end—the list could be extended. These images might not fully explain why Americans annually consume sixty-billion tranquillizers or produce six-hundred-million gallons of liquor but they lend credence to such statistics.

However, the view is not entirely gray; there is justification for some of the enthusiasm in Kerouac's introduction. There is a quality of "EVERYTHING-ness" in Frank's America. A quiet, lyrical moment like "Beaufort, South Carolina" is one example. The enormous energy and activity of American life implicit in "Assembly line" and "Convention hall" represent, if inadequately, the restlessness and mobility which, properly directed, might take the country along a better course. (A few shots of the American jazz and painting worlds might have dramatized this potential.)

Americans, like any people engulfed in a corrupt social order, go on living, if only by inertia. The mark of a good civilization, however, is that through its institutions it transforms this instinctual will to exist into an elaborate sense of beauty and meaning. Frank's America does not reach this mark. It is, instead, a place of impetus without direction, of activity without adequate psychic meaning, of loneliness and lethargy rather than privacy and a liberated personal life.

DONALD GUTIERREZ

Middle Class? . . .

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centered rather than child-centered; "getting by" is more important than "getting ahead"; a lack of involvement in formal associations and political groups is widespread; an awareness of class differences exists but it is not traditional class-consciousness. The recognition of class differences is not tied to any specific political ideology or platform and most often is implicit (bring a group of college students to an auto plant, and the awareness of class differences on both sides will electrify the air). Workers with a strong "class-awareness" can be quite conservative or uninterested in politics. The socialist expectation of the worker as class-conscious does not describe reality, nor does the new cynical view that he is as much a complaining fat cat as anyone else in the Racket Society. All of this may provide only moderate comfort to liberals and socialists, but at the very least it ought to create a good deal of skepticism about the notions concerning American workers which one finds, unexamined and cheerfully propounded, in almost every speech, book or magazine.

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COMMUNICATIONS

Cuba and Radicalism

Joyce Kolko

Reading your special issue, *Cuba: The Invasion and Its Consequences,* was indeed a painful experience. In the aftermath of the Cuban "fiasco" surely more could be expected from a magazine that claims to be democratic socialist and radical than this equivocal scolding of the Administration and the recommendation of a set of proposals, the first of which is to reimburse the American investors in Cuba for their losses. (Even *Business Week,* which supports the Administration plan for government reimbursement of future nationalization, did not have the audacity to suggest such a proposal.)

My chief complaint, however, is the total vacuum in which the article is written and the facile dismissal of any attempt to set a context for U.S. foreign policy as "pseudo-Marxist" or "corrupted Marxist," etc. Although Walzer opens the article by pointing out that the U.S. throughout its history has treated Latin America as a colony, he continues to assume that Castro's anti-Americanism was a "fantasy-ridden world view" and some kind of xenophobia. He also comes to the unsupported conclusion that the Government has learned its lesson with the Cuban invasion and that we may now expect a radically different policy.

There are several underlying assumptions in the article which are completely incompatible with democratic radicalism. 1) The assumption that a complete and unequivocal condemnation of American foreign policy is "morbid anti-Americanism." A radical draws distinctions when he discusses alternatives. Certainly there would be alternative if there were a radical and progressive movement in the United States to make basic changes in foreign policy. But how can a radical naively picture Eisenhower stumping in the Cuban villages or the Kennedy Administration actively assisting the nationalization of U.S. investments. That is true fantasy and it does nothing to show why the U.S. has consistently followed a conservative policy or what forces could change it in a radical direction. 2) The article simply assumes Kennedy has had the wrong advice and perhaps he will call a few DISSENT editors to Washington to set him straight. 3) There is a conservative assumption regarding the role of the middle classes in Cuba. What does the writer mean in commenting on their "tragic" exodus, or that the middle class possessed "the numbers and social power to control" the revolution? What are the "vested interests" of this class that might have opposed the Fidelistas? Is this the alternative a radical commends? 4) And why assume that supporting radical reformers is "a matter of grim necessity" when they are anti-American? An American radical should welcome such a "grim necessity."

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BEFORE GIVING his ten point program for the New Frontier, Walzer blithely dismisses a few discouraging factors indicating Kennedy has given no sign of a change of policy. But "about such things, there is little to say. . . . In a perverse way, however, they suggest the elements of a new United States policy toward Cuba." Would it be presumptuous to ask, in what way? What, for instance, was the lesson learned from the CIA role in the Cuban fiasco? The only change will be the transfer of paramilitary operations to the Pentagon. Reassuring? The CIA will continue its operations of training and equipping local forces for the overthrow of governments it disapproves of.

The simple fact of the matter is that Cuba and Latin America are not unique cases, but only examples of the conservative foreign policy the U.S. has been consistently pursuing around the world. As an American magazine with pretensions of radicalism, DISSENT's primary focus should be on the forces that shape this policy and on its specific implementation—and not building pipedreams of a miraculous leftward swing of the Kennedy Administration at the very time its policy is hardening into a jingoistic and belligerent stand throughout the world. Perhaps then your magazine will be worthy of its name.

Michael Walzer replies:

In what way has Kennedy's Latin American policy since April suggested the elements of a new U.S. approach to the problem of decolonization? In a perverse way. Mrs. Kolko does not understand, but I will do her the honor of assuming that the misunderstanding is a technique of her polemic and nothing else. I wrote that a radically new policy was unlikely—though possible—given the present atmosphere in Washington. Mrs. Kolko paraphrases my remark but drops the negative. I assume that also is a polemical technique.

The purpose of her polemic is to establish her leftist credentials and discredit my own. It is a weary business when so much else is at stake, and I am not terribly eager to debate *that* topic. Are there alternatives to current American policy? I believe that there are and that they do not require the revolutionary transformation of American society. Such a transformation may be desirable for countless other reasons. It is not necessary in order for us to co-exist with Cuba or to support genuine social reform. Castro's fantasy—I suspect Mrs. Kolko shared it—was to believe from the beginning that the marines were on their way. I have heard that confident prophecy from Americans many times. I call its intellectual basis pseudo-Marxism and I find the delight with which it is usually made morbid.

It is possible to condemn American policy; it is possible to study its consistency and not merely express indignation at particular follies; it is possible to be angered and dismayed by the reactionary and jingoistic state of mind of many Americans today—and it is possible at the same time to argue for new policies which are at least conceivable in the America we know. There is little else *to do,* except abandon politics altogether. It is necessary, for example, to attack Kennedy sharply from the left and to attempt to bring pressure upon him. But I would doubt the value of a politics which assumed that he was

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shortly to be replaced *from the left.* It would inevitably be a sectarion. Self-indulgent (and self-destructive) venture.

I won't debate at this time the question of the Cuban middle classes. Mrs. Kolko wirtes as it they can have no part in a socialist society. What then would she do with them?

One final point: if Mrs. Kolko ever encounters real anti-Americanism, she will quickly discover that her radicalism will not save her from being hated. Hatred, even when it is a matter of ideological zeal, is also an undiscriminating and intolerant passion. Then she will realize that supporting, or living with, an angry and usually demogogic anti-Americanism is in fact a grim necessity. Or does she mean to suggest that the palm of progress having passed forever from the hands of the US, we (as radicals) ought to encourage people to hate us (as Americans)? That would be a difficult test, indeed, for my internationalist virtue.

LETTERS

The FLN

Editors:

In the Spring/1961 issue of *Dissent* your Paris correspondent, Paul Parisot, states that "The FLN is tied to the International Communist bloc and includes an internal tendency whose orientation, thought and fundamental political conceptions have nothing in common with democracy and everything in common with Communism of the Moscow variety (Fidel Castro)."

I find this statement quite astonishing and offered without any evidence. Its author owes the readers of DISSENT an explanation and proof of what he so baldly asserts.

CHRISTOPHER WHITE

PAUL PARISOT *replies:*

In May, 1959, M. Oussedik, Secretary of State of the GPRA (Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic) went to Peking to ask for help. At that time it was announced that, in principle at least, such help would be granted. In September, 1960, Ferhat Abbas was received at Peking with full honors. He obtained public promises of "total help." In October, 1960, the president of the GPRA then went to Moscow where he held official conversations with Mr. Kossyguine on the subject of the appeal for help addressed a few weeks before by the FLN to the Soviet Union. On October 6, the Tunisian ambassador to Moscow, Mr. Mestiri, offered a reception in honor of Ferhat Abbas. The latter made a speech in which he said expressly, "The Algerian people place Moscow in the peace camp."

In an interview published by the *New York Times* on October 24, Ferhat Abbas declared that he had no hope of negotiating with France. He added that the Soviet and Chinese leaders had said to him that "the Algerian fighters were performing a great service for the Soviet group by immobilizing entire NATO divisions." At the end of October, *Pravda* wrote, "The Algerian provisional government, expressing the interests of a people struggling for its independence, has the right to receive help from states taking an anti-colonialist stand, including the socialist states . . . the West . . . cannot criticize the USSR and China for having offered help, nor the Algerian people for having accepted it." This article carries the signature "Observer," reserved for the spokesman of the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs. . . .

The links between the FLN and the Soviet bloc are a mystery only for those who would like to see a pro-Western FLN, not committed to the East, which is an impossibility if only because of the fact that the West has never renounced colonialism. Where would one expect the FLN to seek out allies in the world

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if not in the East? A reckoning must be asked of the Western governments; France first of all, naturally, but in the second place and immediately after, the United States.

As for the existence within the FLN of a tendency influenced by Communist doctrines, this is a fact recognized by all observers. And this also is quite natural. How can one fail to recognize that in ninty-five per cent of the world there are courageous men, desiring to make progress, who seek a way along Communist lines? We can only be glad that in the case of the FLN the Communist tendency is still a minority and that even after seven years of atrocious war the possibility exists of a coming together of democratic forces within the FLN. This possibility is represented by men like Ferhat Abbas, Francis, Boumendjel, etc. It will be realized only if the war ends in an agreement with France. Then we shall see what the Communist tendency of the FLN represents exactly, its strength and its possibility of evolving—it also—toward democratic conceptions.

Certain totalitarian characteristics of the FLN, however, cannot be explained by Communist influence. They are aspects of many national revolutions in the underdeveloped lands. They include the policy of the one-and-only party, the refusal to admit variant tendencies within the revolution, the physical extermination of opponents, etc. All this may lead to Stalinism, with the Communists, for their part, acting as a factor encouraging such political backwardness.

"Selfish Reasons"

Editors:

I am now a fan of yours (if the rest of your issues are as rewarding as this summer's issue).

Perhaps I am so enthusiastic for selfish reasons. I am a recent graduate of Barnard, and one of those "young, middle-class Democratic reformers" about which Mary Nichols wrote. In fact, I can be further stereotyped. (This should delight Mrs. Nichols.) I am also interested in Urban Renewal and saving New York from its only "real" blight—that of "Mosesism" and "real" estate.

I, therefore, offer you my gratitude for giving me some articulate authority to back me up. (The vestiges of collegiate paternalism have not yet worn off.)

LINDA SUGARMAN

Creative Thinking

Editors:

I am very much impressed with the hard and creative thinking in your pamphlet "Cuba" just up.

Is there any way of guaranteeing that it be read by the men in Washington now in charge of Latin American policy —particularly the new one, Robert F. Woodward?

MARION S. NORTON

Spring Issue

Editors:

I would like to compliment you on the Spring/1961 issue of DISSENT. It has been read widely around my dormitory here at Northwestern University. Several of the articles in that issue are helping me to convince the overwhelming number of conservatives on this campus that liberalism is not paradoxically stagnant or dogmatic.

STEVE CISLER

Fraternally

Editors:

I am writing to let you know that a group made up largely of democratic socialists is starting up a quarterly journal out here and that we are calling it *Dissent*. We have called it this partly because we like the title and partly because we admire your publication. We have included in our first issue a short note to this effect which also commends your journal to whatever readers we will have and gives your New York address.

Our journal is largely centered at the universities, the three editirs being a political scientist, a lecturer in English and myself, a tutor in philosophy.

PETER WERTHEIM
Victoria, Australia

Root and Branch

Editors:

A group of graduate students at the University of California here in Berkeley, who are concerned about the way in which the Cold War has obscured the

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real issues and problems that face mankind, and who are fed up with the weak and morally compromised stands of American liberalism (a la Schlesinger) and with the disembodied nature of their own technical training, wishing to bring their knowledge to bear on the crucial issues of our time in a radical way, have formed a press with the idea of publishing a magazine in order to have a platform for their views.

Requests for our brochure, subscriptions ($2.50 for four issues) and conrtibutions towards defraying costs for our first issue (October 1961) may be mailed to

The Root and Branch Press
Box 906
Berkeley 3, California

GERALD DWORKIN

Lohia

Editors:

I was shocked to read Mr. Stanley Plastrik's vicious attack on Lohia. (DISSENT, Spring, 1961). . . .

Even the worst enemies of Lohia here don't deny that he is a "brilliant intellectual." As for Lohia being isolated in Indian politics, I don't think there is anything bad about accepting isolation for the sake of certain principles. Such popularity as comes from compromise is neither healthy nor permanent.

Secondly, Lohia is not an ioslated figure in Indian politics. Eminent public figures agree with him on one or another of his policies toward the problems of caste, language, prices, etc. The Socialist party of which he is a leader has as many members as the Praja Socialist party. One of its leaders, George Fernandes, is widely regarded as the most dynamic trade unionist of India. The policies pursued by the Socialist party have such revolutionary significance that almost all other political parties have been forced to sit up and appraise the situation in their light.

The PSP, on the other hand, is hardly distinct from the Congress. It has aligned itself with the Congress and the semi-fascist Muslim League in Kerela, with the Communists and the communal Hindu Maha Sabha in Marahashtra, with the Gatantra Parishad, a party of ex-Maharajas in Orissa, and now its leader, Mr. Asoka Mehta, wants to have an alliance with the Socialist party of (the "isolated" Lohia) in the next general elections.

The Socialist Party has recently lost a number of its workers through mysterious deaths in jails and murders outside, not to mention the thousands of its members who are arrested and sent to jails on the flimsiest excuses because it is organizing the common people and the landless peasantry against the government's caste, language and price exploitations. These are concrete, real issues to the people and the government knows its enemy; so do people like Mr. Asoka Mehta who like Guy Mollet has sold out socialism for a mess of pottage.

KESHAV R. JADHAV

STANLEY PLASTRIK *replies*:

Mr. Jadhav's angry retort to my remarks about Rammanohar Lohia and his Socialist party are regrettable, but understandable. Rereading what I wrote, I do find my comments rather severe. But they were—and remain—an honest expression of a rather dismal interview.

I am, after all, not unacquainted with Lohia's record in the Indian nationalist and revolutionary movement. All the more reason for me (and others) to regret his present activities which include splitting the socialist movement of India and an all-round irresponsible form of "action" aimed at filling up the jails. These are political judgments; let Mr. Jadhav reply to them as such.

As to Jadhav's charges against the Praja Socialist party of Asoka Mehta, their very wildness makes it impossible to consider them seriously. Further, if it is correct that Mehta is proposing an electoral alliance with the Lohia socialists in the coming elections (and I do not know whether this is true), would this not indicate the maturity, objectivity and wisdom of Mehta and his friends to our indignant Lohia supporter?

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AMONG OURSELVES:

Our readers will be pleased and delighted, we know, to hear of the success of our summer issue, NEW YORK, N. Y.

Within a few weeks of its appearance, the entire first edition of 8,000 copies disappeared from sight, sold out. A second edition of 3,000 copies was hastily printed and this too is going well. In fact, if you haven't your copy of NEW YORK, N. Y. yet—or if you need an extra copy—we'd advise you to order one immediately from your newsstand dealer, bookstore or paperback gallery. (Or send in a mail order; $1.15 per copy by mail).

In addition to this being the fastest selling number of DISSENT yet published, NEW YORK, N. Y. has received universal praise and acclaim. Scores of letters from our readers, new and old subscribers, expressed appreciation for its content and arrangement. It received notices or reviews in Time magazine, the London Times Literary Supplement, the Toronto Daily Star, etc. It was mentioned over radio and TV programs and many of the authors included in the issue have been approached for articles by various magazines and publishing houses.

From our viewpoint, much as we welcome the above, the most important result of NEW YORK, N. Y. is the fact that DISSENT has obtained hundreds of new subscribers and thousands of new readers. We welcome them.

—The Editors

CUBA

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by MICHAEL WALZER

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